State v. Millings
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-12-06 · cited 6×
In State v. Millings, the defendant appealed his 1965 manslaughter conviction from the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination about his 1944 auto theft conviction and 1946 conviction for receiving stolen goods. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that prior convictions involving moral turpitude are admissible to impeach the credibility of any witness, including a criminal defendant who chooses to testify. The court further held that a general objection on grounds of prejudice was insufficient and that the question of remoteness had not been timely presented to the trial judge, so there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to strike the evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Bostick v. State
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-11-30 · cited 4×
This case is an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by a defendant convicted of murdering a sheriff and sentenced to death. The petitioner raised two main issues: whether Negroes were systematically excluded from grand and petit juries due to race, and whether he was denied counsel at certain pretrial stages, making his confession inadmissible. The court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that state jury selection procedures did not discriminate on the basis of race and that the confession was voluntary because no request for counsel was denied, no coercion occurred, and the defendant received warnings about remaining silent. The court distinguished the facts from U.S. Supreme Court precedents like Escobedo v. Illinois and found the petitioner's trial counsel had not raised constitutional objections at trial.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Williams v. PA. NATL. MUT. CAS. INS. CO.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-08-26 · cited 1×
This case concerned whether an automobile insurance policy, issued to satisfy South Carolina's financial responsibility laws, required the insurer to cover losses from an in rem attachment of the insured vehicle after it was stolen and involved in an accident causing property damage to a third party. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the insurer, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. The majority held that the policy language and the governing statute (Section 46-750.32) limit coverage to sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay by personal judgment after trial or settlement, and an in rem judgment against the vehicle alone creates no such personal liability. The court relied on its prior decision in Sexton v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company interpreting identical provisions, concluding that the attachment statute (Section 45-551) imposes liability only on the property, not the owner personally. A dissent argued that the statutory requirement of coverage for "liability imposed by law for damages" arising from vehicle ownership should extend to the loss of the vehicle itself through attachment.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-08-04 · cited 46×
This case involved a claim for malicious prosecution arising from the defendant's decision to swear out a warrant charging the plaintiff with disposing of a pickup truck subject to a lien. After the criminal proceedings were nol prossed following the presentation of the state's evidence, the plaintiff sued and obtained a jury verdict for both actual and punitive damages in the Civil Court of Florence; the defendant appealed the denial of its post-trial motions. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to find that the defendant lacked probable cause and acted with malice by resorting to criminal process to resolve a disputed lien and repair charges rather than pursuing civil remedies. The court noted that the magistrate who issued the warrant was consulted only in his judicial capacity, that full facts were not disclosed, and that the statutory offense does not apply when the seller lacks notice of the lien. A dissent argued that the evidence compelled a finding of probable cause as a matter of law.
criminal lawtorts & liability
Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-07-26 · cited 5×
This case involves an employee who sought workers' compensation benefits under South Carolina law for a claimed permanent partial disability from a workplace accident at Sangamo Electric Company. The employer contested the claim, arguing that the required written notice was not given within 30 days, the claim was not filed with the Industrial Commission within one year, and the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Lower tribunals awarded benefits to the employee, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make required factual findings on whether there was reasonable excuse for the late notice and whether the employer was prejudiced, and on whether the claim was timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. The court remanded the case to the Commission for additional evidence and specific findings on these issues, noting that factual determinations are the Commission's responsibility rather than that of the courts.
labor & employmentprocedure
Welch v. MacDougall
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-07-14 · cited 4×
In Welch v. MacDougall, two defendants who had pleaded guilty to safecracking with court-appointed counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging they were victims of entrapment by a state law enforcement agent and that their attorneys had failed to advise them of that defense. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that an entrapment defense must be raised before sentencing and cannot be asserted for the first time in habeas corpus, that the petition failed to make a prima facie showing warranting relief, and that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not rise to the level of shocking the conscience or rendering the proceedings a farce. The record showed that counsel had discussed the lack of any defense with the defendants, who confirmed they wished to plead guilty.
