David Gordon Baker

This case involved a taxpayer who sold patent rights in 1958 in exchange for ongoing royalty payments based on units shipped by the buyer, and later sought a refund of additional South Carolina income taxes assessed for 1960-1962 after the Tax Commission disallowed capital gains treatment. The court had to decide whether the royalty income was earned before January 1, 1960 (when a new law took effect allowing exclusion of half the gains from sales of capital assets) or on or after that date. The court held that the income was earned after January 1, 1960, entitling the taxpayer to the capital gains exclusion and a full refund of the $22,829.47 in additional taxes, penalties, and interest. The reasoning focused on the contract terms tying payments to post-1960 shipments and minimum quotas, finding that the right to receive the income became fixed only when units were actually shipped in those years rather than at the 1958 execution of the agreement.

taxes

The case involved plaintiff Billy B. Warren suing Allstate Insurance for allegedly wrongfully canceling his assigned-risk motor vehicle liability insurance certificate after premiums were paid, which prompted the South Carolina Highway Department to suspend his driver's license under the Safety Responsibility Act. The trial court sustained Allstate's demurrer on grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract, that damages stemmed from the Department's ministerial act rather than any policy violation, and that the claim was akin to a barred perjury action or required prior administrative review. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the complaint adequately alleged a contractual breach regarding the certificate (distinct from the policy itself), that no quasi-judicial proceeding or exhaustion requirement applied because the Department had no authority to adjudicate the cancellation's validity, and that the claim was not precluded by public policy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Pauline Watts, who was indicted for the murder of her husband, a deputy sheriff, after he was fatally shot in their home in 1964; she was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in prison. On appeal, Watts challenged the denial of her motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti—specifically, that the death resulted from criminal agency—independent of her extrajudicial statements to police. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence, including the location of the body, the presence of a revolver with one spent cartridge nearby, and the nature of the wound, sufficiently established the corpus delicti, and that her statement admitting she shot her husband was properly admitted without objection and further developed on cross-examination. The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on manslaughter and the State's decision not to call certain officers as witnesses, finding no error in the trial proceedings.

criminal law

In Tate v. City of Greenville, the plaintiff sued the city for damage to his truck caused by a collision with an overhanging tree limb on Arlington Street, alleging the limb constituted a street defect under Code section 47-70. The trial court granted the city's motion for involuntary nonsuit on the ground that the driver's own negligence and contributory negligence caused the accident as a matter of law, while rejecting the city's argument that the limb was not a defect. On appeal, the court held that the overhanging limb qualified as a defect that the city could be liable for, and that the evidence did not establish the driver's negligence as the only reasonable inference, particularly given his efforts to avoid parked cars near an intersection and school while traveling at low speed. The court reversed the nonsuit and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence presented factual issues for the jury.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Sun Crest Bottling Company, a domestic corporation based in Florence County, could be sued in Darlington County under South Carolina venue statutes because it owned property and transacted business there. The company sold bottled drinks to stores in Darlington County using crates and bottles for which customers paid a refundable deposit, with the containers typically remaining in the county for only a few days before being returned and exchanged. The Supreme Court held that the bottling company did not own property in Darlington County within the meaning of the venue proviso in Section 10-421, reversing the lower court's ruling that the company was subject to suit there. The court reasoned that the crates and bottles were too transitory to qualify as property owned in the county, drawing on precedent involving a bakery truck that made only temporary deliveries, and distinguished cases involving more permanent property like insurance policies. The decision emphasized legislative intent and the brief, rotating nature of the containers rather than any permanence in the county.

