Oliver Jesse Carter

This case involves domestic workers providing chore services to aged and disabled welfare recipients under California's In-Home Supportive Services Program, who sued state and county health and welfare agencies for minimum wages, liquidated damages, and declaratory relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the workers were employed by the recipients rather than the agencies, that the workers fell under the Act's companionship services exemption, that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit; the Sacramento defendants also sought a change of venue. The court denied all motions, finding triable issues of fact regarding the agencies' control and joint employer status under the Act's broad definition, that the exemption did not clearly apply given potential household work exceeding 20 percent of hours, that precedents upheld Congress's authority and the 1974 amendments overrode Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) in the chosen district.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned a defense motion in a criminal trial to admit expert testimony from a psycholinguist, Dr. Margaret Thaler Singer, who would opine based on stylistic analysis that certain writings and tape recordings introduced by the government were not authored by the defendant. The court denied the motion and ruled the testimony inadmissible. The core reasoning was that the field of psycholinguistics lacked sufficient general acceptance in the scientific community, creating a risk of undue prejudice or misleading the jury due to its apparent scientific reliability. Additionally, the proposed testimony was immaterial because the key issue was the defendant's state of mind in subscribing to the ideas expressed, not whether she personally composed the words. The court also noted that admitting the evidence would consume excessive trial time.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns the federal prosecution of a defendant for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), in which the government moved to exclude defense expert psychiatric testimony on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and to strike one expert's testimony. The court denied both motions, holding that the testimony was offered not to negate intent via diminished capacity but to explain the possible effects of prior kidnapping, incarceration, and abuse in support of a coercion or duress defense. The core reasoning was that federal trial judges possess broad discretion to admit expert evidence that may materially assist the jury on matters beyond common experience, even when it touches the ultimate issue of intent, provided it falls within the experts' special competence.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Hearst, the defendant sought to testify in her own defense at her bank robbery trial but moved to restrict the government's cross-examination to prevent questions that might lead her to invoke the Fifth Amendment regarding other potential crimes. The court denied the motion, holding that by choosing to testify and placing her conduct over an extended period in issue, the defendant waived her privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of relevant cross-examination under Brown v. United States. The reasoning emphasized that a defendant who elects to testify cannot selectively shield portions of her testimony from scrutiny, and the proper limit is the scope of matters raised on direct examination rather than a blanket Fifth Amendment protection. The court noted it would still evaluate specific evidence for relevance and prejudice under Rule 403 before allowing questions.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Hearst, the defendant moved to suppress tape recordings of her conversations with family and friends while detained in the San Mateo County Jail, arguing that their admission would violate her rights under the Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied the motion, ruling that jail surveillance does not constitute an unconstitutional search or invasion of privacy because a jail lacks the attributes of privacy found in homes or offices, as established in Lanza v. New York and followed by Ninth Circuit precedent. The court further held that any gaps in the specific tape at issue did not render its audible portions inadmissible, leaving questions of weight and continuity for the jury after cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a motion by defendant Patty Hearst to suppress tape-recorded and oral statements in which she admitted participating in a bank robbery, on the ground that the statements were the product of coercion or duress by members of the Symbionese Liberation Army rather than voluntary. The court held a hearing under Rogers v. Richmond and Jackson v. Denno to determine voluntariness, noting that the government had no involvement in obtaining the statements. After reviewing precedent on the Fifth Amendment and due process implications of private coercion, the court concluded that involuntary statements extracted by private actors can be inadmissible, but found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hearst's statements were in fact made voluntarily. The motion to suppress was therefore denied, and the statements were ruled admissible at trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involves defendant Patricia Hearst, who faced an indictment charging both armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d) and use of a firearm to commit a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), along with disputes over the scope of opening statements and the timing of rulings on certain evidence. The defendant moved to dismiss one of the counts on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that conviction on both would punish a single act twice, and also sought to limit references in opening statements plus preliminary hearings on admissibility of post-offense conduct evidence and tape recordings. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the double jeopardy clause does not bar charging two offenses from the same transaction when each statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact the other does not, as established by Blockburger v. United States, and that no prior acquittal had occurred. The court further denied the motions to limit opening statements or hold pretrial hearings, reasoning that evidentiary questions such as relevance, probative value versus prejudice, and voluntariness of statements are best resolved at trial when the evidence is offered and foundational facts are available.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved jury selection in the highly publicized federal criminal trial of Patty Hearst. The court decided to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors in camera, excluding the press and public, while allowing a full transcript to be released after the jury was selected and sequestered. This approach was taken to encourage candid responses and prevent remaining panel members from learning prior questions and answers through media reports. The core reasoning balanced the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury against First Amendment press interests, prioritizing the former due to pervasive pretrial publicity that risked tainting the jury pool. The court emphasized that voir dire procedures fall within the trial judge's discretion and that delayed public access was a necessary temporary measure.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

