Thomas Durfee

This case concerns whether the residuary clause in Francis W. Goddard's 1881 will operated as an exercise of powers of appointment reserved in two 1888 trust deeds conveying most of his property. The complainants sought instruction on whether the will appointed the trust estates to Goddard's wife absolutely, as she claimed, or whether the default provisions in the deeds applied. The court held that the will did not execute the powers of appointment. The reasoning was that the will's language referred only to the testator's own property and was drafted before the powers existed, the deeds' later and detailed default limitations to keep property in the Goddard line indicated a contrary intent, and no statute imputed an intention to execute the powers via a prior will.

propertyfamily law

The case involved a bill for instructions on construing the will of Albert J. Jones, specifically whether a $25,000 bequest for an Art Institute in Providence was valid and how the residuary clause should be distributed among the testator's relatives. The court held that the bequest was a valid charitable trust, not void for indefiniteness or violation of the rule against perpetuities, and that grandchildren of the testator's predeceased children could not share in the residue. The reasoning was that the will's references to 'art' and 'fine arts' clearly indicated promotion of the fine arts rather than a broader or uncertain purpose, the charitable condition was not subject to the perpetuities rule in the same way as private trusts and could vest in a reasonable time, and the anti-lapse statute did not apply because the relevant parents had never held a devise or bequest under the will. The court therefore upheld the legacy in full and limited the residue to the surviving first-generation children.

property

The case involved a dispute over two mortgages on land owned by Eliza Miller in fee simple. In 1870 her husband Thomas Miller executed a mortgage deed to Franklin Savings Bank to secure a $7,000 loan, which Eliza signed only to release her dower rights, rendering it void as to her estate. A month later the Millers executed a second mortgage to Wheeler that recited the prior mortgage to the savings bank; the bank argued this recital ratified the first mortgage and created an equitable lien superior to Wheeler's. The court sustained the demurrer filed by Miller's heirs and a subsequent purchaser, holding that the first mortgage remained invalid against Eliza Miller's interest both at law and in equity and that the recital in the second mortgage did not bind her or those claiming under her. The opinion found none of the authorities cited by the bank supported its claim that the recital alone could establish priority.

propertyfamily law

This case concerned a procedural challenge in an assumpsit lawsuit, where the defendants filed a plea in abatement stating they had been served as garnishees in a separate action against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff moved to dismiss the plea for lacking an affidavit verifying its facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that an affidavit is not indispensable to the validity of such a plea, particularly when its truth is not disputed, based on historical precedents allowing judicial discretion in accepting unverified pleas. The court reasoned that the affidavit served mainly to inform the court and prevent delays, but was not required for the plea's legal sufficiency, and suggested that challenges to the plea's adequacy should instead be made via demurrer.

procedure

This case concerned a procedural challenge in an assumpsit lawsuit, where the defendants filed a plea in abatement stating they had been served as garnishees in a separate action against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff moved to dismiss the plea for lacking an affidavit verifying its facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that an affidavit is not indispensable to the validity of such a plea, particularly when its truth is not disputed, based on historical precedents allowing judicial discretion in accepting unverified pleas. The court reasoned that the affidavit served mainly to inform the court and prevent delays, but was not required for the plea's legal sufficiency, and suggested that challenges to the plea's adequacy should instead be made via demurrer.

procedure

This case involved a complaint against the defendant for operating a hackney carriage without a valid license in violation of a Providence city ordinance after his license was revoked by the mayor without notice or hearing. The trial court upheld the revocation and found the defendant guilty, leading to exceptions before the appellate court. The court held that the city charter broadly authorized the city council to regulate hackney carriages and grant licenses subject to revocation, and that this power could be delegated to the mayor for exercise at his discretion. It further reasoned that the license was a revocable privilege rather than a vested right, and that the ordinance allowing revocation without notice was not so unreasonable or oppressive as to be invalid, given its administrative purpose and the low fee involved.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the distribution of a $12,000 bequest in Henry J. Steere's will to servants in his employ at the time of his death. Six regular servants claimed sole entitlement, while Mrs. Annie Crosby, who worked irregularly as a laundress and helper, sought to share equally. The court decided that Mrs. Crosby was not entitled to any share. The reasoning was that the will's language intended servants with continuous and permanent employment, not those with casual or intermittent service, as supported by precedents distinguishing between full-time and part-time servants.

