C. Bruce Littlejohn

Margaret Schofield, a provisional teacher hired under a one-year contract, sued Richland County School District after her contract was not renewed based on concerns about classroom discipline, instruction quality, and cooperation that arose outside the formal evaluation process; she sought damages and reinstatement, claiming the district was required to provide remedial assistance under state law before refusing renewal. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that S.C. Code Ann. § 59-26-40 requires remedial advice and assistance only for deficiencies detected during the three mandatory classroom observations, and that even an adequate evaluation makes a provisional teacher merely eligible for an annual contract rather than entitled to renewal. The decision rested on the statute's plain language, which does not impose remediation duties or renewal obligations for performance issues noted independently of the evaluation process.

labor & employment

Hilton Head Plantation Utilities sought approval from the South Carolina Public Service Commission for higher rates and charges for its water and sewer services. The Commission denied the request after a hearing, finding that substantial payments to affiliated entities raised unresolved questions about whether the transactions were at arm's length and whether the claimed operating and maintenance expenses were reasonable and legitimate. The circuit court upheld the denial, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the burden rests on the utility to prove the reasonableness of expenses, particularly those involving affiliates, and that the Commission had acted within its discretion in refusing the increase based on the lack of supporting data. The court remanded the matter to allow the utility an opportunity to provide justification for the expenses.

business & regulatory

The case concerned National Advertising Company's application for permits to repair four billboards damaged by Hurricane Hugo in Mount Pleasant, which the Department of Planning and Engineering denied under zoning code provisions limiting repairs to nonconforming signs. The Board of Adjustment upheld the denial based on repair cost thresholds and a six-month commencement requirement for nonconforming structures, but the circuit court reversed in part, finding insufficient evidence that one sign's repair costs exceeded 50 percent of replacement value and ruling that the six-month rule did not apply to signs. On appeal, the court affirmed the circuit judge, concluding that no evidence supported the cost finding for the Channel 2 sign and that the specific sign regulations in section 155.97 controlled over the general nonconforming structures provision in section 155.72(E).

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Brady Development Co. suing the Town of Hilton Head Island for negligence in administering its Development Standards Ordinance after a developer went bankrupt without completing water and sewer infrastructure, leaving Brady unable to obtain utilities for a house it had built on an approved lot. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Town owed Brady a special duty under the ordinance and denied the Town's directed verdict motions, resulting in a jury verdict of $215,000 for Brady. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance's purpose was to protect the public from overdevelopment rather than to create an enforceable duty to individual lot purchasers. The court also found that Brady assumed the risk by buying the lot despite explicit warnings in the required HUD report about the incomplete utilities.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Owens, the defendant, who had previously been convicted of kidnapping Ernest Vereen, was retried and convicted of Vereen's murder after an earlier death sentence was vacated on post-conviction relief, and he received a life sentence. Owens appealed, arguing that the murder prosecution violated double jeopardy because it relied on the prior kidnapping conviction, that the jury charge on coercion was inadequate, and that statements to a fellow inmate acting as a jailhouse lawyer were protected by attorney-client privilege. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that double jeopardy did not bar the murder prosecution since kidnapping is not an essential element of murder under South Carolina law and the Blockburger and Grady tests were not violated, the coercion instruction accurately stated the law, and the attorney-client privilege does not extend to jailhouse lawyers. The court noted that evidence of the kidnapping was presented but the prosecution focused on the conduct constituting murder, and an exception for newly manifest facts like the victim's death applied.

criminal lawprocedure

In Todd v. Smith, an artist sued the City of Myrtle Beach, its former manager, and the convention center director under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that requiring removal of his painting from a public exhibit at the convention center violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held that the city officials' actions did not implement or execute an official municipal policy as required for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, and the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. A dissent argued that the city's actions reflected a de facto policy infringing on the artist's free speech rights and would have reversed summary judgment as to the city only.