This case involves pretrial motions in the federal criminal prosecution of Patricia Hearst. The court denied the defense's motion for unrestricted access to the government's investigative files, finding no medical evidence of severe involuntary amnesia that would justify such broad discovery and noting that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit blanket pretrial disclosure. It also denied the request for a complete list of government witnesses, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent and Congress's rejection of mandatory witness list exchange in criminal cases, while emphasizing that any exculpatory Brady material must still be provided. The court ordered the parties to exchange information about psychiatric expert witnesses and their reports by specified deadlines, as the parties had largely agreed on this point. Other defense and government motions were either withdrawn, denied without prejudice, or deferred.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved determining whether defendant Patricia Hearst, indicted for armed bank robbery and use of a firearm to commit a felony, was competent to stand trial. The court held that she was competent based on reports from multiple court-appointed psychiatrists and a psychologist. These experts found no evidence of psychosis or serious mental illness that would impair her ability to understand the charges and assist in her defense, applying the Dusky standard requiring sufficient present ability to consult with counsel and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. The court distinguished this from any potential mental state at the time of the offense and noted that while she might benefit from therapy, she was fit to proceed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Bray v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, involved a legal dispute that the parties resolved through settlement. After the settlement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the prior judgment. Chief Judge Oliver J. Carter therefore dismissed the cause with prejudice.

procedure

The case involved California prisoners, some identifying as homosexual, along with ministers from the Metropolitan Community Churches, who sought to hold group religious services in state prisons but were barred by a directive from the Director of Corrections prohibiting congregated ministry or activities organized around homosexuality. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The three-judge district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, accepted that the Church preached a bona fide religion under the First Amendment, and declined to abstain or grant summary judgment outright. It reasoned that while individual visits were permitted under existing rules, the statewide ban raised questions about whether it unconstitutionally infringed the freedom to act on religious beliefs, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the state's penological justifications for security and inmate welfare.

criminal lawreligious libertycivil rights

Plaintiffs who bought lots in two recreational subdivisions developed by defendants sued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1968, along with related pendent claims, alleging the purchases were investment contracts. Defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on grounds including that the lots were not securities, the subdivisions were exempt from the land sales act, and some claims were time-barred. Applying the Howey test as interpreted in this circuit, the court examined whether defendants exercised the essential managerial efforts that determined the success of the enterprise after the sales and found that purchasers received full title with no ongoing service or managerial contracts from defendants. The court also addressed whether the land sales act exemptions applied and noted limitations issues for pre-1970 conduct.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved cattlemen suing major grocery chains, including A&P after settlements by others, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for allegedly conspiring to fix or regulate wholesale beef prices through the National Association of Food Chains and related conduct. After a jury trial, the court awarded trebled damages of over $32 million against A&P. The court denied A&P's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, finding sufficient evidence of a conspiracy, the defendants' ability to influence prices, and resulting economic harm to plaintiffs, while rejecting arguments that the evidence was inadequate or that the NAFC's activities were purely legitimate. The court also denied injunctive relief and class action status but awarded plaintiffs $3.2 million in attorney's fees.

