Joseph Rodney Moss

This case concerned whether real property owned by the South Carolina Public Service Authority (a state-created public corporation) and leased to private individuals or entities for residential, commercial, or agricultural uses remained exempt from ad valorem property taxes. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the property was exempt under Article X, § 3 of the South Carolina Constitution (as property used exclusively for public purposes), S.C. Code Ann. § 58-31-80, and the contract clauses of the U.S. and South Carolina Constitutions. The court reasoned that legislative declarations of public purpose are entitled to great weight, that the leased property continued to serve public functions such as providing lake access and support facilities, and that precedents confirmed leasing arrangements do not negate an overall public purpose. It further held that the statutory tax exemption formed part of a contractual obligation to the Authority's bondholders that could not be impaired by subsequent taxation.

taxesproperty

In State v. Crenshaw, two police officers were convicted of bribery after being found to have extorted $5,000 from a doctor in exchange for promises to drop criminal charges against his son. The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds, including the sufficiency of the indictment, whether police officers qualify as "officers" under the bribery statute (S.C. Code § 16-9-220), the lack of authority to dismiss charges, the distinction from a related statute (§ 16-9-240), vagueness of the statute, and the admissibility of an unsigned recorded statement. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the indictment adequately notified the defendants, police officers meet the criteria for public officers under the statute, apparent ability to influence the outcome suffices for bribery, the statutes address different degrees of culpability, the law provides fair notice, and the unsigned statement fell outside the relevant evidentiary rule. The court found no merit in the remaining claims and upheld the lower court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a products liability lawsuit brought by Carlien Hatfield against fireworks manufacturers for injuries sustained in a fire at her father's store in 1970. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendants strictly liable in tort, but the trial court dismissed that claim, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that strict liability in tort for defective products was not part of the state's common law at the time of the injury, that the 1974 statute adopting it applied only prospectively, and that the doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities did not extend to manufacturers and distributors of such products.

torts & liability

This case is an action for partition of a 50-acre tract of land in Horry County, South Carolina, among numerous family members claiming interests as tenants in common through deeds and intestate succession. The court adopted the trial judge's order finding that a 1908 deed from Doctor Phipps conveyed a life estate to Memory A. Phipps with remainder to his wife and children, that subsequent conveyances and deaths determined specific fractional ownership shares among the parties, and that claims of adverse possession by certain defendants failed because possession was subject to outstanding life estates. The court concluded the property could not be equitably divided in kind and ordered it sold at public auction with proceeds distributed according to the determined ownership percentages, such as 1/8 shares to living children of Memory A. Phipps and smaller fractions to heirs of deceased siblings. The decision rested on deed interpretation, application of life estate rules, and calculation of interests under intestacy laws following the deaths of Memory A. Phipps in 1975 and other family members.

propertyfamily law

The case involved an appeal by Joseph Bing from a contempt of court conviction after he refused to testify at the trial of a fellow inmate who had stabbed him, citing his religious beliefs as a Muslim. The court affirmed the conviction and six-month consecutive sentence. It found that Bing had waived his Fifth Amendment rights during a colloquy with the trial judge and that his First Amendment religious freedom claim did not prevail because the state's compelling interest in the effective operation of the courts overrides religious convictions that prevent testimony. The court also rejected the due process argument, noting that warnings about contempt were sufficient.

criminal lawreligious liberty

The case involved Archie Allen's conviction for murdering a South Carolina game warden during a 1974 incident in Horry County, resulting in a death sentence under Section 16-52 of the state code. Allen appealed, claiming error in the denial of his motions for change of venue based on pretrial publicity, severance, a new trial, and that the death penalty violated the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motions since publicity was not inflammatory and voir dire showed no bias, that evidence supported the verdict, and that capital punishment was constitutional under both federal precedents like Furman v. Georgia and state precedents interpreting the relevant constitutional provisions.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over whether James C. Rikard and Delora Y. Rikard had entered into a franchise agreement with Peddler, Inc. to operate a restaurant and owed unpaid franchise and royalty fees. The court affirmed the judgment against James C. Rikard, finding sufficient evidence that he had agreed to the terms by accepting and operating under the franchise even without signing the written contract. However, it reversed the judgment against Delora Y. Rikard because there was no evidence she was a party to the agreement. The decision relied on the principle that a party can be bound by an unsigned contract if they accept and act upon its terms.

