Richard Conway Casey

In De Los Santos v. City of New York, a civilian NYPD employee sued the city, police department, and a lieutenant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state human rights laws, alleging First Amendment retaliation and other adverse actions for reporting a witnessed sexual encounter between two officers. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. It held that the plaintiff's internal reports did not qualify as protected speech on a matter of public concern and that no reasonable factfinder could conclude she suffered retaliation for opposing sexual harassment.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

The case involved the Securities and Exchange Commission suing Thomas W. Jones and Lewis E. Daidone for allegedly aiding and abetting violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 in their roles at Citigroup Asset Management, stemming from a project to select or create a transfer agent for mutual funds and related recommendations to fund boards. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in full and dismissed the claims, reasoning that the Commission failed to offer evidence of specific profits causally linked to the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that would support disgorgement, and lacked other proof needed to establish liability.

business & regulatory

This case is part of the multi-district litigation arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in which insurance companies that paid claims to victims sued Saudi American Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, RICO, and various common-law theories. The plaintiffs alleged that the bank provided material support to al Qaeda through banking relationships, ties to Islamic charities, and financing of construction projects in Sudan. The district court granted the bank's motion to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint's allegations were conclusory and did not satisfy Rule 8(a)'s requirement to give fair notice of how the bank knowingly supported the attacks or proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also denied leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs' supplemental exhibits did not mention the bank or support the alleged knowledge and causal link.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves multidistrict litigation arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in which the Defendants' Executive Committee sought a broad protective order to limit disclosure of all discovery materials produced in the proceedings. The Plaintiffs' Executive Committee opposed the request, arguing that good cause had not been shown and citing the significant public interest in the litigation. The court granted the application in part, issuing a limited umbrella protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). It reasoned that in unusually complex cases, an initial protective order may be entered based on a general showing of good cause without requiring highly particularized findings of harm, while noting that public access rights primarily attach to judicial documents rather than raw discovery materials exchanged between parties.

procedure

Eliot Sash was charged with two violations of his supervised release conditions stemming from a prior conviction for producing false identification documents: possessing unauthorized law-enforcement uniforms, badges, and paraphernalia on March 6, 2006, and failing to truthfully answer his probation officer's questions about such items on March 3, 2006. Following a revocation hearing with pre- and post-hearing briefing, the court found that the government had proved both violations by a preponderance of the evidence, based on Sash's statements to the probation officer, the items recovered in a search of his residence, and his failure to surrender the equipment despite warnings. The court rejected Sash's arguments that he was entitled to or denied an opportunity to seek clarification of the conditions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, concluding that the conditions were unambiguous and that Sash had not properly pursued clarification from the court. The matter was set for further proceedings on sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In this admiralty case, shipping companies Maersk, Inc. and A.P. Moller-Maersk obtained a maritime attachment of funds belonging to named defendant Mohinder Singh Sahni and related entities, alleging an international fraud scheme involving fake shipments of used tires and electronics that caused the carriers financial losses. Movant Mohinder Singh Sahani, whose assets were restrained, moved to vacate the attachment or reduce it, asserting that he was a distinct individual from the defendant with a different background, age, and U.S. contacts. The court denied the motion, concluding that plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence of possible identity overlap or conspiratorial involvement to maintain the attachment under Supplemental Rule B, without reaching a final determination on the movant's true identity or name.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to permit the rejection of long-term wholesale power purchase agreements regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as part of a debtor's reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code, or whether FERC holds exclusive authority over such contracts. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to authorize the rejection of the energy contracts and that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over their disposition. The reasoning centered on the Federal Power Act's grant of regulatory authority to FERC over filed rates and contracts, the absence of any bankruptcy provision preempting that authority, and the need to consider the public interest in energy regulation, distinguishing it from standard contract rejections in bankruptcy.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In this case, plaintiff Sea Transport Contractors obtained a Rule B maritime attachment in the Southern District of New York to secure breach-of-contract claims against defendant Industries Chemiques du Senegal that were pending in London arbitration and litigation. The defendant moved to vacate or modify the attachment, arguing it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, that one contract was not maritime in nature, that Rule B attachments cannot support foreign proceedings, and that the amount should be reduced or counter-security awarded. The court denied the motion to vacate, holding that the defendant was not an immune instrumentality under the FSIA, that the cooperation contract qualified as a maritime contract subject to admiralty jurisdiction, and that Rule B may be used in aid of foreign litigation; it granted a reduction of the attachment to $5,218,109.38 based on the two-year contract term and denied counter-security. The core reasoning rested on the defendant's ownership structure, the shipping-related terms of the contracts, and the text of the Supplemental Admiralty Rules.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from Salvino, Inc.'s production and sale of plush bean-filled bears featuring Major League Baseball club logos without an MLBP license, prompting MLBP to send a cease-and-desist letter and file claims for trade dress infringement, breach of contract, and unfair competition; Salvino responded with antitrust claims alleging that MLBP's centralized licensing through the Agency Agreement violated the Sherman Act and related laws. The court granted MLBP's motion for summary judgment on Salvino's antitrust, California unfair competition, and tortious interference claims, while denying Salvino's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the trade dress claims. Core reasoning included that MLBP's single-agent licensing structure created procompetitive efficiencies in quality control, promotion, and administration that were not shown to be achievable through less restrictive means, and that genuine factual issues existed as to whether MLB clubs' colors and uniforms had acquired secondary meaning. Salvino had previously obtained licenses for other MLB products but failed to secure one for the bears despite negotiations.