business & regulatory

This case involves a Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit brought by a female employee against Stauffer Chemical Company, alleging discrimination in hiring, promotions, harassment, and termination, along with class claims. The court granted the defendant's motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement, finding the complaint's allegations too conclusory and lacking sufficient factual details or jurisdictional facts regarding timely filing. It also struck the prayer for exemplary damages as unavailable under Title VII and allowed the plaintiff 30 days to amend the complaint with more specific allegations to establish a continuing pattern of discrimination.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Trujillo v. Stone, the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief after his state court convictions for second-degree burglary and receiving stolen property, arguing that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that he could not be convicted of both offenses violated his constitutional rights. The court first addressed exhaustion of state remedies, determining that the jury instruction claim was exhausted and separable from unexhausted claims regarding search and seizure and ineffective counsel, allowing it to be considered on the merits. On the merits, the court found no constitutional error because the California Court of Appeal had vacated the receiving stolen property conviction due to insufficient evidence, leaving only the burglary conviction intact. The court dismissed the unexhausted claims without prejudice and the search and seizure claim for lack of factual support.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved multiple plaintiffs who invested in shares of Medical Logistics through registered representative Donald Mitchell while he worked at brokerage firms Bache & Co. and Burnham & Co.; the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and related claims arising from Mitchell's promotion of the speculative unregistered stock. The court analyzed each plaintiff's individual circumstances and the relationships among the parties, focusing on whether the brokerage firms could be held liable as controlling persons under the federal securities laws or under agency principles. It determined that the firms were not vicariously liable because they had acted in good faith, had not induced the violations, and had no duty to monitor all incoming mail or calls to representatives absent specific suspicion of wrongdoing. The court also addressed the availability of the good-faith defense under Section 20(a) of the Act and distinguished situations where agency relationships would preclude that defense.

business & regulatory

This case involved a wrongful death and property damage action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by the family of pilot Marshall G. Richardson and his aircraft's insurer against the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that FAA air traffic controllers at San Francisco International Airport negligently failed to provide timely and adequate warnings about wake turbulence from a preceding Boeing 707, causing Richardson's Navion aircraft to crash into the bay on final approach in 1967. The court entered judgment for the defendant, finding that the pilot was responsible under Visual Flight Rules for maintaining safe separation, altitude, and avoidance of wake turbulence by flying above the preceding aircraft's descent path or landing long, procedures he knew or should have known. The tower's duties were limited to sequencing and providing the wake turbulence advisory that was issued, and the evidence showed the crash resulted from the pilot's own positioning rather than any controller negligence.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involves plaintiff Van Hoomissen suing Xerox Corporation and individual defendants for alleged retaliation—including denial of promotions, demotion, and termination—after he protested the company's hiring practices that he claimed discriminated against Mexican Americans at its Mountain View plant; the EEOC intervened as a plaintiff. The court ruled on motions to dismiss and strike the three counts of the complaint, granting the motions as to Count Two (under 42 U.S.C. § 1981) and Count Three (state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress), while allowing Count One (under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) to proceed after the plaintiff amended the complaint to cure a jurisdictional defect regarding deferral to the California FEPC. The core reasoning was that the Title VII claim satisfied statutory prerequisites, the alleged discharge fell within the scope of the EEOC charges as reasonably related conduct under precedents like Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corporation, and the other claims failed to state viable causes of action.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by the operator of a nightclub challenging four contempt convictions arising from violations of a temporary injunction issued under California's Red Light Abatement Act to halt allegedly lewd entertainment and conduct at the premises. The federal court reviewed claims that the injunction amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment because it lacked sufficient judicial determination that the prohibited activities were obscene rather than protected speech, and that the petitioner was denied a jury trial despite facing multiple criminal contempt charges carrying potential jail time. The opinion analyzed the adequacy of the hearings on the injunction, equated statutory "lewdness" with obscenity standards, noted that the petitioner had stipulated to modifications and declined further proceedings, and distinguished the procedural rights applicable to criminal versus civil contempt. It addressed exhaustion of state remedies but focused on the validity of the convictions themselves.

free speechcriminal lawprocedure