Earl C. Latourette

This case was an original mandamus proceeding in the Oregon Supreme Court brought by the Lane County District Attorney against the presiding circuit judge, seeking an order to discharge a grand jury empaneled in April 1956. The petition alleged that the judge had improperly directed the preparation of the 1956 jury list by ignoring statutory requirements and inserting specific names, rendering the grand jury illegally constituted. The court sustained the respondent's demurrer and quashed the writ. It reasoned that mandamus is unavailable to control judicial discretion and that a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy existed in the ordinary course of the law, such as through motions in the trial court. The decision emphasized that the statute governing mandamus explicitly limits its use in cases involving judicial functions.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the vendors under a land sale contract appealed the denial of attorney’s fees in a strict foreclosure decree against the vendee who defaulted. The contract provided that the vendee would pay reasonable attorney’s fees if a suit was brought to foreclose the contract. The trial court awarded the fees conditionally but ultimately disallowed them when the vendee failed to pay the balance and the property was foreclosed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the contract's promise for attorney’s fees was unconditional and must be enforced as written without adding exceptions.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether four electric refrigerators and ranges installed in apartments above a bakery shop were personal property or fixtures that became part of the real estate subject to a mortgage held by the Elliotts. After the owners went bankrupt and the mortgage was foreclosed, the bankruptcy trustee claimed the appliances as personal property while the Elliotts asserted they were part of the realty. The court held that the appliances remained personal property. It applied the three-part test from prior precedent—annexation, adaptation, and intention—finding that the items were plugged into sockets and removable without material injury to themselves or the premises, making intention irrelevant where the first two factors were clear. The decision reversed the lower court ruling.

property

The case concerned a priority dispute in the insolvent estate of Anie M. Brown between federal tax liens for unpaid taxes and Title & Trust Company's claim for unpaid rent secured by a contractual lien on furniture and equipment in a pre-existing lease. The court held that the federal tax liens were superior. It reasoned that Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes grants the United States priority in insolvency situations over competing creditors, particularly when the competing lien is inchoate. The decision reversed the lower court's ruling in favor of the lessor.

taxesfederal powerproperty

This case involved a dispute over title to 160 acres of real property in Douglas County, Oregon, originally owned by John F. Pettingill and later acquired by Lilla G. Putnam. The plaintiffs, George and Gladys Putnam, sought to quiet title based on inheritance from their father, George H. Putnam, claiming the property passed to him under Lilla Putnam's will. The intervenor, Katherine A. Pettingill (Lilla's sister), argued that the will specifically excepted the property, directing its sale with proceeds (after certain debts) paid to her as a specific legacy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and ordered the property sold and proceeds distributed according to the will; the appellate court affirmed, holding that the will's description sufficiently identified the parcel despite minor omissions, that the specific legacy to the sister was not subject to certain estate charges, and that delays in probate did not alter the outcome in this instance.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved William Frank Cory, who was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon under Oregon law and then charged as a habitual criminal based on three prior out-of-state felony convictions, resulting in an increased sentence of 15 years. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the habitual criminal conviction and sentence, ordering reinstatement of the original four-year term. The court held that the 1951 amendment to the habitual criminal statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it granted district attorneys unfettered discretion to pursue enhanced penalties in non-violent felony cases without any statutory standards or classification, allowing arbitrary application to similarly situated defendants. The prior convictions here did not involve violence or threats, so the discretionary provision directly applied and rendered the proceedings void. The court distinguished this from valid classifications and cited its prior ruling in State v. Pirkey to support striking down the statute's selective enforcement mechanism.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a worker for Volney Felt Mills who was injured when a truck driver delivering sawdust for Timber Structures, Inc. backed into him on the employer's premises. Both employers were subject to Oregon's Workmen's Compensation Act, and the trial court granted judgment for the defendant on the basis of statutory immunity under ORS 656.154. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant lacked joint supervision and control over the premises and that the parties were not engaged in a common enterprise or related purposes, as the sawdust deliveries constituted an ordinary vendor transaction rather than shared operations. The court reasoned that the statute requires all statutory conditions to be met before barring a negligence action against a third-party employer, and here those conditions were not satisfied. Plaintiff was therefore permitted to pursue his common-law damages claim.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved Frank Cannon, who was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape as a lesser included offense of statutory rape and sentenced to life imprisonment under ORS 163.270. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, holding the life sentence invalid because it violated Article I, section 16 of the Oregon Constitution, which requires that all penalties be proportioned to the offense. The court reasoned that a life term for the lesser offense could not be proportionate when the greater offense of rape carried a maximum of only 20 years, creating an absurd result that shocked the moral sense, and it directed resentencing to a term of not more than 20 years with credit for time served.

