Lionel K. Legge

The case involved a buyer who purchased a used house and later discovered the heating system was defective, seeking to recover replacement costs from the seller based on an implied warranty of fitness. The court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, holding that it failed to state a cause of action. South Carolina precedent rejects implied warranties in the sale of real property, requiring instead allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, which were absent here; the court also noted that the house being used was properly considered but not prejudicial. The decision emphasized that liability for defects requires specific facts not pleaded in the complaint.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned ownership of a four-acre parcel conveyed in 1925 by a deed whose granting clause stated it was transferred to named trustees 'their successors and assigns' but added that the land was to be used for school purposes only and would revert to the grantor or his heirs if used otherwise. After the property ceased to be used for schools, plaintiff Stylecraft, Inc., as successor to the original grantees, claimed fee-simple ownership, while defendant Thomas asserted he held the grantor's retained reversionary interest. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants to surrender possession. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under a long line of precedents the fee-simple estate created by the granting clause could not be diminished by later restrictive language in the deed. The court rejected the argument that the grantor's intent should override this established rule of property law.

property

The City of Columbia sued Niagara Fire Insurance Company to collect an additional 2% license fee on gross premiums collected in 1962 by Eagle Fire Insurance Company, which Niagara acquired at the end of that year under a reinsurance agreement. Niagara had paid its 1963 license fee based only on its own 1962 premiums, but the city argued the fee should also cover the acquired business volume. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that Niagara must pay the additional amount. The court reasoned that the ordinance taxes the privilege of doing business in the current year, using prior-year premiums only as a measure of expected volume, and that Niagara's acquisition meant its 1963 operations encompassed Eagle's business as well.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case involved the York County Fair Association's appeal from a circuit court order denying its claim for exemption from South Carolina income tax assessed for the period 1949 through 1962. The association, a corporation engaged in holding fairs and whose capital stock was owned by an American Legion Post, claimed exemption under a statute for labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations where no net earnings benefit any private stockholder or member. The court decided that the exemption did not apply because the Post was a private corporation rather than a public one, and affirmed the denial of the claim.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Lionel Gentry sued defendant Watkins-Carolina Trucking Co. for personal injuries and property damage after his van was struck from behind by the defendant's loaded tractor-trailer on Interstate 85, alleging negligence by the truck driver. A jury awarded Gentry $30,000 in actual damages. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of certain medical and other testimony, a statement in the trial judge's jury instructions, and the size of the verdict as excessive. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the driver's negligence, that the challenged evidentiary rulings and instructions did not constitute reversible error, and that the verdict was not so shockingly large as to indicate passion or prejudice.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved retail supermarket operators challenging the constitutionality of Section 5 of a 1965 South Carolina statute that barred stores from selling one brand of milk at a lower price than competing brands or discriminating in sale terms, with a limited exception tied to wholesale price differences set by the Dairy Commission. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement by the State Dairy Commission, arguing the provision violated their rights, while the Commission defended it as necessary to prevent unfair trade practices and monopolies in the milk industry. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the statute's constitutionality, reversing a lower court's ruling, on the grounds that it represented a valid exercise of the state's police power to protect public welfare without directly fixing retail prices, given the economic interests retained by producers and distributors under the prevailing milk marketing system. The court found the law did not infringe on retailers' property rights in milk they accepted for sale and was supported by evidence of potential anticompetitive effects.