family lawproperty

This case involved a petition to enforce a mechanics’ lien for unpaid work and materials used in constructing a building on land owned by defendant Harriet A. Swarts, under a contract dated July 5, 1888. Prior to the contract, the cellar had been excavated and piles driven for the foundation; mortgages on the property were recorded on July 13, 1888, before the petitioners began their contract work on August 1. The court addressed whether the lien or the mortgages had priority under the relevant Rhode Island statute. The court held that the lien took precedence because construction had commenced with the excavation and foundation work, making any subsequent liens subordinate. The reasoning centered on statutory interpretation that priority attaches from the start of construction itself, not from each contractor’s separate start date, and that the mortgages were taken with knowledge of the ongoing building process.

property

This case involved a civil libel action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for a letter accusing him of embezzling company funds and being in legal trouble, which was sent to a third party regarding a disputed business relationship. After a jury awarded the plaintiff $300 in damages in the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant petitioned for a new trial, arguing errors in the court's rulings (including denial of a nonsuit), that the letter was privileged, inconsistency with a special finding on partnership status, and excessive damages. The court denied the petition, holding that the motion for nonsuit was properly denied and not preserved for review, the letter went beyond what was necessary to protect the defendant's interests so was not privileged, the special finding on the partnership was consistent with liability for the alleged libel, the damages were not excessive given the serious charge and the defendant's failed attempt to prove truth at trial, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involves an employee suing his employer, Providence Gas Company, for injuries from an explosion at the gas works, alleging negligence in maintaining a tank. The court considered demurrers to the three counts in the declaration. It overruled the demurrers to the first two counts after allowing amendments to properly allege the defendant's knowledge of the defect, reasoning that pleadings need not specify defects in detail when facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge and negligence may be inferred from the circumstances. The demurrer to the third count was sustained because it lacked any allegation of negligence.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a replevin action by Eliza A. Harris against a deputy sheriff who had attached goods in the possession of J. F. Breitschmidt to satisfy a creditor's writ. Harris claimed title under an unrecorded bill of sale that recited a $300 payment but was actually given as security for unpaid rent, making the goods worth less than the debt. The trial court ruled for Harris, but on petition for new trial the court held that the instrument, though absolute in form, operated as an unrecorded mortgage under the relevant statutes and was therefore void against attaching creditors. The decision rested on the policy that an absolute transfer intended as security cannot evade the recording requirement or the statutory right to attach mortgaged property in the mortgagor's possession. The petition was granted.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a husband who took possession of valuable jewelry belonging to his wife before their marriage and refused to return it, leading to the appointment of a trustee for her property under a Rhode Island statute. The trustee sued the husband in trover for conversion after he declined to surrender the items. The court ruled that the trustee could maintain the action against the husband. It reasoned that the statute reserves a married woman's pre-marriage property to her sole and separate use, empowers the court to appoint a trustee who may sue to recover it, and contains no exception favoring the husband, consistent with the law's purpose of protecting such assets even from him.