business & regulatory

In Hopkins v. Hopkins, the wife filed for divorce on the ground of three years' continuous separation but made no mention of alimony or property division in her complaint; the husband defaulted by not answering. The trial court, following a master's recommendation, granted the divorce and ordered the husband to convey his interest in the marital home and furniture to the wife in lieu of alimony, later holding him in contempt for noncompliance. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the alimony and contempt orders, holding that a default judgment cannot grant relief beyond what is demanded in the complaint under the applicable statute, because the husband had no notice of any alimony claim and the complaint stated no facts supporting such relief.

family lawprocedure

This case involved Vickie Cude's conviction on charges of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the heroin conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on simple possession of heroin as a lesser included offense. The court reasoned that the undisputed evidence established possession of more than two grains of heroin, which under state statute created a prima facie case of intent to distribute, and the defendant's testimony denying knowledge or ownership of the drugs provided no facts from which a jury could find simple possession rather than the greater offense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a condemnation action by the South Carolina State Highway Department to acquire a strip of land from J.R. Townsend's commercial property for highway widening. A jury awarded the landowner $51,000 after viewing the premises, exceeding the valuations offered by the Department's appraiser. The trial judge denied the Department's motion for a new trial nisi, concluding that because the jury had viewed the site and he had not, he lacked authority to reduce the verdict so long as it fell within the range of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge, acting as the thirteenth juror, retained discretion to grant a new trial nisi on grounds of excessiveness and should have viewed the premises himself to properly evaluate the motion. The Court affirmed the denial of a new trial absolute but reversed and remanded for the judge to view the property and reconsider the nisi motion.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a judgment creditor who obtained a $52,973.43 judgment against Grant R. Allen and sought to set aside Allen's June 1971 conveyance of his interest in jointly owned real property to his wife Ada F. Allen for $2,500 under South Carolina's Statute of Elizabeth, alleging the transfer was without adequate consideration and intended to defraud creditors. The Special Referee and trial court found that the conveyance was supported by fair consideration, as the wife had made most of the mortgage payments and other contributions from her own funds, and there was no fraudulent intent, and therefore refused to void the deed; the trial court additionally ordered the wife to pay the creditor $3,140 plus interest. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed these findings, holding that the evidence established valuable consideration and no violation of the statute. A dissent argued that the grantor's intent to defraud was imputable to the grantee and that the deed should have been set aside.

property

This case involved a taxpayer challenge to a 1975 South Carolina statute authorizing the Richland-Lexington Airport District to issue up to $2 million in general obligation bonds backed by ad valorem taxes on district property, for airport improvements. The plaintiff argued that the special act violated Article VIII, Section 7 of the state constitution (requiring general laws for county structure and powers, with no special county laws) and Article III, Section 34(IX) (barring special laws where a general law could apply). The court held the act constitutional, reasoning that Article VIII, Section 7 did not bar special-purpose districts for public functions like airports and that a general law was not feasible given the unique scale and needs of the Columbia Metropolitan Airport serving a multi-county area. Precedents upholding special districts for public health and infrastructure supported the conclusion that the legislation did not run afoul of the special-law prohibition.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a taxpayer's declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a 1974 South Carolina statute (the Bond Act) that authorized municipalities to issue revenue bonds to acquire land for slum clearance or redevelopment projects, then lease or convey that land to private entities with repayment secured solely from those private parties. The plaintiff argued that the Act violated the state constitution by using public authority and funds for private purposes and implicated federal due process concerns. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling and held the Act unconstitutional. The core reasoning was that the legislation primarily benefited private developers with only negligible or speculative public advantage, even though slum clearance can qualify as a public purpose in other contexts, and thus failed to meet the requirement that bond-issuing authority serve a public rather than private purpose.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved D. Legrand Weaver, who was convicted in Florence County court of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of state law and of resisting arrest after a high-speed chase and physical altercation with a highway patrol officer. Weaver appealed, claiming trial errors including prejudicial comments by the judge about the officer's authority to arrest and use force, as well as the refusal of a requested jury instruction on weighing breathalyzer evidence. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the officer had authority to arrest without a warrant for offenses committed in his presence and could use reasonable force, that the judge's statements were not erroneous or prejudicial, and that the jury instructions on the breathalyzer test and related presumptions were adequate and substantially covered the requested charge.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a claim for workers' compensation benefits by Levine L. Privette against the South Carolina State Forestry Commission after he was injured while operating equipment for a subcontractor on state forest land. The Industrial Commission and lower courts awarded benefits, finding Privette to be a statutory employee, but the Supreme Court reversed. The court held that Privette's brief, temporary work substituting for the subcontractor was casual employment, which does not qualify for coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The reasoning centered on the fortuitous and non-regular nature of the employment, which occurred only to allow the subcontractor time to visit a doctor.