business & regulatory

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Annie L. Causby against her employer, Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., for a knee injury sustained in 1960. After an initial award in April 1963 granting temporary total disability and partial permanent disability, Causby sought additional benefits under a statute allowing review for change of condition, leading to a December 1963 order for knee surgery and related compensation. The Full Commission affirmed the additional award, but the Circuit Court reversed it, and the appellate court affirmed that reversal. The court reasoned that "change of condition" requires a physical change occurring after the original award, and the evidence showed the claimant's ongoing knee pain and need for surgery existed at or before the April 1963 award with no post-award worsening supported by the record.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a customer who was stopped by a store manager after forgetting to pay for two packages of ham, leading to his arrest for petit larceny and later shoplifting; he was acquitted and sued the store for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The jury found for the store on malicious prosecution but for the plaintiff on abuse of process, and the store appealed the latter verdict. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial judge gave erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions, including one stating that an arrest for shoplifting or petit larceny requires a warrant (which confuses abuse of process with false arrest) and another incorrectly describing compensatory damages as putting the plaintiff in the "same or better" position.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a South Carolina corporation suing a Delaware corporation for damages arising from an alleged breach of agreement over the handling of payments on worthless checks, after the defendant initiated criminal proceedings against a third party. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing it was not subject to substituted service of process because it was a foreign corporation not transacting business in South Carolina under the relevant statute. The court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that the defendant's regular solicitation of orders by a resident salesman, substantial annual sales to the plaintiff and others in the state over several years, and deliveries into South Carolina established sufficient contacts. Under the applicable test from prior precedent, these activities meant that exercising personal jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the circuit court's factual determination was supported by the evidence.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involves Lionel McCrary's appeal from a circuit court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus following his 1962 convictions for housebreaking, safecracking, and grand larceny at two locations. McCrary, representing himself, alleged that he was denied due process, that his retained counsel provided incompetent representation, that the trial court improperly consolidated the indictments for a single trial, and that various other errors occurred including the use of false evidence, lack of a search warrant, and an incomplete trial transcript. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that counsel had rendered competent representation meeting constitutional standards by acting in good faith to the best of his ability, that consolidation was within the trial court's discretion and agreed to by counsel without resulting prejudice, and that the remaining claims were either waived, not preserved for appeal, or unsupported by the record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an appeal from a circuit court order denying a writ of habeas corpus to Alvin T. Allen, who had been convicted in 1964 of housebreaking, larceny, and safecracking and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Allen challenged his confinement on grounds including denial of a preliminary hearing, insufficient time to prepare his defense with counsel, a purportedly defective indictment due to post-drafting addition of his name, an improper gross sentence, and ineffective representation from lack of a trial transcript at the habeas hearing. The court affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Allen's retained counsel was competent and had adequate preparation time with his client's agreement to proceed, that no preliminary hearing was required as a matter of due process, that the indictment was valid when presented to the grand jury, that the sentence was within statutory limits, and that any transcript issue had been waived or was irrelevant to the habeas proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was an appeal from a circuit court order denying a writ of habeas corpus following guilty pleas to a five-count indictment for conspiracy to break and enter, housebreaking, grand larceny, safecracking, and possession of burglary tools. The appellant contended that his 14-year sentence exceeded the legal maximum for possession of burglary tools because the back of the indictment listed the counts in a different order. The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the plain language on the face of the indictment controls over any caption or external legend, so the sentence was properly imposed on the safecracking count to which the appellant had pleaded guilty. The court further held that the appellant's separate challenge to the maximum sentence for the burglary tools offense was not properly before it.

criminal lawprocedure

This case under South Carolina’s Workmen’s Compensation Law concerned the amount of compensation owed to claimant Bundrick for partial loss of use of his right arm after a workplace fall that also injured his hip. The Hearing Commissioner and Full Commission awarded compensation based on a 50% permanent loss of use; the Circuit Court reduced the award to 20%, finding insufficient competent evidence for a higher percentage and relying primarily on medical testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claimant’s lay testimony was admissible and probative on the extent of functional impairment, that the issue was not so technically complex as to require exclusive reliance on expert medical evidence, and that the Circuit Court improperly substituted its judgment for the Commission’s fact-finding role in weighing conflicting medical opinions. The matter was remanded to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with these principles.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a South Carolina insurance company that paid additional license taxes under protest and sued to recover them after the Tax Commission disallowed certain deductions in computing its net income for the tax base under state statutes for 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1962. The company argued that all South Carolina taxes paid should be deductible and that an auditor's agreement on the 1958 calculation should bind the Commission, while the Commission maintained limits on deductions for taxes benefiting out-of-state operations and its authority to revise the computation method. The court upheld the tax assessments, ruling that deductions must reasonably relate to in-state income production under combined provisions of the license tax and income tax statutes, and that the Commission could adjust prior returns to follow its adopted formula. However, it reversed the interest assessment on the 1958 underpayment, finding it inequitable since the correct liability amount was not determinable by the company until the Commission's later revision.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned challenges by property owners in St. Andrews Public Service District to the constitutionality of Act No. 397 of 1965 and related regulations under Act No. 535 of 1965, which authorized the district's commission to issue $5 million in general obligation bonds for sewer system extensions and improvements while imposing a combination of district-wide ad valorem taxes, monthly sewer service charges, and front-foot assessments on abutting properties to cover debt service and operations. The plaintiffs argued that the frontage assessments were unconstitutional, that the plan was discriminatory, and that certain owners (including those with septic tanks or vacant lots) should be exempt from some levies. The court held both acts constitutional and the commission's plan valid, reasoning that the assessments constituted permissible local improvement financing under the police power to protect public health, that benefits to properties need not be immediate or direct, that the commission's discretionary choices on assessments (such as for corner lots) were not arbitrary, and that all district properties benefited from the overall system even if not directly served. The decree was affirmed.