family lawproperty

The case involved a trover action by Mrs. Claflin against her former landlords for conversion of an organ she had owned before her marriage. The plaintiffs had left the organ in the rented premises as security for unpaid rent, and the defendants refused to return it even after being informed it belonged to Mrs. Claflin. The trial court instructed the jury that no formal demand was required when the possessor had already refused outright to surrender the item, and the defendants appealed this instruction. The court held that the instruction was correct, reasoning that conversion occurs through retention under a claim of right adverse to the owner, and an advance refusal itself supplies the necessary evidence of dominion over the chattel.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved an action of account brought by the executor of Mary C. Hazard against the Albro brothers, alleging that the parties were tenants in common of a farm and that the defendants had received all rents, profits, and benefits without accounting for the testatrix's one-third share. The defendant David Albro pleaded that he had not occupied or received the income jointly with his co-defendant as alleged, and the plaintiff demurred to that plea. The court held that the plea was bad under Rhode Island statute Pub. Stat. cap. 204, § 31, and that the underlying declaration was sufficient because Pub. Stat. cap. 236, § 1 creates liability for a cotenant who receives more than his just share, making that cotenant a bailiff for the excess by operation of law. The statute is broader than the common-law rule or the statute of Anne, allowing the action even without an express appointment as bailiff or actual receipts in some circumstances. The court therefore sustained the demurrer and overruled the plea.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit by the current city treasurer of Providence on a $1,000 bond given by liquor dealers to his predecessor in 1889, as required by statute for obtaining a license. The defendants demurred, arguing that the successor treasurer could not sue because the bond did not explicitly run to successors and that a prior criminal conviction of the principal was needed to show a breach. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that an official bond given to an officer with legal succession allows the successor to maintain the action even without explicit mention in the statute or bond. It further ruled that no prior conviction is required before suing on the bond, as the relevant statute did not impose such a prerequisite.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the interpretation of a will left by George C. Kenyon, who died in 1874, leaving his estate in trust for his son Daniel C. Kenyon for life, with the remainder after Daniel's death to the testator's "own right heirs." Daniel died in 1887 without issue, leading to a dispute between the testator's other heirs and Daniel's estate administrator over who was entitled to the remaining property. The court decided that Daniel had received a vested remainder in fee under the will, so the property passed to his heirs and representatives upon his death, subject to his debts. The reasoning centered on the technical meaning of "right heirs" referring to Daniel at the testator's death, the legal preference for vesting remainders, and the interpretation of the trust as creating only a life estate rather than a fee simple that would preclude a remainder.

property

The case involved a property owner suing a street railway company for damages under a provision in the company's charter, which made the company liable for injuries to abutting estates caused by the laying of its rails. The plaintiff alleged that the rails reduced the market and rental value of his estate, which he used as a summer home and boarding house, and caused guests to stop returning, though these harms stemmed from the railway's operation rather than the initial installation. The court sustained the company's demurrer, ruling that the charter section covers only injuries resulting from the laying of the rails or incidents of that process, not from their later use for travel. The plaintiff's declaration did not expressly allege any qualifying injuries from the laying itself, so the action could not proceed.

propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case is an equity suit by complainant Horton to set aside a sheriff’s deed conveying his real estate to defendant Bassett, based on an execution sale that the bill alleges was never completed because no bids were called for or sale announced. The complainant also claims he was unable to attend due to illness but had arranged for another to pay or bid, and that the property (sold for $10) was worth $5,000; a prior similar bill had been dismissed on demurrer. Bassett demurred, arguing the prior dismissal created estoppel or res judicata, that the new bill was inconsistent with prior allegations, and that a pending ejectment action provided adequate relief. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that dismissal of the first suit does not bar a second when different facts and circumstances are alleged as grounds for relief, that the prior allegations do not estop the new claims, and that the law action could not remove the cloud on title created by the deed.

propertyprocedure

This was a slander action in which the plaintiff alleged multiple counts of defamatory statements by the defendant, who pleaded the general issue and notice of justification. The trial court sustained the defendant's objection to evidence on all counts except the first, which alone set forth the exact words used, and refused the plaintiff's requested jury instruction that unproven charges implied malice and entitled her to exemplary damages as a matter of right. The court affirmed these rulings on appeal, holding that slander counts must plead the precise words to allow proper pleading of defenses and to enable the court rather than the jury to determine their legal effect, while noting that awards of exemplary damages remain discretionary with the jury even when malice is shown. The third exception was deemed without merit, and all exceptions were overruled.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an action for trespass and ejectment to recover possession of a house and lot in Providence. The plaintiff had mortgaged the property, conveyed it to the defendant subject to the mortgage, and later reacquired it via the bank's foreclosure sale under the mortgage's power of sale. After the sale, the bank sent written notice to the defendant that the plaintiff sought possession, but no further notice to quit was given before suit. The lower court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to notice to quit and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On review, the court held that the defendant was a tenant at sufferance entitled to statutory notice under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 282, § 1, that the bank's letter did not satisfy the requirement, and therefore sustained the defendant's exceptions.

propertyprocedure