free speechcivil rights

The case involved Ricardo Sherard, a 15-year-old convicted in General Sessions Court of murder and attempted armed robbery after he shot a 15-year-old victim in the back during an attempted robbery while joyriding with friends. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and concurrent sentences of life and 20 years imprisonment. The court held that limiting cross-examination of two accomplices who testified for the state was not prejudicial because the jury learned they had avoided murder charges carrying life sentences, that the prosecutor's closing argument did not deny a fair trial, and that evidence of unrelated crimes was either admissible on the issue of flight or not prejudicial to Sherard. Any potential errors were deemed harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including Sherard's own statements to police.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is the appeal of Leroy Joseph Drayton's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping, along with his death sentence for the murder, following a retrial after an earlier reversal. The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed numerous claims of trial error, including the excusal of jurors opposed to the death penalty, the qualification of jurors with prior case knowledge, the admission of in-court identifications and the defendant's written statement, the refusal to charge robbery as a lesser included offense, references to parole violations, and the denial of jury instructions on statutory mitigating circumstances based on alleged intoxication. The majority affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court properly applied standards from Lockhart v. McCree for juror excusals, found the evidence admissible, and determined there was insufficient evidence to support the requested mitigating circumstance instructions. A dissent contended that evidence of the defendant's alcohol consumption required submission of the intoxication-related mitigating factors to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned two consolidated lawsuits in which individuals injured in collisions with City of Columbia vehicles sought damages under the South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act. The circuit courts dismissed the claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the enactment of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act on July 1, 1986, which repealed the prior statute and reinstated sovereign immunity absent liability insurance, extinguished the appellants' causes of action. The court reasoned that the repeal of the statute operates retrospectively to blot it out as if it never existed, ending all proceedings not prosecuted to final judgment, and since the city had no applicable insurance, no recovery was possible. This application was consistent with the prospective abolition of sovereign immunity in McCall v. Batson.

torts & liability

The case involved Von Ceil Lewis, who was convicted of conspiracy, solicitation of murder, and accessory before the fact of murder in connection with a contract killing of her cousin over a drug dispute. Lewis conceded her guilt on the first two charges and appealed only her accessory conviction, raising issues about evidentiary rulings on hearsay and cross-examination, the trial judge's comments on a redacted statement, and a peremptory juror strike under Batson. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in limiting cross-examination since alternative testimony was available, that testimony about threats was not hearsay as it went to state of mind, that the judge's explanation was procedural rather than a comment on facts, and that the strike had a racially neutral explanation.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Harris, the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual conduct with a minor and challenged the use of his prior "Peeping Tom" conviction to impeach his trial testimony. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prior offense could properly be used for impeachment. It reasoned that impeachment by prior conviction requires a crime of moral turpitude, defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to accepted standards of duty to others or society. The court concluded that "Peeping Tom," which involves invading privacy by peering into private premises and is classified as a felony, meets this standard as it inherently breaches duties to neighbors and society.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves consolidated appeals from the dismissal of claims alleging fraudulent conveyances under South Carolina's Statute of Elizabeth, arising from underlying allegations of fraud and unfair trade practices in real estate transactions on Daufuskie Island. Appellants claimed that respondents backdated deeds to transfer partnership property to themselves and a new entity for no consideration, with intent to hinder recovery on potential judgments. The circuit court had dismissed the fraudulent conveyance causes of action for lack of creditor status and failure to obtain a nulla bona return, and had also struck notices of lis pendens. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute protects parties defrauded in property conveyances even without judgment creditor status, that Rule 18(b) permits joinder of such claims without first reducing a debt to judgment, and that lis pendens notices are proper in actions affecting title to real property. The court remanded for further proceedings and reinstated the lis pendens notices.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Kirylik v. Kirylik, a father petitioned a South Carolina family court to hold the mother in contempt for allegedly violating a prior visitation order regarding their child. The family court dismissed the petition, determining that Delaware had become the appropriate forum under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) after the mother and child relocated there and registered the custody order. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while a court retains power to enforce its orders, it has discretion to decline jurisdiction when another state has assumed home-state status, a modification action is pending in Delaware, and enforcement there would avoid conflicting decrees. The court noted that Delaware's adoption of the UCCJA provides the father a forum to seek contempt remedies, including cost-shifting provisions. This approach aligns with the UCCJA's goals of promoting uniformity and preventing jurisdictional conflicts in custody matters.

