In De Los Santos v. City of New York, a civilian NYPD employee sued the city, police department, and a lieutenant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state human rights laws, alleging First Amendment retaliation and other adverse actions for reporting a witnessed sexual encounter between two officers. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. It held that the plaintiff's internal reports did not qualify as protected speech on a matter of public concern and that no reasonable factfinder could conclude she suffered retaliation for opposing sexual harassment.
The case involved the Securities and Exchange Commission suing Thomas W. Jones and Lewis E. Daidone for allegedly aiding and abetting violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 in their roles at Citigroup Asset Management, stemming from a project to select or create a transfer agent for mutual funds and related recommendations to fund boards. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in full and dismissed the claims, reasoning that the Commission failed to offer evidence of specific profits causally linked to the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that would support disgorgement, and lacked other proof needed to establish liability.
This case is part of the multi-district litigation arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in which insurance companies that paid claims to victims sued Saudi American Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, RICO, and various common-law theories. The plaintiffs alleged that the bank provided material support to al Qaeda through banking relationships, ties to Islamic charities, and financing of construction projects in Sudan. The district court granted the bank's motion to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint's allegations were conclusory and did not satisfy Rule 8(a)'s requirement to give fair notice of how the bank knowingly supported the attacks or proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also denied leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs' supplemental exhibits did not mention the bank or support the alleged knowledge and causal link.
This case involves multidistrict litigation arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in which the Defendants' Executive Committee sought a broad protective order to limit disclosure of all discovery materials produced in the proceedings. The Plaintiffs' Executive Committee opposed the request, arguing that good cause had not been shown and citing the significant public interest in the litigation. The court granted the application in part, issuing a limited umbrella protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). It reasoned that in unusually complex cases, an initial protective order may be entered based on a general showing of good cause without requiring highly particularized findings of harm, while noting that public access rights primarily attach to judicial documents rather than raw discovery materials exchanged between parties.
Eliot Sash was charged with two violations of his supervised release conditions stemming from a prior conviction for producing false identification documents: possessing unauthorized law-enforcement uniforms, badges, and paraphernalia on March 6, 2006, and failing to truthfully answer his probation officer's questions about such items on March 3, 2006. Following a revocation hearing with pre- and post-hearing briefing, the court found that the government had proved both violations by a preponderance of the evidence, based on Sash's statements to the probation officer, the items recovered in a search of his residence, and his failure to surrender the equipment despite warnings. The court rejected Sash's arguments that he was entitled to or denied an opportunity to seek clarification of the conditions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, concluding that the conditions were unambiguous and that Sash had not properly pursued clarification from the court. The matter was set for further proceedings on sentencing.
In this admiralty case, shipping companies Maersk, Inc. and A.P. Moller-Maersk obtained a maritime attachment of funds belonging to named defendant Mohinder Singh Sahni and related entities, alleging an international fraud scheme involving fake shipments of used tires and electronics that caused the carriers financial losses. Movant Mohinder Singh Sahani, whose assets were restrained, moved to vacate the attachment or reduce it, asserting that he was a distinct individual from the defendant with a different background, age, and U.S. contacts. The court denied the motion, concluding that plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence of possible identity overlap or conspiratorial involvement to maintain the attachment under Supplemental Rule B, without reaching a final determination on the movant's true identity or name.
