The case concerned whether a bank's cancellation of Eunice Langford Bristow's prior promissory notes, through a novation agreement that substituted new collateral mortgages on property owned by Marsh Investment Corporation, should be rescinded so as to reinstate her original debts. The court held that the prior indebtedness should not be reinstated. Under Louisiana law, consent to a contract may be vitiated by error or fraud as to a principal cause, but the bank's own gross negligence in accepting the invalid mortgages without verifying authority barred it from obtaining rescission on those grounds.
This case involves a bankruptcy dispute between Louisiana Industrial Coatings, Inc. (LIC), a subcontractor, and Boh Bros. Construction Co., the prime contractor, over unpaid balances on thirteen industrial painting subcontracts and Boh's counterclaim for excess costs to complete unfinished work after LIC's breach. The bankruptcy court denied LIC and its assignee's claims for payment on completed subcontracts, interpreting the contracts to allow Boh to offset its losses on uncompleted ones, and granted Boh a net counterclaim. On appeal, the district court applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to the bankruptcy court's factual findings, affirmed the contract interpretation and denial of claims, but amended the counterclaim amount downward to $106,370.92 by correcting the calculation of credits for amounts due on completed subcontracts. The core reasoning centered on the subcontract terms permitting recoupment of losses, LIC's substantial breaches including on the disputed LOOP-Clovelly subcontract, and the inapplicability of Bankruptcy Code section 553 to these transaction-based adjustments.
This case concerned a 1982 collision in the Gulf of Mexico between the bulk carrier EN GEDI, owned by Zim Israel, and the ACADIA FOREST, owned by LASH Carriers, with allegations that a third vessel, the JOSE COLOMO owned by PEMEX, contributed by embarrassing navigation. After trial on liability, the court held that the ACADIA FOREST was solely at fault for the collision, with no fault attributable to the EN GEDI or the JOSE COLOMO. The decision rested on findings that the ACADIA FOREST, in a crossing situation under maritime rules, failed to keep out of the way, did not alter course substantially or in time despite the risk of collision indicated by constant bearings, and made inadequate radio contact, while the other vessels maintained proper courses and speeds. Remaining issues of damages to the EN GEDI were referred for further proceedings, with other claims settled.
In this diversity case, plaintiff diamond merchant Sol Silver sued Louisiana defendant Dr. Earl Nelson to recover nearly $200,000 in diamonds and rings that were delivered under five memoranda agreements but never returned or paid for, asserting claims including conversion, breach of contract, conspiracy to convert, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. After a bench trial, the court made detailed findings of fact about the parties' meetings, failed sale attempts, and travel between Louisiana and New Jersey, then issued conclusions of law on choice of law. The court applied sections 145, 188, and 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to hold that Louisiana law governs the tort claims and measure of damages, including interest rates under the Louisiana Civil Code.
This case involved a 1977 collision in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet between the M/S SOUTHWIND and the M/V ASTROS, which occurred when the SOUTHWIND sheered due to hydrodynamic forces from a recently dredged borrow pit. On remand from the Fifth Circuit, the district court apportioned liability between the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the SOUTHWIND, finding the Corps 20 percent at fault for failing to publish information about the altered channel conditions in breach of its regulations and duty of care, while holding the SOUTHWIND 80 percent liable due to its pilot's negligence in not taking adequate precautions despite awareness of the pit. The court reasoned that the Corps' omission was a proximate cause because advance notice would have led the pilot to exercise greater care, and it adjusted the interest on damages awarded to the ASTROS's owner under the Suits in Admiralty Act to limit prejudgment interest against the United States to four percent from the date of judicial demand. The opinion also addressed contribution between the defendants and referred remaining damages issues to a magistrate.
Farrell Lines sued its insurer INA to recover costs it incurred defending a 1975 personal injury suit brought by longshoreman William Glasper, who was injured while loading containers onto Farrell's vessel using allegedly defective equipment. Farrell had attempted to bring INA into the original suit via third-party complaint but was denied leave as untimely, leading to this separate action seeking reimbursement under two INA policies (a comprehensive general liability policy and a multiple liability policy). The court found no duty to defend or indemnify, holding that the policies' watercraft exclusions barred coverage because Glasper's injury arose from the ownership, operation, and loading of a vessel owned by Farrell and occurred during stevedoring operations at a dock. The court further determined that the container and trailer involved did not qualify as an automobile under the auto liability portion of the second policy and that other policy provisions did not create coverage. Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint.
