Thomas P. Bussey

The case involved a dispute over coverage under an accident insurance policy issued by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company to Harry Stevenson. Stevenson suffered third-degree burns to his feet after walking barefoot on the hot deck of his boat, leading to the amputation of his left foot; the insurer denied the claim, arguing the injury was not accidental due to Stevenson's diabetic condition and was not independent of other causes. A jury awarded Stevenson benefits, and the trial court denied the insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence viewed favorably to the insured showed the burns were an accidental injury that proximately caused the loss, that policy terms must be construed liberally in favor of the insured with ambiguities resolved to permit recovery, and that the diabetic condition did not preclude coverage where the injury was the nearest efficient cause. The court rejected arguments that the injury was foreseeable or that the policy language was unambiguous.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case under the South Carolina Business Corporation Act, a surviving corporation after a statutory merger sought a judicial determination of the fair value of shares held by a dissenting minority stockholder who had objected to the merger of two oil companies. The circuit court valued the corporation's net assets at $1,032,214 and the dissenter's 37.5% interest at $387,080, awarding 6% interest. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the meaning of statutory "fair value" by considering net asset value, market value, and capitalized earnings, weighted them (primarily toward net assets), and affirmed the lower court's valuation after finding it was supported by the evidence and not against the clear weight or preponderance of the proof. The court noted that fair value requires weighing all relevant factors on a case-specific basis without relying on any single method.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute over disability insurance benefits where the insurer stopped payments after initially covering the plaintiff's claim, leading to a lawsuit that resulted in a jury finding of total disability and an award of benefits. The plaintiff then moved for attorneys' fees under a South Carolina statute allowing such awards when an insurer refuses payment without reasonable cause or in bad faith. The trial court granted the maximum statutory fee of $2,500, and the insurer appealed on grounds including lack of jurisdiction after the court term adjourned sine die, failure to plead the fee claim, unconstitutionality of the statute, and insufficient evidence of unreasonable refusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute authorizes the trial judge to determine fees after the main liability issue is resolved, that jurisdiction was proper, the statute was constitutional as a general law, and the evidence supported the finding of no reasonable cause for denial. It also awarded an additional $750 in fees for the appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a breach of contract claim by Coastal Mall, Inc., a Horry County corporation, against defendant Askins, a Florence County resident, alleging improper construction of a canopy structure on the plaintiff's property that caused collapse and required repairs. The defendant moved to change venue to Florence County under state statutes allowing transfer when the designated county is improper or when convenience favors it. The lower court denied the motion, ruling the action concerned injury to real property and thus had to be tried in Horry County. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, concluding the suit was a transitory contract action rather than one for injury to real property, so venue properly belonged in the defendant's county of residence.

procedureproperty

This case was a workers' compensation appeal arising from the death of Bessie C. Hedgepath in an accident in Orangeburg County while she was allegedly employed by Stanley Home Products, Inc. The Industrial Commission awarded death benefits to the claimant, but the employer appealed to the Court of Common Pleas in Richland County. The lower court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the relevant statute, which requires appeals to be filed in the county where the accident occurred or where the employer has its principal office. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that Stanley's principal office was in Massachusetts rather than Richland County and that the statutory venue rule was jurisdictional with no provision allowing transfer to another county.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. McClinton, the defendant appealed his conviction for assault with intent to ravish after a jury trial, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal due to insufficient evidence on the element of identity. The court affirmed the conviction and 20-year sentence, holding that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, provided competent support for the jury's verdict. The State established the corpus delicti through the victim's account of being assaulted on the Erskine College campus, and identity was supported by circumstantial evidence including the defendant's proximity to the scene, similar clothing, and bite marks on his hand consistent with the victim's description of biting her attacker. The court also ruled that the officers' descriptions of the hand injury were admissible, whether as factual observations or lay opinions, because they were not superfluous and aided the jury.