propertyenvironmenttaxes

The case involved a plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries from a 1961 car accident in which defendant Brown negligently drove into the plaintiff's vehicle; Brown and Coleman, both employees of a car dealership, had been drinking, and Coleman was a passenger on a personal errand for Brown. After the jury returned a verdict for Coleman (and against defaulting defendant Brown), the trial judge granted the plaintiff a new trial against both on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. On appeal, the court held that while orders granting new trials on factual grounds are generally not appealable, it could review whether any evidence supported liability against Coleman. Finding no evidence that Coleman drove, controlled the car, or was engaged in a joint enterprise with Brown, the court concluded there was no basis for liability and reversed the new-trial order as to Coleman.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved George W. Dukes, who in 1953 pleaded guilty to an indictment describing a robbery committed on a highway with a pistol and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Years later, Dukes petitioned for habeas corpus, arguing that the indictment charged only highway robbery (with a 10-year maximum) rather than armed robbery, and that he had already served the maximum allowable term. The court held that the indictment sufficiently alleged armed robbery under the relevant statutes because it explicitly described the use of a pistol during the robbery, making the 25-year sentence proper. Any potential defect or ambiguity from the indictment's caption or references to a highway was deemed surplusage or waived because Dukes failed to raise it by demurrer or motion to quash before pleading guilty. The lower court's denial of relief was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gulf Oil Corporation, a company doing business in South Carolina, challenging additional franchise tax assessments on amounts transferred from earned surplus to a capital account in connection with stock dividends issued from 1958 to 1963. The Tax Commission treated the excess of market value over par value of the dividend shares as "paid-in surplus" includable in the tax base under Sections 65-606 and 65-607 of the 1962 Code, but Gulf paid the assessments under protest and sought a refund. The court held that these internal transfers did not qualify as paid-in surplus and were not subject to the tax. It reasoned that paid-in surplus, per standard accounting definitions and the statute's language, arises only from the sale or issuance of stock above par value, not from mere bookkeeping reallocations of retained earnings without any asset increase or external contribution.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case concerned a dispute among siblings over two parcels of land in Orangeburg County that their uncle had conveyed to one brother as trustee for another. The petitioners sought a declaration of equal ownership interests, termination of the trust, and distribution based on prior family agreements requiring them to share equally any gifts or property received from their mother or uncle above a certain value. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decree, holding that the conveyance was not a gift subject to those agreements because the agreements expressly excluded testamentary transfers, the parties knew of an existing will devising the land to the beneficiary, and the deed was executed for consideration after the uncle's marriage likely revoked that will. The core reasoning focused on the plain language and intent of the family agreements, along with surrounding evidence showing the conveyance carried out the uncle's prior testamentary plan rather than constituting a new gift.

propertyfamily law

The case involved contractors who bid on and completed a public water pipeline installation project and later sued the Commission of Public Works for extra construction costs, claiming the owner failed to fully disclose on its plans the subsoil conditions and groundwater levels revealed in its pre-bid test borings. The jury found for the defendant on this claim (while awarding the contract balance on a separate count), and the plaintiffs appealed the adverse verdict along with a related denial of interest. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury instructions were erroneous because they conflicted on the owner's duty of accurate disclosure and the contractors' right to rely on the plans despite disclaimer clauses, and that certain evidence on engineering practices and bid tabulations should have been excluded.

business & regulatoryprocedure