family lawprocedure

Duke Power Company sued the South Carolina Tax Commission to recover corporate license fee taxes paid under protest after the Commission included proceeds from the sale of an unfinished nuclear power plant in Duke's gross receipts for tax purposes. The circuit court ruled in Duke's favor, interpreting the statute to limit the tax base to receipts from customer charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clear language of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-19-110 imposes the license fee on the entire gross receipts from business within the state, which includes the sale proceeds. The court reasoned that where a statute is unambiguous, its terms must be given their literal meaning, and the subsequent amendment to the statute did not affect the law applicable at the time of the sale.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case was an attorney disciplinary proceeding against Dove Walter Green, Jr., stemming from his handling of a 1972 class action lawsuit filed on behalf of homeowners seeking to protect a recreational lake from development in the Cherry Grove Subdivision. Green was charged with violating multiple disciplinary rules, including DR5-106(A), by designating the suit as a class action, soliciting potential class members without success, settling the case without notice to all members, and accepting settlement proceeds like lots as fees. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the facts undisputed, rejected Green's claim of mere oversight in leaving the class designation in pleadings, and held that he breached fiduciary duties, damaged class members, and neglected the matter. The court imposed a public reprimand as the sanction, with one justice concurring on misconduct but dissenting on the severity of the penalty.

procedure

Schuermann sued American Ka-Ro Corporation for damages arising from the alleged wrongful termination of his employment contract after an adulterous affair with the wife of another Ka-Ro employee. The trial court granted Schuermann summary judgment and awarded nearly $200,000 in damages under the contract and a non-competition clause. The appellate court reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over whether the company president had previously warned Schuermann about affairs inside the company, which could establish just cause for termination based on disobedience or disloyalty. The court remanded the case for trial to determine amounts recoverable under the contract if just cause existed and to address the non-competition clause.

labor & employment

The case involved a challenge by the NAACP and an individual plaintiff to the validity of the incorporation of the Town of Hilton Head Island and the election of its initial mayor and council, on the ground that the area failed to meet the dwelling-unit density requirement of South Carolina Code § 5-1-30 for coastal municipalities. Both sides moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs', a ruling the Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statutory term "dwelling unit" encompasses vacation homes and periodically rented properties in addition to permanent residences, consistent with legislative intent to enable incorporation of areas bordering the Atlantic Ocean that have at least 150 such units averaging one per three acres. It further found the Secretary of State's feasibility study adequate and no abuse of discretion, leaving no genuine issue of material fact.

elections

The case involved Pee Dee News Company appealing convictions on 46 counts of distributing obscene material under South Carolina law. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, citing prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination and the trial judge's failure to consolidate counts for sentencing. The court upheld the constitutionality of the state's obscenity statute against challenges of overbreadth and vagueness, finding it consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents like Miller v. California, and determined that the indictments were adequate and not duplicitous.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the executor of Katherine Hodge's estate against Crafts-Farrow State Hospital, alleging that the hospital's negligence in bathing the deceased patient, who suffered from Alzheimer's disease, caused her to fall and suffer a head injury that led to her death from pneumonia. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the verdict. The court held that there was no competent evidence showing that any breach of duty by hospital employees proximately caused the death, as the fatal reaction to sedation administered for medical evaluation was not foreseeable. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the hospital.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case concerned the validity of the October 1979 will of Holly B. Smoak, who died at age 90; the will was contested by Dorothy M. Smoak on grounds of undue influence by the testator's niece Janette W. Martin, who had cared for him after his wife's death. A jury in the Court of Common Pleas invalidated the will, reviving a May 1979 will that benefited the contestant more substantially. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have directed a verdict upholding the October will because the evidence was insufficient to establish undue influence as a matter of law. The court reviewed the record and found no proof of coercion or domination overcoming the testator's free will, despite the fiduciary relationship and changes in beneficiaries. It also rejected arguments that the testator lacked opportunity to revoke the will after execution.

family lawproperty