criminal law

This case involved a wife's 1972 action for separate maintenance and support against her dentist husband, resulting in court orders for monthly alimony and child support based on his high income. After the husband fell behind on payments and sought modification due to claimed changes in his health and finances, the trial court denied modification, found him in contempt, entered a $35,000 judgment for arrears, and awarded the wife attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to reduce support given the husband's earning capacity, no error in denying credit for certain direct expenditures on the children, and that the equal protection challenge to the attorney's fee award was neither properly preserved nor meritorious.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company against American Mutual Fire Insurance Company seeking pro rata contribution for claims paid after an automobile accident involving policyholder Mulkins. Nationwide argued that American's cancellation notice for a renewal policy had extended coverage under Mulkins' original policy, which had expired by its terms, making both insurers liable at the time of the November 1971 accident. The trial court denied American's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to a jury, which found for American. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory provisions on policy cancellation and renewal did not apply because American had manifested its willingness to renew by issuing a renewal policy, and there was no factual or legal basis to conclude that the original policy remained in effect a month after expiration.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case arose from a 1973 fire caused by a Kirkland subcontractor's negligence during construction of Hamlet Gardens, damaging the property by $9,894.93. Kirkland held a mechanics lien against the insolvent owner's property and sought to offset the fire damage claim against that lien while pursuing reimbursement from its own liability insurer, Hartford; after the owner's receiver and mortgage holder assigned subrogation rights to Providence Washington (the builder's risk insurer, which had already paid the claim), the dispute centered on whether Washington could enforce the claim against Kirkland or the deposited funds. The trial court granted summary judgment to Washington, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kirkland was equitably entitled to the pro tanto offset against Hamlet because strict mutuality is not required in equity when justice and insolvency warrant it, and that Washington, standing in Hamlet's shoes as assignee or subrogee, took subject to that offset. The court further ruled that Kirkland was entitled to the Hartford funds deposited with the court because it had discharged Hartford's liability. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment in Kirkland's favor.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case concerned the constitutionality of a 1973 South Carolina law (Act No. 415) that established a special rule for taxing new buildings and improvements in Charleston County, requiring them to be returned for taxation starting the month after occupancy, in contrast to the general statewide law. The plaintiffs, local tax officials, sought a declaration upholding the act, while some taxpayers challenged it. The court held the act unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 7 of the state constitution, which bars the legislature from enacting laws specific to one county. The reasoning was that a general law already exists on the subject, the act creates nonuniform treatment across counties, and it does not solely concern local fiscal matters but involves state functions of property assessment.

taxesproperty

The case involved a dispute over liability insurance coverage for a home builder, W.N. Leslie, Inc., after a buyer was injured due to a defective disappearing stairway in a newly constructed home. Leslie had paid medical expenses and a settlement to the injured buyer and sought reimbursement from Travelers Insurance under its policy, which provided coverage only until construction operations were completed. The trial court and jury found in favor of Leslie, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the operations were not completed because the parties knew additional work remained and the stairway had not been properly installed or affixed. The court also rejected arguments that coverage was excluded due to assumed liability or that parol evidence was improperly admitted.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case is a workers' compensation appeal in which an employee of a supermarket, Kash and Karry, sought benefits after breaking his arm while chasing two boys who had snatched a customer's purse on a sidewalk near the store entrance. The employee had been retrieving shopping carts from a parking lot when the incident occurred, and the Industrial Commission awarded compensation on the ground that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; both the circuit court and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the employee's good-faith effort to recover the purse advanced the employer's interest by protecting a customer and her shopping funds, even though assisting customers was not part of his assigned duties, relying on the principle that acts outside regular duties undertaken to benefit the employer fall within the course of employment.

