Hans A. Linde

Linn County sought civil forfeiture of real property, a house, a vehicle, and other assets under a local ordinance targeting property used in controlled substance offenses. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that former ORS 30.315(3) barred state courts from enforcing local forfeiture ordinances when the underlying conduct is specifically defined as a crime and made punishable under state law, regardless of whether the ordinance characterizes the forfeiture as civil. The court reasoned that the county's ordinance was premised on illegal drug activities punishable under state statutes, and the statutory restriction on civil enforcement applied directly.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned the statute of limitations applicable to criminal contempt proceedings for violating an injunction against the unauthorized practice of law. The Oregon Supreme Court held that such proceedings are governed by the equitable doctrine of laches, which is presumptively guided by the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors under former ORS 131.125(2)(b), rather than a ten-year period. The court reasoned that enforcement of equitable orders like injunctions is subject to laches unless a statute provides otherwise, and there is no constitutional separation of powers issue with applying statutory time limits. It remanded for the trial court to determine timeliness for each alleged violation.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Ramirez v. Selles, a lawyer sued other lawyers for negligence and intentional interference with his contract for professional services after they allegedly advised his clients to terminate his employment, avoid paying his fees, and alter their accounts of prior proceedings to blame him. The trial court dismissed the complaint under ORCP 21, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had to allege facts negating the defendants' competitor's privilege. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the interference claim and remanded, reasoning that a defendant's privilege to interfere is an affirmative defense rather than an element plaintiff must negate, and that the complaint alleged facts of improper motive or means sufficient to state a claim; it affirmed dismissal of the negligence claim because negligent harm to a third party's economic interests does not create tort liability absent a separate duty. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the interference allegations.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Portland's ordinance prohibiting the concealed carrying of knives with blades longer than three and a half inches was preempted by Oregon state criminal statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions to dismiss complaints under the ordinance, holding that the state law displaced the local penal ordinance. The reasoning centered on Article XI, section 2 of the Oregon Constitution, which prioritizes state criminal laws, and the legislative history showing that the 1985 amendments to ORS 166.240(1) intentionally omitted broader knife prohibitions, indicating a policy incompatible with the city's stricter rule.

criminal law

In State v. Boots, the defendant appealed his aggravated murder conviction, challenging a jury instruction that permitted jurors to convict without agreeing on which of two alternative aggravating facts—committing the homicide during a first-degree robbery or committing it to conceal the robbery—had been proved. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the instruction was improper and reversed on that ground. The court reasoned that the 17 distinct factual circumstances listed in ORS 163.095 are not synonymous or interchangeable, so a unanimous jury verdict on at least one specific aggravating fact is required by both statute and Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution for a capital offense. The court distinguished prior cases involving alternative mental states or non-capital crimes and rejected the view that jurors could simply pick among unrelated theories as long as each believed some aggravating fact existed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether forging a check and then uttering the same forged check in one transaction could be treated as two separately punishable forgery offenses under ORS 165.007. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the acts constituted only a single crime, reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding for resentencing. The court reasoned from the 1971 Criminal Code commentary that the forgery statute was designed to define one offense that could be committed either by falsely making or by uttering a forged instrument, and that ORS 161.062 did not alter this legislative intent for forgery. The decision also addressed preservation of the sentencing issue on appeal.

criminal law

The case concerned the proper handling of a conditional use permit application under Douglas County's land use ordinance after the county board of commissioners reversed the planning commission's approval on a single ground that had not been raised by the opponents and left six other asserted errors undecided. LUBA reversed the board's decision on the compatibility issue because it was not properly raised and remanded the matter for the board to address the remaining issues. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding LUBA's remand, reasoning that the county board had no legal duty to decide every alleged error, the opponents did not waive the undecided issues by failing to appeal them separately, and the policy favoring expeditious land use decisions does not require LUBA to treat an incomplete denial as a final rejection of all grounds.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned Oregon taxpayers who sought a refund of state income taxes paid on dividends received from a mutual fund that invested in U.S. government obligations and repurchase agreements. The Oregon Tax Court and the state supreme court held that the portion of the dividends traceable to direct U.S. obligations was exempt from state taxation under 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a), but the portion attributable to repurchase agreements was taxable. The core reasoning was that the federal statute exempts state taxes that require consideration of interest on U.S. obligations, which applied to the direct holdings but not to the repurchase-agreement income because that income was paid by the securities seller rather than by the United States; the court also found that the nondiscrimination principle from Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury did not alter this result.