criminal law

The case involved a customer who tripped and fell over a low display platform in a gas company's showroom while paying her bill, alleging negligence for failing to warn of the hazard. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff based on a jury verdict awarding damages, but the appellate court reversed and dismissed the case. The court reasoned that the platform was clearly marked with a metallic strip, well-lit, and visible, providing adequate notice of the step, thus there was no substantial evidence of negligence by the defendant.

torts & liability

This case involves a dispute among family members over a longstanding partnership between brothers William and James McEwen in land and livestock operations, including a 1935 contract to purchase over 13,000 acres from Thomas Turnbull and a 1939 conveyance of a 320-acre parcel to Walter T. McEwen held in trust. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment on the partnership's existence and extent, dissolution, an accounting, and to set aside the conveyance while requiring Walter to account for rents and profits; the trial court issued an interlocutory decree recognizing partnership rights in certain assets like a grazing allotment, ordering an accounting, and directing the land be returned to the Turnbull estate subject to the purchase contract. The defendants appealed, but the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The core reasoning was that the decree was not final because it left unresolved matters like the accounting and potential forfeiture or payment under the contract, and appeals are only permitted from final decrees disposing of the entire cause; the fact that some incidental relief was granted did not alter its interlocutory nature.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefamily law

The Port of Portland sued to enjoin the Reeders and other defendants from maintaining houseboats, moorage structures, and related facilities beyond a harbor line the Port had established along the Willamette River at Swan Island Basin, arguing these obstructed navigation to the Port's shipyard and drydock operations. The defendants claimed ownership of adjacent riparian land and structures extending into navigable waters, asserting that the Port's ordinance was invalid and that any removal would require just compensation. After trial, the court upheld the Port's authority to set the harbor line under its statutory powers to protect navigation on the navigable river, modified the injunction to require removal of the structures and houseboats, and directed that the Reeders receive compensation for reasonable removal costs and any destroyed facilities pursuant to ORS 778.090. The ruling reasoned that the river's use for large vessel traffic justified the regulation, that the statute was constitutional as applied, and that ordinary riparian rights of access were preserved but subject to the harbor line. The decree was remanded for the trial court to set a removal timeline and fix compensation amounts.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves property owners challenging a Portland city ordinance creating a sewer system district that included their land (the California area), arguing the inclusion was arbitrary, capricious, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by potentially imposing assessments exceeding benefits. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed, ruling that defining the territorial district for local sewer improvements falls within the city council's legislative discretion under the police power. The court noted that the plaintiffs' property would receive some benefit from adjacent sewer lines and drainage features, and that preliminary cost estimates were premature and non-binding since final assessments occur after construction, at which point owners can object and challenge any excess. The affirmance was without prejudice to future claims if actual assessments exceed benefits.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Coos Bay Lumber Company and Local 7-116 of the International Woodworkers of America over the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement that required the employer to deduct up to 7.5 cents per hour from covered employees' wages to fund a union-designated insurance program for life, health, and accident benefits. The employer filed for a declaratory judgment after some employees objected and demanded the full wage increase instead, while the union cross-claimed seeking specific performance and an accounting of unpaid amounts. The trial court ruled for the employer and objecting employees, holding that neither federal nor state law allowed the union to commit employees' wages to the program via collective bargaining. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the Labor Management Relations Act authorized such deductions as part of a valid bargaining agreement linking the wage increase to the insurance benefit.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Dr. Ross H. Elliott, a chiropractor, who was convicted under Oregon's Nuisance Act (ORS 161.310) for setting up and maintaining an office to perform abortions, which the indictment described as an act that openly outrages public decency and injures public morals. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Nuisance Act on appeal, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague under the 14th Amendment. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute had been upheld in prior cases such as State v. Atwood and that the indictment sufficiently alleged the offense without needing to negate exceptions for lawful abortions by licensed physicians, as those did not apply to chiropractors and illegal abortions are mala in se. The decision relied on established precedent incorporating prior interpretations into the statute and the long-standing application of the Nuisance Act to such conduct.