labor & employment

This case involved a wrongful death suit by the parents of a child fatally struck by a car, alleging that the South Carolina Highway Department negligently parked its truck on the road, obstructing views and contributing to the accident; the suit proceeded under the South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act, which waives immunity for injuries from negligent operation of government vehicles. The trial court allowed the case to proceed against the department alone after a settlement with the driver, resulting in a verdict reduced to the statutory $10,000 cap. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the department not liable because the statute's language limits recovery to negligent operation 'while being operated,' which does not encompass a parked vehicle, and requires strict construction of the immunity waiver. The court reasoned that 'operation' refers to the active functioning of the vehicle's mechanism, excluding mere parking even if it created a hazard.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved owners of lots in a residential subdivision seeking to prevent a builder from constructing a road across a small piece of adjacent land acquired from the original developer, claiming it was subject to restrictive covenants limiting the area to residential use. The trial court granted the injunction, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that the restrictive covenants applied only to the numbered lots shown on the recorded plat of the subdivision, and the disputed acreage was not designated as a lot on that plat. Therefore, under the rule of strict construction favoring the free use of property, the covenants did not restrict the use of that land.

property

This case involved a 16-year-old employee who suffered serious injuries to both hands in a workplace accident at a canning company and sought continued workers' compensation for temporary total disability. The Industrial Commission found that the claimant remained totally disabled, had not reached maximum medical recovery, and was entitled to resumed benefits and further medical care, but the circuit court reversed the award. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Commission's award. The court held that the Commission's factual findings were supported by the evidence, that precedent cited by the lower court was distinguishable, and that the workers' compensation statute provided for ongoing temporary total disability benefits under these circumstances without regard to the claimant's status as a student or the seasonal nature of the job.

labor & employment

In State v. Fennell, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence via a uniform traffic ticket and, after a mistrial, pleaded guilty to reckless driving before the magistrate, even though no ticket or warrant had charged that offense. The magistrate later sought to withdraw the plea and retry the DUI charge, but the circuit court ruled that the plea was valid and barred further prosecution. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that reckless driving is a separate and distinct offense from DUI rather than a lesser included offense, because each requires proof of elements not necessary to the other. The Court further held that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea to reckless driving absent a proper charging document, as required by statute, and that such jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the original DUI charge.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a property owner suing developers for trespass after they graded a road and built a house that encroached on the rear portion of his land while developing a subdivision. A jury awarded the plaintiff $3,500 in actual damages against all defendants and $15,500 in punitive damages against two defendants. On appeal by one defendant, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the actual damages award was grossly excessive because there was no evidence of the land's value or depreciation to support such an amount, as the plaintiff had purchased the property for only $400 and suffered only limited damage to the rear acre.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved White's 1970 burglary conviction in York County and his later petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged the admissibility of a pre-trial one-on-one identification confrontation with the victim and claimed violations of his right to counsel and right to appeal. The court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, ruling that White had been fully advised of his rights, knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel's presence at the confrontation, and that the victim's uncertain identification based on size, build, and gait was not the product of improper police suggestions. On the appeal issue, the court found no reversible error in the trial record, concluded that trial counsel should have ensured White understood his appeal rights but that the lack of a timely appeal did not justify a new trial or belated appeal without a showing of prejudice, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a contract dispute between Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. and defendant Way over refrigeration equipment leased for her grocery store under two documents that functioned as a financing arrangement. The plaintiff sued for 36 unpaid monthly installments after repossessing the equipment due to malfunctions reported by the defendant, who counterclaimed for damages from lost merchandise and customers. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the installments and granted a nonsuit on the counterclaim. The court reversed, holding that the evidence created a jury question on which party breached the contract and that the plaintiff failed to prove any damages beyond possibly nominal amounts. It further reasoned that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applied and was not properly excluded by the contract terms.

business & regulatory

The case involved defendant Pierce's conviction for the murder of Peg Cuttino, following a trial after a change of venue, based in part on a confession and testimony placing him near the crime scene. Pierce appealed, contending that the trial court erred by admitting a witness's testimony about seeing him in the area the day after the date alleged in the indictment, by denying a new trial due to the solicitor's allegedly inflammatory closing argument (to which no timely objection was made), and by denying a new trial motion based on after-discovered evidence. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the life sentence, holding that the testimony was admissible because it was corroborative of the State's case rather than proof of a different offense date, that objections to argument must be raised at trial to preserve the issue, and that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in concluding the new evidence would not likely alter the result. The court noted that the defendant had prior knowledge of the witness's account and that the after-discovered evidence was not material enough to warrant relief.

criminal lawprocedure