procedureproperty

This case arose from a 1953 automobile collision in Charleston between the plaintiff's car and the defendant's furniture truck, in which the plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages for personal injuries and property damage based on claims of negligent and reckless driving by the defendant's agent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including $36,000 in actual personal injury damages, but the trial judge granted a new trial nisi reducing the personal injury award by $7,000 (which the plaintiff accepted), while rejecting the defendant's other post-trial motions. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the last clear chance doctrine, its handling of future damages instructions, and the size of the verdict. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the last clear chance request was not properly made under the governing statute, that the jury instructions were adequate, and that the reduced verdict did not reflect passion or prejudice or require further reduction. The court emphasized that determinations of excessiveness fall within the trial judge's discretion absent clear abuse.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff storekeeper who obtained a default judgment against defendant Gary for the purchase price of an unsatisfactory ice-making machine after the defendant failed to respond to a summons and complaint. The lower court later cancelled the judgment upon the defendant's motion, finding that installation of a replacement machine constituted a novation relieving the defendant of liability under the original sale. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and restored the judgment, reasoning that the defendant had not followed the statutory procedure under Code Section 10-1213 to set aside a default judgment, including timely application within one year, and that the facts did not establish grounds for relief or a valid novation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved an appeal from a 30-day jail sentence for contempt of court imposed on Adger Goff after he threatened a witness, Dutch Mishoe, during a recess in a civil trial in which Mishoe had testified against Goff and his wife. The incident occurred outside the courtroom but while Mishoe remained under subpoena and had not been released by the court. The trial judge found Goff guilty of direct contempt under the common law, based on testimony that Goff cursed and threatened Mishoe over his statements in the case. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, ruling that the conduct occurred in the presence of the court because the witness was still attendant upon the proceedings, that the inherent power to punish contempt derives from common law rather than statute, and that sufficient evidence supported the factual findings of intimidation. The court rejected arguments that the events were not direct contempt or that statutory procedures applied.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a farmer suing a farm machinery dealer for breaching a contract to promptly repair his tractor, which he needed for cultivating 113 acres of cotton, after the dealer had notice of the urgency; the farmer claimed the delay forced him to use mules instead, resulting in a much lower crop yield, while the dealer counterclaimed for damage to a loaned substitute tractor. A jury awarded the farmer $4,000 in damages, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court's reasoning centered on the inadmissibility of the farmer's evidence regarding damages, which consisted of speculative opinions about expected crop yields rather than objective comparisons to actual production on similar lands under comparable conditions, as required by precedent for assessing losses to growing crops.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a challenge to the City of Greenville's zoning ordinance by J.C. James, who purchased property outside city limits in 1945 and began operating a trailer court in 1947; the area was annexed in 1948 and rezoned in 1950 to a single-family residential district that prohibited trailer courts, leading city officials to order discontinuation of the use as a non-conforming activity. James appealed through the Board of Adjustment and courts, arguing the ordinance was arbitrary, violated due process, and constituted spot zoning by depriving him of a prior vested business right without evidence of harm. The South Carolina Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid as applied to the property, reversing the lower courts' dismissal of the petition. The core reasoning was that the restriction lacked any evidentiary support showing the trailer court impaired public health, safety, morals, or welfare, making it an unreasonable exercise of police power rather than a valid minimum requirement for the general welfare, and that established uses could not be eliminated without such justification.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of a 12-year-old boy's estate against a railroad company and its train crew after the boy was fatally injured in an automobile-train collision at a crossing in Charleston County, South Carolina. The complaint alleged negligence, including failure to give statutory signals and excessive speed by the southbound train, which struck the car after it had crossed behind a northbound train. The defendants denied liability, raised defenses including contributory negligence by the driver (the boy's mother) and family-purpose agency, and challenged the verdict amount on appeal. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the judgment, upholding the jury's findings on the lack of statutory signals and the damages award, and finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a new trial.

torts & liability

In Godwin v. Carrigan, a landowner who had donated one acre to the Town of Summerton for a sewer system sued in 1954 for a writ of mandamus under state condemnation statutes, claiming that defective septic tanks and unfiltered sewage discharge into a creek had polluted his remaining 350 acres, created odors, and taken his property without just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court denied the writ after the town returned that it had acquired the necessary rights, paid compensation through tax abatement, and that any damages were known to the owner years earlier. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory condemnation procedure is not exclusive when the right to compensation is disputed, that a constitutional remedy remains available, that no ministerial duty to condemn arises until the right to compensation is established or conceded, and that unreasonable delay in seeking relief provided additional grounds to refuse the writ. The court also noted the town's affirmative defense of prescription through long adverse use.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

