Fred James Cassibry

The case concerned whether a bank's cancellation of Eunice Langford Bristow's prior promissory notes, through a novation agreement that substituted new collateral mortgages on property owned by Marsh Investment Corporation, should be rescinded so as to reinstate her original debts. The court held that the prior indebtedness should not be reinstated. Under Louisiana law, consent to a contract may be vitiated by error or fraud as to a principal cause, but the bank's own gross negligence in accepting the invalid mortgages without verifying authority barred it from obtaining rescission on those grounds.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a bankruptcy dispute between Louisiana Industrial Coatings, Inc. (LIC), a subcontractor, and Boh Bros. Construction Co., the prime contractor, over unpaid balances on thirteen industrial painting subcontracts and Boh's counterclaim for excess costs to complete unfinished work after LIC's breach. The bankruptcy court denied LIC and its assignee's claims for payment on completed subcontracts, interpreting the contracts to allow Boh to offset its losses on uncompleted ones, and granted Boh a net counterclaim. On appeal, the district court applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to the bankruptcy court's factual findings, affirmed the contract interpretation and denial of claims, but amended the counterclaim amount downward to $106,370.92 by correcting the calculation of credits for amounts due on completed subcontracts. The core reasoning centered on the subcontract terms permitting recoupment of losses, LIC's substantial breaches including on the disputed LOOP-Clovelly subcontract, and the inapplicability of Bankruptcy Code section 553 to these transaction-based adjustments.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a 1982 collision in the Gulf of Mexico between the bulk carrier EN GEDI, owned by Zim Israel, and the ACADIA FOREST, owned by LASH Carriers, with allegations that a third vessel, the JOSE COLOMO owned by PEMEX, contributed by embarrassing navigation. After trial on liability, the court held that the ACADIA FOREST was solely at fault for the collision, with no fault attributable to the EN GEDI or the JOSE COLOMO. The decision rested on findings that the ACADIA FOREST, in a crossing situation under maritime rules, failed to keep out of the way, did not alter course substantially or in time despite the risk of collision indicated by constant bearings, and made inadequate radio contact, while the other vessels maintained proper courses and speeds. Remaining issues of damages to the EN GEDI were referred for further proceedings, with other claims settled.

torts & liability

In this diversity case, plaintiff diamond merchant Sol Silver sued Louisiana defendant Dr. Earl Nelson to recover nearly $200,000 in diamonds and rings that were delivered under five memoranda agreements but never returned or paid for, asserting claims including conversion, breach of contract, conspiracy to convert, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. After a bench trial, the court made detailed findings of fact about the parties' meetings, failed sale attempts, and travel between Louisiana and New Jersey, then issued conclusions of law on choice of law. The court applied sections 145, 188, and 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to hold that Louisiana law governs the tort claims and measure of damages, including interest rates under the Louisiana Civil Code.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involved a 1977 collision in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet between the M/S SOUTHWIND and the M/V ASTROS, which occurred when the SOUTHWIND sheered due to hydrodynamic forces from a recently dredged borrow pit. On remand from the Fifth Circuit, the district court apportioned liability between the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the SOUTHWIND, finding the Corps 20 percent at fault for failing to publish information about the altered channel conditions in breach of its regulations and duty of care, while holding the SOUTHWIND 80 percent liable due to its pilot's negligence in not taking adequate precautions despite awareness of the pit. The court reasoned that the Corps' omission was a proximate cause because advance notice would have led the pilot to exercise greater care, and it adjusted the interest on damages awarded to the ASTROS's owner under the Suits in Admiralty Act to limit prejudgment interest against the United States to four percent from the date of judicial demand. The opinion also addressed contribution between the defendants and referred remaining damages issues to a magistrate.

