Joseph Rodney Moss

This case concerned whether real property owned by the South Carolina Public Service Authority (a state-created public corporation) and leased to private individuals or entities for residential, commercial, or agricultural uses remained exempt from ad valorem property taxes. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the property was exempt under Article X, § 3 of the South Carolina Constitution (as property used exclusively for public purposes), S.C. Code Ann. § 58-31-80, and the contract clauses of the U.S. and South Carolina Constitutions. The court reasoned that legislative declarations of public purpose are entitled to great weight, that the leased property continued to serve public functions such as providing lake access and support facilities, and that precedents confirmed leasing arrangements do not negate an overall public purpose. It further held that the statutory tax exemption formed part of a contractual obligation to the Authority's bondholders that could not be impaired by subsequent taxation.

taxesproperty

In State v. Crenshaw, two police officers were convicted of bribery after being found to have extorted $5,000 from a doctor in exchange for promises to drop criminal charges against his son. The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds, including the sufficiency of the indictment, whether police officers qualify as "officers" under the bribery statute (S.C. Code § 16-9-220), the lack of authority to dismiss charges, the distinction from a related statute (§ 16-9-240), vagueness of the statute, and the admissibility of an unsigned recorded statement. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the indictment adequately notified the defendants, police officers meet the criteria for public officers under the statute, apparent ability to influence the outcome suffices for bribery, the statutes address different degrees of culpability, the law provides fair notice, and the unsigned statement fell outside the relevant evidentiary rule. The court found no merit in the remaining claims and upheld the lower court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a products liability lawsuit brought by Carlien Hatfield against fireworks manufacturers for injuries sustained in a fire at her father's store in 1970. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendants strictly liable in tort, but the trial court dismissed that claim, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that strict liability in tort for defective products was not part of the state's common law at the time of the injury, that the 1974 statute adopting it applied only prospectively, and that the doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities did not extend to manufacturers and distributors of such products.

torts & liability

This case is an action for partition of a 50-acre tract of land in Horry County, South Carolina, among numerous family members claiming interests as tenants in common through deeds and intestate succession. The court adopted the trial judge's order finding that a 1908 deed from Doctor Phipps conveyed a life estate to Memory A. Phipps with remainder to his wife and children, that subsequent conveyances and deaths determined specific fractional ownership shares among the parties, and that claims of adverse possession by certain defendants failed because possession was subject to outstanding life estates. The court concluded the property could not be equitably divided in kind and ordered it sold at public auction with proceeds distributed according to the determined ownership percentages, such as 1/8 shares to living children of Memory A. Phipps and smaller fractions to heirs of deceased siblings. The decision rested on deed interpretation, application of life estate rules, and calculation of interests under intestacy laws following the deaths of Memory A. Phipps in 1975 and other family members.

propertyfamily law

The case involved an appeal by Joseph Bing from a contempt of court conviction after he refused to testify at the trial of a fellow inmate who had stabbed him, citing his religious beliefs as a Muslim. The court affirmed the conviction and six-month consecutive sentence. It found that Bing had waived his Fifth Amendment rights during a colloquy with the trial judge and that his First Amendment religious freedom claim did not prevail because the state's compelling interest in the effective operation of the courts overrides religious convictions that prevent testimony. The court also rejected the due process argument, noting that warnings about contempt were sufficient.

criminal lawreligious liberty

The case involved Archie Allen's conviction for murdering a South Carolina game warden during a 1974 incident in Horry County, resulting in a death sentence under Section 16-52 of the state code. Allen appealed, claiming error in the denial of his motions for change of venue based on pretrial publicity, severance, a new trial, and that the death penalty violated the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motions since publicity was not inflammatory and voir dire showed no bias, that evidence supported the verdict, and that capital punishment was constitutional under both federal precedents like Furman v. Georgia and state precedents interpreting the relevant constitutional provisions.

criminal law