Hans A. Linde

Linn County sought civil forfeiture of real property, a house, a vehicle, and other assets under a local ordinance targeting property used in controlled substance offenses. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that former ORS 30.315(3) barred state courts from enforcing local forfeiture ordinances when the underlying conduct is specifically defined as a crime and made punishable under state law, regardless of whether the ordinance characterizes the forfeiture as civil. The court reasoned that the county's ordinance was premised on illegal drug activities punishable under state statutes, and the statutory restriction on civil enforcement applied directly.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned the statute of limitations applicable to criminal contempt proceedings for violating an injunction against the unauthorized practice of law. The Oregon Supreme Court held that such proceedings are governed by the equitable doctrine of laches, which is presumptively guided by the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors under former ORS 131.125(2)(b), rather than a ten-year period. The court reasoned that enforcement of equitable orders like injunctions is subject to laches unless a statute provides otherwise, and there is no constitutional separation of powers issue with applying statutory time limits. It remanded for the trial court to determine timeliness for each alleged violation.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Ramirez v. Selles, a lawyer sued other lawyers for negligence and intentional interference with his contract for professional services after they allegedly advised his clients to terminate his employment, avoid paying his fees, and alter their accounts of prior proceedings to blame him. The trial court dismissed the complaint under ORCP 21, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had to allege facts negating the defendants' competitor's privilege. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the interference claim and remanded, reasoning that a defendant's privilege to interfere is an affirmative defense rather than an element plaintiff must negate, and that the complaint alleged facts of improper motive or means sufficient to state a claim; it affirmed dismissal of the negligence claim because negligent harm to a third party's economic interests does not create tort liability absent a separate duty. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the interference allegations.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Portland's ordinance prohibiting the concealed carrying of knives with blades longer than three and a half inches was preempted by Oregon state criminal statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions to dismiss complaints under the ordinance, holding that the state law displaced the local penal ordinance. The reasoning centered on Article XI, section 2 of the Oregon Constitution, which prioritizes state criminal laws, and the legislative history showing that the 1985 amendments to ORS 166.240(1) intentionally omitted broader knife prohibitions, indicating a policy incompatible with the city's stricter rule.

criminal law

In State v. Boots, the defendant appealed his aggravated murder conviction, challenging a jury instruction that permitted jurors to convict without agreeing on which of two alternative aggravating facts—committing the homicide during a first-degree robbery or committing it to conceal the robbery—had been proved. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the instruction was improper and reversed on that ground. The court reasoned that the 17 distinct factual circumstances listed in ORS 163.095 are not synonymous or interchangeable, so a unanimous jury verdict on at least one specific aggravating fact is required by both statute and Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution for a capital offense. The court distinguished prior cases involving alternative mental states or non-capital crimes and rejected the view that jurors could simply pick among unrelated theories as long as each believed some aggravating fact existed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether forging a check and then uttering the same forged check in one transaction could be treated as two separately punishable forgery offenses under ORS 165.007. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the acts constituted only a single crime, reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding for resentencing. The court reasoned from the 1971 Criminal Code commentary that the forgery statute was designed to define one offense that could be committed either by falsely making or by uttering a forged instrument, and that ORS 161.062 did not alter this legislative intent for forgery. The decision also addressed preservation of the sentencing issue on appeal.

criminal law