torts & liabilityfederal power

Farrell Lines sued its insurer INA to recover costs it incurred defending a 1975 personal injury suit brought by longshoreman William Glasper, who was injured while loading containers onto Farrell's vessel using allegedly defective equipment. Farrell had attempted to bring INA into the original suit via third-party complaint but was denied leave as untimely, leading to this separate action seeking reimbursement under two INA policies (a comprehensive general liability policy and a multiple liability policy). The court found no duty to defend or indemnify, holding that the policies' watercraft exclusions barred coverage because Glasper's injury arose from the ownership, operation, and loading of a vessel owned by Farrell and occurred during stevedoring operations at a dock. The court further determined that the container and trailer involved did not qualify as an automobile under the auto liability portion of the second policy and that other policy provisions did not create coverage. Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This admiralty case involved Otto Candies, Inc. suing McDermott International, Inc. for breach of bareboat charter agreements on two ocean-going barges, alleging that McDermott failed to repair extensive damage sustained during the charter period and return the vessels in the required condition. McDermott denied liability, claimed the barges were returned in better condition, and argued that some claimed repairs involved ordinary wear and tear or pre-existing damage for which it was not responsible. After trial, the court found that the barges were delivered seaworthy, suffered aggravated damage under McDermott's control in Brazil, and were not properly restored to on-charter condition by McDermott despite the charter terms requiring repairs beyond ordinary wear and tear. The court therefore awarded Candies damages calculated by subtracting credits for pre-existing damage from the repair costs needed to restore the barges, while rejecting McDermott's counterclaim and demands for reduced charter hire.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case arose from injuries sustained by plaintiff Doris Jean Fisher when the skiff she was riding in, operated by Willie Danos, collided with an unlit jetty owned by Gulf Oil Company in navigable waters in Louisiana. Danos had previously settled, and after a jury trial finding Gulf not negligent and apportioning fault between Danos and Fisher, appeals addressed issues including whether the settlement released Gulf and whether Fisher had revoked her jury trial election. Following remand from the Court of Appeals for non-jury reconsideration of the record, the district court made findings of fact detailing the circumstances of the nighttime collision, the jetty's construction without required permits or warning lights, the parties' actions and knowledge, and related damages calculations, to support entry of judgment under admiralty law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Lewis E. Johnson seeking attorneys’ fees and costs from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Equal Access to Justice Act after litigating claims about improper mortgage calculations for a housing project. The court determined that Johnson qualified as a prevailing party on one of his claims despite not succeeding on all, and that the government's position lacked substantial justification because it was found arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court granted the motion for fees but limited the award to only those allocable to the successful claim, referring the fee calculation to a magistrate.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This admiralty case on remand from the Fifth Circuit involves disputes over damages arising from negligent repair and replacement of a low-pressure turbine by subcontractors Turbine Service and Gonzales, under contracts with Todd Shipyards, including claims against insurers Travelers and Sentry for resulting losses of use and repair costs. The court addressed five specific issues by applying the appellate holdings that a red-letter clause limited Todd's liability for negligence or breach to $300,000, reducing loss-of-use damages to $498,000, excluding insurer liability for costs to repair or replace their insureds' own work product, and awarding prejudgment interest. It selected Louisiana Civil Code Article 2924 rates (7% through September 1980, then 10%, then 12%) applied on a compound basis from the date of loss for full compensation, calculated adjusted awards across parties, and confirmed that the liability limit does not bar recovery of prejudgment interest or certain attorneys' fees. The opinion withdraws a prior remand opinion to incorporate these modifications for clarity and finality, resulting in a table of recalculated damage allocations.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved plaintiff Leonard Gauthier's claim against his employer Crosby Marine Service, Inc. and its insurer for punitive damages based on their alleged arbitrary and capricious refusal to pay maintenance and cure benefits after his 1978 workplace injury aboard a vessel. The court had previously ruled on the underlying maintenance and cure obligations in a severed proceeding but delayed entry of a final judgment due to disputes over Rule 54(b) certification in the multi-claim litigation and disagreements among the parties about voluntary payment. The court decided in favor of the defendants, holding that their failure to pay was not arbitrary or capricious because they maintained a good-faith belief that no payment was due until a proper final judgment was entered or the entire case resolved, and they promptly arranged payment after appellate review of enforcement efforts. The core reasoning centered on the procedural complexities of judgment finality, the parties' communications showing no frivolous positions, and the availability of enforcement remedies that the plaintiff ultimately pursued.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved French citizens Andre and Paulette Laubie suing the Royal Sonesta Hotel, its officers, and insurer for negligence after unknown persons severed the chain lock on their room door and stole $50,000 in jewelry while they were guests. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, contending that Article 2971 of the Louisiana Civil Code limited their liability to $100 (or $500 after a 1982 amendment). After reviewing the procedural history—including an initial dismissal, certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court (which held the limit did not apply to delictual liability), and the subsequent legislative amendment explicitly covering officers, employees, and delictual claims—the court concluded that the 1982 amendment was merely interpretive of the original statutory intent and applied retroactively. As a result, the defendants' liability was capped at the $100 limit in effect at the time of the theft, the claim fell below the federal jurisdictional amount, and the action was dismissed.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a longshoreman, Willie C. Noel, who was injured at his employer's shipyard when a tugboat operated by a coworker pushed a crane barge into the moored barge where he was working, crushing his foot between the dock and the barge. The plaintiff sued his employer, Geosource, Inc., under Section 5(b) of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for negligence of the vessel. The court decided in favor of the plaintiff, finding the defendant negligent for failing to inform the tug operator of workers' locations and to sound a warning, which proximately caused the injury, and awarded damages for lost earning capacity, pain, and mental distress. The core reasoning was that the employer's breach of duty to avoid hazards under its control led to the accident, while the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent under the circumstances.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

