This case involves domestic workers providing chore services to aged and disabled welfare recipients under California's In-Home Supportive Services Program, who sued state and county health and welfare agencies for minimum wages, liquidated damages, and declaratory relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the workers were employed by the recipients rather than the agencies, that the workers fell under the Act's companionship services exemption, that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit; the Sacramento defendants also sought a change of venue. The court denied all motions, finding triable issues of fact regarding the agencies' control and joint employer status under the Act's broad definition, that the exemption did not clearly apply given potential household work exceeding 20 percent of hours, that precedents upheld Congress's authority and the 1974 amendments overrode Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) in the chosen district.
The case concerned a defense motion in a criminal trial to admit expert testimony from a psycholinguist, Dr. Margaret Thaler Singer, who would opine based on stylistic analysis that certain writings and tape recordings introduced by the government were not authored by the defendant. The court denied the motion and ruled the testimony inadmissible. The core reasoning was that the field of psycholinguistics lacked sufficient general acceptance in the scientific community, creating a risk of undue prejudice or misleading the jury due to its apparent scientific reliability. Additionally, the proposed testimony was immaterial because the key issue was the defendant's state of mind in subscribing to the ideas expressed, not whether she personally composed the words. The court also noted that admitting the evidence would consume excessive trial time.
This case concerns the federal prosecution of a defendant for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), in which the government moved to exclude defense expert psychiatric testimony on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and to strike one expert's testimony. The court denied both motions, holding that the testimony was offered not to negate intent via diminished capacity but to explain the possible effects of prior kidnapping, incarceration, and abuse in support of a coercion or duress defense. The core reasoning was that federal trial judges possess broad discretion to admit expert evidence that may materially assist the jury on matters beyond common experience, even when it touches the ultimate issue of intent, provided it falls within the experts' special competence.
In United States v. Hearst, the defendant sought to testify in her own defense at her bank robbery trial but moved to restrict the government's cross-examination to prevent questions that might lead her to invoke the Fifth Amendment regarding other potential crimes. The court denied the motion, holding that by choosing to testify and placing her conduct over an extended period in issue, the defendant waived her privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of relevant cross-examination under Brown v. United States. The reasoning emphasized that a defendant who elects to testify cannot selectively shield portions of her testimony from scrutiny, and the proper limit is the scope of matters raised on direct examination rather than a blanket Fifth Amendment protection. The court noted it would still evaluate specific evidence for relevance and prejudice under Rule 403 before allowing questions.
In United States v. Hearst, the defendant moved to suppress tape recordings of her conversations with family and friends while detained in the San Mateo County Jail, arguing that their admission would violate her rights under the Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied the motion, ruling that jail surveillance does not constitute an unconstitutional search or invasion of privacy because a jail lacks the attributes of privacy found in homes or offices, as established in Lanza v. New York and followed by Ninth Circuit precedent. The court further held that any gaps in the specific tape at issue did not render its audible portions inadmissible, leaving questions of weight and continuity for the jury after cross-examination.
This case involved a motion by defendant Patty Hearst to suppress tape-recorded and oral statements in which she admitted participating in a bank robbery, on the ground that the statements were the product of coercion or duress by members of the Symbionese Liberation Army rather than voluntary. The court held a hearing under Rogers v. Richmond and Jackson v. Denno to determine voluntariness, noting that the government had no involvement in obtaining the statements. After reviewing precedent on the Fifth Amendment and due process implications of private coercion, the court concluded that involuntary statements extracted by private actors can be inadmissible, but found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hearst's statements were in fact made voluntarily. The motion to suppress was therefore denied, and the statements were ruled admissible at trial.
