State v. Millings
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-12-06 · cited 6×
In State v. Millings, the defendant appealed his 1965 manslaughter conviction from the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination about his 1944 auto theft conviction and 1946 conviction for receiving stolen goods. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that prior convictions involving moral turpitude are admissible to impeach the credibility of any witness, including a criminal defendant who chooses to testify. The court further held that a general objection on grounds of prejudice was insufficient and that the question of remoteness had not been timely presented to the trial judge, so there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to strike the evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Bostick v. State
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-11-30 · cited 4×
This case is an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by a defendant convicted of murdering a sheriff and sentenced to death. The petitioner raised two main issues: whether Negroes were systematically excluded from grand and petit juries due to race, and whether he was denied counsel at certain pretrial stages, making his confession inadmissible. The court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that state jury selection procedures did not discriminate on the basis of race and that the confession was voluntary because no request for counsel was denied, no coercion occurred, and the defendant received warnings about remaining silent. The court distinguished the facts from U.S. Supreme Court precedents like Escobedo v. Illinois and found the petitioner's trial counsel had not raised constitutional objections at trial.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Williams v. PA. NATL. MUT. CAS. INS. CO.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-08-26 · cited 1×
This case concerned whether an automobile insurance policy, issued to satisfy South Carolina's financial responsibility laws, required the insurer to cover losses from an in rem attachment of the insured vehicle after it was stolen and involved in an accident causing property damage to a third party. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the insurer, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. The majority held that the policy language and the governing statute (Section 46-750.32) limit coverage to sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay by personal judgment after trial or settlement, and an in rem judgment against the vehicle alone creates no such personal liability. The court relied on its prior decision in Sexton v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company interpreting identical provisions, concluding that the attachment statute (Section 45-551) imposes liability only on the property, not the owner personally. A dissent argued that the statutory requirement of coverage for "liability imposed by law for damages" arising from vehicle ownership should extend to the loss of the vehicle itself through attachment.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-08-04 · cited 46×
This case involved a claim for malicious prosecution arising from the defendant's decision to swear out a warrant charging the plaintiff with disposing of a pickup truck subject to a lien. After the criminal proceedings were nol prossed following the presentation of the state's evidence, the plaintiff sued and obtained a jury verdict for both actual and punitive damages in the Civil Court of Florence; the defendant appealed the denial of its post-trial motions. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to find that the defendant lacked probable cause and acted with malice by resorting to criminal process to resolve a disputed lien and repair charges rather than pursuing civil remedies. The court noted that the magistrate who issued the warrant was consulted only in his judicial capacity, that full facts were not disclosed, and that the statutory offense does not apply when the seller lacks notice of the lien. A dissent argued that the evidence compelled a finding of probable cause as a matter of law.
criminal lawtorts & liability
Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-07-26 · cited 5×
This case involves an employee who sought workers' compensation benefits under South Carolina law for a claimed permanent partial disability from a workplace accident at Sangamo Electric Company. The employer contested the claim, arguing that the required written notice was not given within 30 days, the claim was not filed with the Industrial Commission within one year, and the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Lower tribunals awarded benefits to the employee, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make required factual findings on whether there was reasonable excuse for the late notice and whether the employer was prejudiced, and on whether the claim was timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. The court remanded the case to the Commission for additional evidence and specific findings on these issues, noting that factual determinations are the Commission's responsibility rather than that of the courts.
labor & employmentprocedure
Welch v. MacDougall
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-07-14 · cited 4×
In Welch v. MacDougall, two defendants who had pleaded guilty to safecracking with court-appointed counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging they were victims of entrapment by a state law enforcement agent and that their attorneys had failed to advise them of that defense. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that an entrapment defense must be raised before sentencing and cannot be asserted for the first time in habeas corpus, that the petition failed to make a prima facie showing warranting relief, and that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not rise to the level of shocking the conscience or rendering the proceedings a farce. The record showed that counsel had discussed the lack of any defense with the defendants, who confirmed they wished to plead guilty.
criminal lawprocedure