In Brooks v. Rosiere, plaintiffs sued police officers, the City of New Orleans, and related defendants in Louisiana state court and moved to remand after the defendants removed the case to federal court. The court granted the motion for remand, holding that removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 because the first-served defendant (Rosiere) failed to petition for removal within thirty days of service, thereby waiving the right to remove, and the remaining defendants could not file a valid petition without unanimous joinder within that timeframe. The court rejected arguments that the defect could be cured by later consent, examination of state records, application of exceptions for unserved defendants, waiver by plaintiffs' conduct, amendment under § 1653, or judicial economy considerations, emphasizing that the thirty-day limit and unanimity rule are strictly enforced.

procedure

This case is a federal court action for legal malpractice in which plaintiff Cabot sued attorney A. Morgan Brian and his law firms after Brian's failure to timely file an appellate brief caused dismissal of Cabot's appeal from a state trial court judgment of $830,305.05 against it in a construction cost-overrun dispute. The court addressed Cabot's motion to vacate a prior order that had struck the jury demand on the issue of whether the state appeal would have succeeded and directed briefing on that question and on damages. The court held that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. did not require vacating the portion of the order asking whether the appeal would have been reversed, because that remained a legal question for the court, but did require vacating the damages portion because Jenkins shifted the burden of proof on success of the underlying claim to the attorney. The reasoning rested on analysis of Jenkins as modifying the prior 'case within a case' approach in Louisiana malpractice law while leaving the threshold legal determination intact.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Parker v. Cronvich, two deputies in the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office sued the sheriff and a chief deputy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, claiming their terminations violated First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliating against their union membership and exercise of free speech and association. The court found that the deputies were suspended and later fired after a heated confrontation at roll call that amounted to insubordination, and that the sheriff’s broad discretion to hire and fire deputies was not constrained by the Constitution in this instance. Applying the three-step inquiry from Tanner v. McCall, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show that protected conduct caused the discharge, as the expressions at issue were not matters of public concern and the evidence did not establish that union activity motivated the termination. The court therefore entered judgment for the defendants.

civil rightsfree speechlabor & employment

In Hannon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., asbestosis plaintiffs could not identify specific products from certain defendant manufacturers, prompting summary judgment motions; plaintiffs urged a collective liability theory akin to market share liability from Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. The court denied application of that theory, distinguishing asbestos from DES because fibers vary in type and harm, relevant markets are complex and hard to define, major producers like Johns-Manville are absent, and some plaintiffs can identify defendants. It concluded the rationale for shifting the burden of proof under market share liability does not apply, making the theory inappropriate for these cases.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Jane C. Lynn's claims against the City of New Orleans and a police officer under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that the officer violated her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during an investigation of a hit-and-run accident by entering an apartment, arresting her and others for interfering with the investigation, and detaining her in minimal clothing. The court found that the officer acted under color of state law and that the arrest was supported by probable cause under a local ordinance prohibiting resistance to officers, as the occupants had been drinking and initially refused entry while the officer investigated. It applied Parratt v. Taylor to conclude that any due process deprivation did not give rise to a federal claim where state remedies were available, and it held that punitive damages were unavailable against the municipality under Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.

civil rightscriminal law

The case concerned the United States' recovery of oil spill cleanup costs from barge owner Dixie Carriers, Inc., and its insurer under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 after a 1974 spill of over one million gallons of crude oil into the Mississippi River. The court had previously held that the FWPCA was the exclusive remedy, limiting the government's recovery to $100 per gross ton of the vessel ($121,600 total), and the present issue was whether Dixie was entitled to a credit against that cap for roughly $108,000 it voluntarily spent on initial cleanup before discontinuing operations. The United States argued that the statute's text, which addresses only costs incurred by the government itself, does not authorize any such credit for voluntary expenditures by the responsible party. Defendants countered that statutory purpose, equity, estoppel, agency principles, and provisions like 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) supported allowing the credit to avoid anomalous results and encourage prompt private cleanup. The court analyzed these contentions through rules of statutory construction and legislative history without adopting the defendants' proposed interpretations.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns Jones Act employers Crosby Marine Service and L. Griffin seeking indemnity from Dixie Oil Tools for maintenance and cure payments they were ordered to make to injured seaman Leonard Gauthier after he suffered a groin injury while loading oil tools. The employers had already been held liable for those payments following a severed trial, while a later jury found Gauthier's injury was caused 50% by his own negligence and 50% by Dixie's negligence. The court held that Crosby and Griffin could not recover indemnity from Dixie, concluding that the claim failed whether analyzed under maritime or state law because the seaman's contributory negligence would bar his own recovery against the third party. The core reasoning was that indemnity actions are independent rather than derivative, and no precedent supported allowing employers to recover when contributory negligence would prevent the employee's recovery.

labor & employmenttorts & liability