business & regulatory

The case involved federal criminal charges against David Rutkoske for securities fraud, conspiracy, commercial bribery, and wire fraud arising from an alleged scheme at Lloyd Wade Securities to manipulate demand and sales of NetBet, Inc. stock through undisclosed commissions and high-pressure sales tactics. Rutkoske moved to dismiss the superseding indictments on statute-of-limitations grounds, arguing that the alleged overt acts fell outside the five-year period, and alternatively sought a change of venue and a bill of particulars. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the second superseding indictment related back to the first superseding indictment, which was timely on its face and did not impermissibly broaden the charges, and that the government had adequately alleged timely overt acts. The court also denied the venue and bill-of-particulars requests, finding no showing of prejudice or need for additional details beyond the indictment and discovery already provided.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appealing the Bankruptcy Court's authorization for Enron to retain the law firm Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman as special counsel to represent current and former employees during multiple governmental investigations. The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's order, finding that the approval was based on a valid business reason. The court reasoned that providing independent counsel would encourage employee cooperation with investigations, help retain staff amid scrutiny, and support the company's reorganization efforts, and that this determination was not clearly erroneous under the circumstances of extensive investigations into Enron.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

John Mannix was convicted by a New York state jury of second-degree murder (depraved indifference) and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon following a fatal altercation in a Manhattan bar, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. After his state appeals were denied, he filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the conviction on grounds including sufficiency of the evidence, the definition of "depraved indifference," jury instructions, and equal protection. The magistrate judge issued a detailed report recommending denial of the petition, concluding that the claims failed under applicable state law interpretations and federal habeas standards. With no objections filed, the district court adopted the report in full, denied the petition, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

Allocco Recycling, Ltd., a Brooklyn operator of a fill-material transfer station, sued New York City and its Sanitation Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging that denial of its permit-expansion application and a subsequent moratorium on transfer-station permits violated the Commerce Clause, Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Takings Clause, and New York law. The plaintiff sought to increase its permitted bonding volume for non-putrescible waste and to add a construction-debris facility, claiming the actions discriminated against interstate commerce and deprived it of property interests. Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim and on jurisdictional grounds. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing certain claims such as those involving a new permit or tortious interference while allowing others to proceed.

business & regulatoryenvironmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the City of New York seeking declaratory judgments to enforce tax liens on portions of properties owned by the Permanent Missions of India and Mongolia to the United Nations, specifically the parts used as residences for diplomatic staff below the rank of ambassador, due to unpaid real property taxes under New York law. India and Mongolia moved to dismiss, claiming immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court denied the motions, holding that the FSIA's exception to immunity applies because the suits concern rights in immovable property situated in the United States. The reasoning focused on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4), which removes immunity in cases where such property rights are at issue, distinguishing this from other FSIA exceptions and prior case law interpreting the provision.