abortioncriminal law

The case involved a congressional candidate who submitted a map of western Oregon highlighting O&C railroad lands and a picture of Sacajawea for inclusion in the state voters' pamphlet, which the Secretary of State rejected. The candidate petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel acceptance of the materials. The court ordered the writ, holding that the statutory term 'statement' broadly encompasses pictures and maps used to convey a candidate's message, consistent with the law's language and prior administrative practice. The Secretary of State's authority to reject submissions is limited to the specific categories of prohibited content listed in ORS 255.040, such as obscene or defamatory matter, and does not extend to judging relevance or pertinence.

electionsfree speech

The case concerned whether a libel action could be brought against a deceased testator's estate based on defamatory statements about the plaintiff grandson that appeared in the will, which was probated and published after the testator's death. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that such an action lies. The court reasoned that the outdated maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona does not bar recovery because the publication of the will occurs after death, the testator intended the statements to be made public through probate, and the state constitution provides a remedy for reputational harm; it rejected arguments that the executor acts only as a court officer rather than publishing on the testator's behalf.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a patent for a recessed-head screw. Plaintiff Phillips Screw Co. alleged that defendant James Givnan, its former patent attorney, breached his fiduciary duties by using confidential information gained during his employment to obtain the patent in his own name and then transferring rights to a company he controlled. The trial court initially found for the plaintiff but conditioned permanent relief on payment to Givnan for a proportional interest in the patent; when the plaintiff refused to pay, the court entered a final decree awarding ownership to the defendants. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Givnan had breached a confidential relationship, the plaintiff's multi-year delay in asserting any claim, its prior recognition of Givnan's ownership during unsuccessful purchase negotiations, and its disavowal of interest after receiving a negative commercial evaluation constituted laches and estoppel that barred relief. The court also rejected the defendants' cross-appeal concerning the timing of any post-appeal payment opportunity.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved the criminal prosecution of Dr. George H. Buck, a licensed physician, under Oregon's Criminal Abortion Act (OCLA § 23-408) for performing an abortion by using instruments to destroy an unborn child, where the procedure was not necessary to preserve the mother's life. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the conviction. The court's core reasoning was that the Medical Practice Act (OCLA § 54-931) expressly permits physicians to perform abortions when a woman's health appears in peril due to pregnancy, after consultation with another licensed physician, and this civil regulatory framework creates an applicable exception or defense that must be reconciled with the criminal manslaughter statute, rendering the conviction invalid.

abortioncriminal lawhealthcare

The case concerned a dispute between a motor carrier and Oregon's Public Utilities Commissioner over the effective date of a 1951 state law (ch. 428) imposing fees and taxes on motor transportation companies, which specified an effective date of January 1, 1952, but was referred to voters and approved in a referendum election on November 4, 1952. The court affirmed that the tax obligations began on the November approval date rather than the earlier statutory date. The core reasoning rested on Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that any measure referred to the people takes effect only upon majority voter approval, combined with the absence of clear legislative intent in the act for retroactive operation of the tax once approved.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by an aerial crop-dusting operator to the Oregon Agricultural Chemical Control Act, which regulated the application of chemicals by aircraft and authorized state agencies to issue licenses, create protected areas, and promulgate regulations. The trial court held some provisions unconstitutional for lacking standards but declined to rule on others. The Oregon Supreme Court held the entire statute unconstitutional under Article III, section 1 of the state constitution, ruling that the Act improperly delegated legislative authority to the Department of Agriculture, the State Board of Aeronautics, and local committees without providing any definite standards or guidelines for rulemaking. The court further determined that the protected-area provisions suffered from the same defect and that the law was not severable.

business & regulatoryenvironment