taxesfederal power

This case involved a defendant convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance after police found marijuana in his truck following an unlawful roadblock stop. Officers stopped the vehicle without legal basis, smelled marijuana, and obtained the defendant's consent to search by indicating they would otherwise detain the truck to seek a warrant. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence must be excluded because the unlawful stop placed the officers in a position to pressure for consent, distinguishing the facts from cases like State v. Kennedy where consent was deemed voluntary. The court reasoned that while consent can sometimes validate a search after an illegal stop, the totality of circumstances here—including the lack of prior suspicion and the detention threat—rendered the consent insufficient to purge the taint of the illegality under state constitutional standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In Prince v. Brydon, plaintiff Brad Littlefield sought to hold defendant John R. Hansen, Jr., an Idaho lawyer, liable under the Oregon Securities Act for losses from purchasing an unregistered limited partnership interest sold in Oregon. Hansen had prepared documents and provided legal services for the partnership, including drafting the agreement and offering circular and giving a tax opinion. The circuit court and Court of Appeals granted summary judgment to Hansen, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that preparing such documents constitutes material aid in the sale under ORS 59.115(3), making the nonseller liable unless he proves he lacked knowledge of the relevant facts as an affirmative defense. The court reasoned that materiality depends on the importance of the contribution to the transaction, not on knowledge of the unlawfulness, and that the statute deliberately places the burden on those who materially aid to show ignorance.

business & regulatory

In State v. Edgmand, the defendant was tried for unlawful delivery and possession of a controlled substance and sought to testify that she was at a tavern when the offense occurred, but the trial court excluded the testimony for lack of the five-day prior notice required by Oregon's alibi statute, ORS 135.455, and convicted her. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute's notice and exclusion provisions do not apply to a defendant's own testimony about her whereabouts at the time of the alleged crime, which can be distinguished from testimony by other alibi witnesses. The court reached this result by construing the statute to avoid a potential conflict with the state constitutional right of an accused to be heard by herself under Article I, section 11.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a defendant convicted of attempted sexual abuse for touching the victim's thigh area and between her breasts without consent under Oregon's criminal statute defining sexual contact to include touching of sexual or other intimate parts for sexual gratification. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court's jury instruction erroneous for directing the jury to apply undifferentiated community standards of decency to determine intimate parts. The court reasoned that the statute requires a subjective test (the part must be intimate to the person touched) combined with an objective test (the accused knew or reasonably should have known it was intimate), with only breasts specified as intimate by law, and held that the indictment was sufficient to allow retrial under this standard.

criminal law

The case involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to attempting to manufacture methamphetamine but was ordered to pay restitution for extensive damage to a rental house caused by the actual manufacturing process conducted by another person. The defendant appealed the restitution portion of his sentence, arguing that the acts underlying his conviction did not cause the pecuniary harm. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance and remanded for resentencing, holding that under ORS 137.106 and ORS 137.103, restitution requires a showing that the damages resulted from the specific criminal activities of which the defendant was convicted or that he admitted. The court reasoned that the record showed no proof or admission of acts by the defendant that caused the house damage, and a conviction for attempt does not support restitution as if for the completed crime.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the City of Portland seeking injunctions against several adult bookstores operating in zones where a municipal ordinance prohibited such businesses, defined by their emphasis on nudity, sexual activity, or erotic materials. Defendants challenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional restraint on free expression under Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution. The circuit court ruled for the defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was invalid because it targeted the content of expression rather than regulating only its nuisance aspects like time, place, or manner. The court applied its established analysis from cases such as State v. Robertson and State v. Henry, finding no well-established historical exception allowing content-based restrictions on obscene or adult materials.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