The case involved an employee who alleged that his employer promised him lifetime employment until age 65 in exchange for forgoing a workers' compensation claim after he suffered permanent injuries from inhaling fumes while repairing equipment on the job. The employee sued for breach after being terminated in 1951, claiming his claim under the compensation law was now time-barred. The trial court overruled the employer's demurrer, finding that forbearance to sue provided valid consideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Workmen's Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for covered injuries, prohibits any agreement waiving rights under the Act, and renders the alleged contract unenforceable because the forbearance could not constitute valid consideration.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over recovery under a fire insurance policy issued to life tenants Timothy F. Hunt and Jeanne Hunt Burley for damage to a building in which Mrs. Belle B. Hunt held the remainder interest in fee simple. After a fire caused $1,290.45 in agreed damage, the life tenants sued for the full amount, claiming the insurer was estopped from limiting payment to their proportional interest, while the insurer had also issued a separate policy to the remainderman and sought to apportion liability. The lower court awarded the full loss amount to the life tenants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a partial loss the recovery is limited by statute and policy language to the insureds' actual loss based on their ownership interest, not the policy face amount or agreed value of the property. The core reasoning was that the policy and statute tie recovery to the insured's proportionate interest in the loss, with no basis for estoppel or unjust enrichment where the insureds received coverage matching their requested interest.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the murder conviction of R.C. Williams, a prisoner on a Laurens County chain gang, for shooting and killing guard Eugene Davenport during a disturbance in the stockade on October 21, 1953. Williams was tried and sentenced to death by electrocution after a jury found him guilty without a recommendation of mercy. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant's motion to sequester witnesses. The core reasoning was that sequestration was essential in this capital case because other prisoners, who were key witnesses, were likely to be influenced by hearing the guards' testimony first, given their ongoing subjection to those guards' authority.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over title to property in York County, South Carolina, after a 1932 tax sale that occurred in the name of a prior owner rather than the true owner at the time. The court held that the tax sale was invalid and that the purchaser at the sale had not acquired title through adverse possession. The core reasoning was that the purchaser's possession was not actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive for the statutory period, as the life tenant remained in possession without any change in control or notice to the true owners until her death in 1949, and tax payments alone did not establish a hostile claim. The court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings to return the property to the appellants along with an accounting of rents since 1949.

propertytaxes

The case involved Eugene Vickers, who was convicted by a jury in Cherokee County of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature following an alleged incident at a social gathering. Vickers appealed, raising exceptions regarding the trial judge's extensive questioning of a defense witness that elicited hearsay about another witness's emotional state, the denial of cross-examination on a medical exam, the refusal of a jury instruction on a missing witness inference, and the denial of a directed verdict. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the record and determined that the judge's questions were aimed at clarifying relevant facts in a fair manner without indicating any view on guilt or evidence weight, and that any hearsay was properly stricken with no resulting prejudice. The court overruled all exceptions and affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Margaret Joiner against defendant heating contractor Joiner v. Fort, after she fell into an uncovered floor vent in a church annex that the defendant's workers had left open and unguarded while cleaning the heating system. The jury awarded Joiner $7,500 in actual damages, and the trial court denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding of actionable negligence by the defendant in failing to replace the vent cover or provide warnings, that contributory negligence was a jury question rather than established as a matter of law given the poor visibility and lack of notice to the plaintiff, that the verdict was not excessive based on the documented injuries, and that medical expenses paid via insurance were properly recoverable as damages.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute over a 1950 Ford automobile that had been involved in a negligent operation leading to damages. Plaintiff Burgess obtained a judgment and sought to execute on the vehicle, which had been attached but then released to its owner upon posting of a surety bond; Stephenson Finance Company held a mortgage on the car and sought to enjoin the sale, arguing the bond discharged the lien. The court held that the statutory lien created by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle under the relevant code section survived the release of the attachment by bond, allowing the judgment creditor to proceed with execution and sale of the vehicle. The reasoning was that the lien arises automatically at the time of injury independent of attachment proceedings, which serve only to enforce it, and the bond merely releases the vehicle from custody without discharging the underlying statutory lien, distinguishing it from general attachment rules.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved adjoining property owners in which the plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages from an alleged nuisance and sought an injunction. After the defendants defaulted, the trial judge awarded $1,000 in unliquidated damages without a jury and entered an injunction, leading to execution and sale of the defendants' home. On appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment, the court held the damages portion of the default judgment void. The core reasoning was that under South Carolina law, even after the 1939 amendment to the default judgment statute, a judge lacks authority in tort actions to assess unliquidated damages without submitting the issue to a jury. The court reversed the damages award, declared related proceedings including the sale null and void, and remanded to allow the defendants to plead.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty