David Gordon Baker

This case involved a taxpayer who sold patent rights in 1958 in exchange for ongoing royalty payments based on units shipped by the buyer, and later sought a refund of additional South Carolina income taxes assessed for 1960-1962 after the Tax Commission disallowed capital gains treatment. The court had to decide whether the royalty income was earned before January 1, 1960 (when a new law took effect allowing exclusion of half the gains from sales of capital assets) or on or after that date. The court held that the income was earned after January 1, 1960, entitling the taxpayer to the capital gains exclusion and a full refund of the $22,829.47 in additional taxes, penalties, and interest. The reasoning focused on the contract terms tying payments to post-1960 shipments and minimum quotas, finding that the right to receive the income became fixed only when units were actually shipped in those years rather than at the 1958 execution of the agreement.

taxes

The case involved plaintiff Billy B. Warren suing Allstate Insurance for allegedly wrongfully canceling his assigned-risk motor vehicle liability insurance certificate after premiums were paid, which prompted the South Carolina Highway Department to suspend his driver's license under the Safety Responsibility Act. The trial court sustained Allstate's demurrer on grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract, that damages stemmed from the Department's ministerial act rather than any policy violation, and that the claim was akin to a barred perjury action or required prior administrative review. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the complaint adequately alleged a contractual breach regarding the certificate (distinct from the policy itself), that no quasi-judicial proceeding or exhaustion requirement applied because the Department had no authority to adjudicate the cancellation's validity, and that the claim was not precluded by public policy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Pauline Watts, who was indicted for the murder of her husband, a deputy sheriff, after he was fatally shot in their home in 1964; she was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in prison. On appeal, Watts challenged the denial of her motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti—specifically, that the death resulted from criminal agency—independent of her extrajudicial statements to police. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence, including the location of the body, the presence of a revolver with one spent cartridge nearby, and the nature of the wound, sufficiently established the corpus delicti, and that her statement admitting she shot her husband was properly admitted without objection and further developed on cross-examination. The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on manslaughter and the State's decision not to call certain officers as witnesses, finding no error in the trial proceedings.

criminal law

In Tate v. City of Greenville, the plaintiff sued the city for damage to his truck caused by a collision with an overhanging tree limb on Arlington Street, alleging the limb constituted a street defect under Code section 47-70. The trial court granted the city's motion for involuntary nonsuit on the ground that the driver's own negligence and contributory negligence caused the accident as a matter of law, while rejecting the city's argument that the limb was not a defect. On appeal, the court held that the overhanging limb qualified as a defect that the city could be liable for, and that the evidence did not establish the driver's negligence as the only reasonable inference, particularly given his efforts to avoid parked cars near an intersection and school while traveling at low speed. The court reversed the nonsuit and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence presented factual issues for the jury.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Sun Crest Bottling Company, a domestic corporation based in Florence County, could be sued in Darlington County under South Carolina venue statutes because it owned property and transacted business there. The company sold bottled drinks to stores in Darlington County using crates and bottles for which customers paid a refundable deposit, with the containers typically remaining in the county for only a few days before being returned and exchanged. The Supreme Court held that the bottling company did not own property in Darlington County within the meaning of the venue proviso in Section 10-421, reversing the lower court's ruling that the company was subject to suit there. The court reasoned that the crates and bottles were too transitory to qualify as property owned in the county, drawing on precedent involving a bakery truck that made only temporary deliveries, and distinguished cases involving more permanent property like insurance policies. The decision emphasized legislative intent and the brief, rotating nature of the containers rather than any permanence in the county.

procedureproperty

This case arose from a 1953 automobile collision in Charleston between the plaintiff's car and the defendant's furniture truck, in which the plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages for personal injuries and property damage based on claims of negligent and reckless driving by the defendant's agent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including $36,000 in actual personal injury damages, but the trial judge granted a new trial nisi reducing the personal injury award by $7,000 (which the plaintiff accepted), while rejecting the defendant's other post-trial motions. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the last clear chance doctrine, its handling of future damages instructions, and the size of the verdict. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the last clear chance request was not properly made under the governing statute, that the jury instructions were adequate, and that the reduced verdict did not reflect passion or prejudice or require further reduction. The court emphasized that determinations of excessiveness fall within the trial judge's discretion absent clear abuse.

torts & liabilityprocedure