Stevenson v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-09-24 · cited 10×
The case involved a dispute over coverage under an accident insurance policy issued by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company to Harry Stevenson. Stevenson suffered third-degree burns to his feet after walking barefoot on the hot deck of his boat, leading to the amputation of his left foot; the insurer denied the claim, arguing the injury was not accidental due to Stevenson's diabetic condition and was not independent of other causes. A jury awarded Stevenson benefits, and the trial court denied the insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence viewed favorably to the insured showed the burns were an accidental injury that proximately caused the loss, that policy terms must be construed liberally in favor of the insured with ambiguities resolved to permit recovery, and that the diabetic condition did not preclude coverage where the injury was the nearest efficient cause. The court rejected arguments that the injury was foreseeable or that the policy language was unambiguous.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Santee Oil Co., Inc. v. Cox
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-09-02 · cited 19×
In this case under the South Carolina Business Corporation Act, a surviving corporation after a statutory merger sought a judicial determination of the fair value of shares held by a dissenting minority stockholder who had objected to the merger of two oil companies. The circuit court valued the corporation's net assets at $1,032,214 and the dissenter's 37.5% interest at $387,080, awarding 6% interest. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the meaning of statutory "fair value" by considering net asset value, market value, and capitalized earnings, weighted them (primarily toward net assets), and affirmed the lower court's valuation after finding it was supported by the evidence and not against the clear weight or preponderance of the proof. The court noted that fair value requires weighing all relevant factors on a case-specific basis without relying on any single method.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Coker v. Pilot Life Insurance
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-08-21 · cited 11×
The case involved a dispute over disability insurance benefits where the insurer stopped payments after initially covering the plaintiff's claim, leading to a lawsuit that resulted in a jury finding of total disability and an award of benefits. The plaintiff then moved for attorneys' fees under a South Carolina statute allowing such awards when an insurer refuses payment without reasonable cause or in bad faith. The trial court granted the maximum statutory fee of $2,500, and the insurer appealed on grounds including lack of jurisdiction after the court term adjourned sine die, failure to plead the fee claim, unconstitutionality of the statute, and insufficient evidence of unreasonable refusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute authorizes the trial judge to determine fees after the main liability issue is resolved, that jurisdiction was proper, the statute was constitutional as a general law, and the evidence supported the finding of no reasonable cause for denial. It also awarded an additional $750 in fees for the appeal.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Coastal Mall, Inc. v. Askins
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-08-20 · cited 8×
The case involved a breach of contract claim by Coastal Mall, Inc., a Horry County corporation, against defendant Askins, a Florence County resident, alleging improper construction of a canopy structure on the plaintiff's property that caused collapse and required repairs. The defendant moved to change venue to Florence County under state statutes allowing transfer when the designated county is improper or when convenience favors it. The lower court denied the motion, ruling the action concerned injury to real property and thus had to be tried in Horry County. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, concluding the suit was a transitory contract action rather than one for injury to real property, so venue properly belonged in the defendant's county of residence.
procedureproperty
C. H. Hedgepath v. Stanley Home Products, Inc.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-08-20 · cited 3×
This case was a workers' compensation appeal arising from the death of Bessie C. Hedgepath in an accident in Orangeburg County while she was allegedly employed by Stanley Home Products, Inc. The Industrial Commission awarded death benefits to the claimant, but the employer appealed to the Court of Common Pleas in Richland County. The lower court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the relevant statute, which requires appeals to be filed in the county where the accident occurred or where the employer has its principal office. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that Stanley's principal office was in Massachusetts rather than Richland County and that the statutory venue rule was jurisdictional with no provision allowing transfer to another county.
labor & employmentprocedure
State v. McClinton
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1975-08-05 · cited 8×
In State v. McClinton, the defendant appealed his conviction for assault with intent to ravish after a jury trial, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal due to insufficient evidence on the element of identity. The court affirmed the conviction and 20-year sentence, holding that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, provided competent support for the jury's verdict. The State established the corpus delicti through the victim's account of being assaulted on the Erskine College campus, and identity was supported by circumstantial evidence including the defendant's proximity to the scene, similar clothing, and bite marks on his hand consistent with the victim's description of biting her attacker. The court also ruled that the officers' descriptions of the hand injury were admissible, whether as factual observations or lay opinions, because they were not superfluous and aided the jury.
criminal law