In Jones v. Bierek, a tenant sued her landlord for personal injuries sustained in a fall from an inadequately lit stairway in a common area of the apartment building. The trial court dismissed the complaint as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 for actions arising under a rental agreement or the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, even though it was filed within the ordinary two-year limit for tort claims under ORS 12.110. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding that the two-year tort limitation applied. The court reasoned that the negligence claim did not arise under the rental agreement or RLTA because the landlord's duty regarding unsafe conditions in common areas extended to non-tenants as well, and the legislature did not intend RLTA to deprive tenants of the longer period available for such common-law claims.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether Oregon's tax increment financing system for urban renewal projects, under which property values in a redevelopment area are 'frozen' at a base level for calculating tax rates for regular taxing units while the tax revenue from subsequent value increases is directed to the urban renewal agency, violates the limits on tax levies imposed by Article XI, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiff Dennehy, a property owner, challenged the resulting tax assessments as exceeding the constitutional tax base of the affected taxing units without voter approval. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the financing mechanism itself does not inherently exceed those limits because the regular taxing units' rates are computed only on the frozen value, but it reversed in part the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment due to potential issues arising from rounding in rate calculations that could produce minor excesses. The court remanded for further proceedings on those narrow computational questions and related remedies.

taxesproperty

The case involved a dispute over the scope of the Oregon Governor's veto authority under a 1921 constitutional amendment, which allows veto of emergency clauses in bills. In 1983, the Governor signed a bill amending the Public Employees’ Retirement System but purported to veto three specific provisions within it, despite the bill containing an emergency clause; the legislature treated those vetoes as invalid. Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, sued state education and retirement officials to enforce the provisions and recover improper contributions, while defendants argued the vetoes were effective. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the amendment empowers the Governor to veto only the emergency clause itself and not other bill provisions, based on the amendment's text, historical context, and rules of constitutional construction emphasizing adopted language over alternative interpretations.

procedure

The case concerned jurisdiction over wage claims by county employees seeking retroactive pay under a public employee interest arbitration award after they had left the bargaining unit. Plaintiffs sued in circuit court under the general wage claim statute, but the county argued that the Employment Relations Board (ERB) had exclusive authority because noncompliance with an arbitration award constitutes an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.752(1) and related statutes. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding ERB's jurisdiction exclusive. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ERB has primary jurisdiction to determine whether an award is final and binding and whether noncompliance has occurred, so the circuit court should have abated the action pending ERB proceedings rather than dismissing it or proceeding to judgment. The court reversed both lower decisions and remanded with instructions to abate until administrative proceedings were completed.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved an employee discharged from a light-duty job offered after an industrial injury and workers' compensation claim, who sued for breach of an alleged contract for permanent employment. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a jury could reasonably find a breach of a permanent employment contract based on statements made during the compensation hearing. However, the court reversed the reduction of damages by social security disability benefits the employee later received, holding that such statutory benefits are a collateral source that does not offset an employer's contract liability. The decision turned on contract interpretation and the distinct policies underlying social security benefits versus common-law mitigation rules.

labor & employment

In Arena v. Gingrich, a patient sued her surgeon for negligence and battery after he implanted an Angelchik ring to repair a hiatal hernia without first explaining that alternative procedure as required by Oregon's informed consent statute, ORS 677.097; a jury found for the defendant on both claims. The Court of Appeals reversed on the negligence claim, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that reversal while remanding for further proceedings. The court held that when a physician fails to obtain informed consent, causation is determined by whether the specific patient would have consented after proper disclosure, rejecting an "objective" test based on a hypothetical reasonable patient. The battery claim was not revived on appeal due to procedural requirements for preserving error.

torts & liabilityhealthcare