taxespropertyfederal power

This case is a purported class action by investors who acquired Alcatel ADS shares, alleging violations of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts through misleading public statements about the company's financial health, inventory, acquisitions, and earnings during a period of industry downturn, as well as related accounting manipulations. Plaintiffs claimed these actions artificially inflated stock prices in connection with an IPO and secondary trading. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 9(b), and the PSLRA, arguing the claims were time-barred, lacked particularized pleading of fraud, and that control-person liability claims failed without a predicate violation. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding some claims time-barred or insufficiently pled while allowing others to proceed based on the allegations' sufficiency under the applicable standards.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Dr. Annie B. Bedden-Hurley sued the New York City Board of Education alleging employment discrimination, retaliation, defamation, and harassment based on her race, gender, national origin, color, age, and religion under Title VII, the ADEA, the NYSHRL, state tort law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Most claims were dismissed as time-barred, outside the court's subject matter jurisdiction because the EEOC charge did not include them, or for failure to meet procedural requirements under state law. The § 1981 claims for race-based discrimination and retaliation after March 4, 1999, survived because the plaintiff made a short and plain statement of her claim meeting the liberal pleading standards.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a challenge by abortion providers and physicians to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which criminalizes a specific late-term abortion procedure known as partial-birth abortion (or D&X) with penalties including fines and imprisonment, but includes an exception only to save the mother's life and none for maternal health. The court addressed whether the statute could stand without a health exception, considering congressional findings, medical testimony on the comparative safety of abortion procedures like D&E, D&X, and induction, and the Supreme Court's prior ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart. It concluded that the Act requires a health exception to be constitutional, as the evidence did not support Congress's determination that the banned procedure is never medically necessary or that alternatives are always sufficient. The decision rested on the principle that, under precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause, a ban on abortion procedures must include an exception when substantial medical authority indicates it may be necessary to preserve the woman's health, and the federal Act could not evade this requirement.

abortionfederal powercivil rights

This case involves allegations by Papyrus Technology Corp. that the New York Stock Exchange infringed its patents on wireless trading technology and breached related contracts; the NYSE counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. The opinion addresses the NYSE's motion to disqualify attorney Tedd Van Buskirk and his new firm, Frommer Lawrence & Haug, from representing Papyrus on the ground that Van Buskirk had access to NYSE confidences while an associate at Milbank, which represents the NYSE. The court granted the motion in part by disqualifying Van Buskirk personally due to his prior exposure to confidential information and denied it in part by allowing the Frommer firm to continue representation under an effective ethical screen that prevents his participation. The reasoning applies rules on imputed disqualification and screening from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, finding no substantial risk of misuse of confidences given the timing, minimal prior contact, and firm procedures, while noting the absence of a per se bar on screening in a fifty-attorney firm.

procedure

This case involves eleven investors suing over fifty defendants, including Bear Stearns & Co., for their alleged roles in a fraudulent scheme by broker-dealer A.R. Baron & Co. from 1992 to 1996, which involved securities manipulation, unauthorized trades, parking stock, and misleading customers in initial public offerings of companies like CMSI and HPI, leading to over $80 million in investor losses. The complaint asserted claims under federal securities fraud laws, RICO, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties, and common-law fraud. The court addressed seven motions to dismiss and granted them in part and denied them in part, dismissing certain control person liability claims for failure to adequately plead control and some time-barred claims, while allowing other claims to proceed based on the sufficiency of the pleadings and lack of collateral estoppel from prior arbitrations. The reasoning focused on pleading standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b), the elements of control person liability under securities laws, and whether prior proceedings resolved key issues like statutes of limitations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a challenge by abortion providers to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal statute that prohibits certain late-term abortion procedures without an exception for the woman's health. The court granted the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the Act against the plaintiffs and their members for a period of ten days. To reach this result, the court found that the plaintiffs had shown both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. The likelihood of success rested on Supreme Court precedent holding that a health exception is constitutionally required when medical opinion is divided on whether the banned procedures may be safer for some patients.

abortion