labor & employment

The case involved a dispute over whether property owners, the Blands, had an easement to use a 30-foot street across land owned by Carolina Land Company to access a public road. Carolina Land Company sought to enjoin the Blands from grading and using the street on their lot, claiming the easement had been abandoned. The lower court found abandonment based on nonuse and resubdivision of the properties. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that mere nonuse does not constitute abandonment of an easement created by deed and that the evidence did not show a clear intent by the dominant estate owners to relinquish the easement.

property

This case involves a divorce action between Clyde Daniel Smith and Kathy Sue Smith, where the husband sought a divorce on grounds of physical cruelty after an initial separation order. The court had previously remanded for reconsideration of support, alimony, and fees, and on appeal from the new order, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decisions increasing child support to $70 per week, denying alimony and possession of the marital home to the wife, awarding custody to the wife, and setting attorney's fees at $700 total. The reasoning centered on the trial court's discretion in support and alimony awards based on the parties' financial circumstances, the statutory limits allowing only monetary alimony rather than specific property, and lack of abuse of discretion shown.

family lawproperty

This case concerned a dispute over shares of stock in Sandy Island Corporation that Thomas McLeod agreed in a Florida divorce settlement to transfer to his minor daughter under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, with his ex-wife Marlene acting as custodian. The corporation resisted the transfer, citing its bylaws that required any sale of stock to first be offered to the company or other stockholders at the bona fide price, a restriction noted on most certificates and allegedly agreed to by Thomas even though his certificate was lost. After an earlier reversal of summary judgment, the trial court (affirmed on appeal in relevant part) found the transfer was effectively a sale rather than a gift due to the negotiated divorce context lacking donative intent, that the restriction applied and the plaintiff had knowledge of it, and ordered the corporation to have an option to purchase the shares for $50,000. The core reasoning was that restrictions on stock transfers are enforceable against parties with notice, the parol evidence rule did not bar proof of the restriction against a non-party to the original agreement, and the divorce settlement exchange was not a true gift. The court remanded for determination of valuation timing and amount before allowing the option exercise.

business & regulatoryfamily lawproperty

The case concerned the convictions of John Wesley Queen and Terry Stewart Moore for distributing marijuana in violation of South Carolina Code Section 32-1510.49, for which each received a five-year prison sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the trial judge did not abuse discretion by denying a continuance based on one defendant's use of pain medication, because the record showed no evidence of incapacity and the defendant fully participated in the proceedings. The court further held that the trial judge's pretrial comments to the jury about law enforcement beginning at the local level did not constitute prejudicial error or deny the defendants a fair trial.

criminal lawprocedure

Nucor Corporation, a Delaware company with operations in South Carolina, sued Fanevil Construction Inc., a Massachusetts company, to recover the unpaid balance on a contract for the design and manufacture of steel joists. The joists were made in South Carolina for use in a Massachusetts school project, with some repairs also performed there after initial delivery issues. Fanevil challenged personal jurisdiction in South Carolina, arguing it had no presence or agents in the state. The court held that jurisdiction was proper under the state's long-arm statute because the contract called for performance in part within South Carolina, including manufacturing and payments. This ruling was affirmed on appeal as supported by the evidence of significant in-state activities.

procedurebusiness & regulatory