The case involved a buyer who purchased a used house and later discovered the heating system was defective, seeking to recover replacement costs from the seller based on an implied warranty of fitness. The court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, holding that it failed to state a cause of action. South Carolina precedent rejects implied warranties in the sale of real property, requiring instead allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, which were absent here; the court also noted that the house being used was properly considered but not prejudicial. The decision emphasized that liability for defects requires specific facts not pleaded in the complaint.
The case concerned ownership of a four-acre parcel conveyed in 1925 by a deed whose granting clause stated it was transferred to named trustees 'their successors and assigns' but added that the land was to be used for school purposes only and would revert to the grantor or his heirs if used otherwise. After the property ceased to be used for schools, plaintiff Stylecraft, Inc., as successor to the original grantees, claimed fee-simple ownership, while defendant Thomas asserted he held the grantor's retained reversionary interest. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants to surrender possession. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under a long line of precedents the fee-simple estate created by the granting clause could not be diminished by later restrictive language in the deed. The court rejected the argument that the grantor's intent should override this established rule of property law.
The City of Columbia sued Niagara Fire Insurance Company to collect an additional 2% license fee on gross premiums collected in 1962 by Eagle Fire Insurance Company, which Niagara acquired at the end of that year under a reinsurance agreement. Niagara had paid its 1963 license fee based only on its own 1962 premiums, but the city argued the fee should also cover the acquired business volume. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that Niagara must pay the additional amount. The court reasoned that the ordinance taxes the privilege of doing business in the current year, using prior-year premiums only as a measure of expected volume, and that Niagara's acquisition meant its 1963 operations encompassed Eagle's business as well.
The case involved the York County Fair Association's appeal from a circuit court order denying its claim for exemption from South Carolina income tax assessed for the period 1949 through 1962. The association, a corporation engaged in holding fairs and whose capital stock was owned by an American Legion Post, claimed exemption under a statute for labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations where no net earnings benefit any private stockholder or member. The court decided that the exemption did not apply because the Post was a private corporation rather than a public one, and affirmed the denial of the claim.
In this case, plaintiff Lionel Gentry sued defendant Watkins-Carolina Trucking Co. for personal injuries and property damage after his van was struck from behind by the defendant's loaded tractor-trailer on Interstate 85, alleging negligence by the truck driver. A jury awarded Gentry $30,000 in actual damages. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of certain medical and other testimony, a statement in the trial judge's jury instructions, and the size of the verdict as excessive. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the driver's negligence, that the challenged evidentiary rulings and instructions did not constitute reversible error, and that the verdict was not so shockingly large as to indicate passion or prejudice.
This case involved retail supermarket operators challenging the constitutionality of Section 5 of a 1965 South Carolina statute that barred stores from selling one brand of milk at a lower price than competing brands or discriminating in sale terms, with a limited exception tied to wholesale price differences set by the Dairy Commission. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement by the State Dairy Commission, arguing the provision violated their rights, while the Commission defended it as necessary to prevent unfair trade practices and monopolies in the milk industry. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the statute's constitutionality, reversing a lower court's ruling, on the grounds that it represented a valid exercise of the state's police power to protect public welfare without directly fixing retail prices, given the economic interests retained by producers and distributors under the prevailing milk marketing system. The court found the law did not infringe on retailers' property rights in milk they accepted for sale and was supported by evidence of potential anticompetitive effects.