criminal lawprocedure
Elliott v. Snyder
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-07-06 · cited 14×
The case involved a dispute over a land sale contract in which the seller sought rescission and cancellation after the buyer's second annual installment check was returned by the bank marked 'drawn against uncollected funds.' The lower court, affirmed on appeal, held that the contract remained in full force and effect. The court found that the check was not worthless, as sufficient funds were deposited prior to presentment and would have cleared if re-presented after January 9, 1963, and that the accepted method of payment by check combined with substantial compliance prevented forfeiture. Forfeitures are disfavored, and a breach must be substantial and fundamental to warrant rescission.
property
Williams v. Williams
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-06-17 · cited 4×
This case arose from a 1963 car accident in which the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries and property loss from Thomas Carlisle Williams, the driver, the vehicle itself, and Francis Williams, the owner of the repair shop where the car had been taken. The complaint alleged that Thomas was acting as Francis's employee or agent at the time, but the jury returned a verdict awarding damages only against Thomas and the car, not against Francis. The trial judge granted a new trial to all defendants on the ground that the actual damages awarded were inadequate. On appeal, the court held that the verdict exonerating Francis should stand, as the jury's finding on the agency issue was supported by conflicting evidence and granting a new trial as to him was not necessary to correct the inadequacy of damages against the other defendants.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Elrod v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-06-14 · cited 3×
This case involved a dispute over double indemnity benefits under two life insurance policies after the insured died from injuries sustained in a vehicle collision. The insurance company paid the base benefits but refused the additional amount, claiming the insured was not "struck by" an automobile as required by the policy since the other vehicle did not directly contact him. The lower court ruled for the beneficiary, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy language did not require direct physical contact and that the insured qualified under the provision based on being involved in the accident.
business & regulatory
Glisson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-05-24 · cited 17×
This case involved whether an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm covered judgments against the insured, Clyde Burton Cheezem, arising from a 1956 collision that occurred while he drove a jeep during temporary National Guard duty as Officer of the Day. Plaintiffs, who obtained $10,000 judgments each in federal court after the accident, sued State Farm after the insured's assets proved insufficient. The trial court held coverage applied, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the jeep was not furnished for the insured's regular use and was not being used in his business or occupation under the policy's exclusion provisions. The court construed the policy terms liberally in favor of the insured, noting Cheezem's primary occupation was as a Methodist minister and his National Guard assignment was temporary and limited rather than regular or vocational.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Cothran v. Stroman
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-05-17 · cited 7×
This case involved homeowners in a subdivision seeking to enforce restrictive covenants against neighbors operating a beauty parlor in their residence. The lower court denied the injunction, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendants' commercial activity violated the covenant limiting lots to residential purposes. The court reasoned that such covenants must be interpreted to fulfill their plain purpose of prohibiting commercial uses, even if the activity is not noxious or offensive, and thus enjoined the operation of the beauty shop.
property
Gibson v. Brown
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-04-15 · cited 9×
This case is an appeal from a malicious prosecution lawsuit filed by the respondent against Patricia Brown and her father, Leo Hutchinson. The lower court overruled the father's demurrer, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations—that the father advised, counseled, aided, and abetted his daughter in the prosecution—were enough to establish joint liability. The court reasoned that while passive knowledge or acquiescence is insufficient, active participation in instituting or continuing the proceedings satisfies the elements of malicious prosecution, including institution of proceedings, malice, lack of probable cause, and damages.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Smith v. First Provident Corp.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-04-12 · cited 7×
This case involved an appeal from a circuit court order affirming the rescission of a 1959 exclusive agency contract between a landowner and a real estate agent for selling 24 lots in the Park View Terrace subdivision near Florence, South Carolina. The court decided to affirm the rescission, holding that the contract applied only to the specified 24 lots and that no subsequent agreement had been reached to include additional land. The core reasoning was that the agent had breached the contract by failing to perform essential development duties over several years, while the landowner had not breached by limiting dealings to the original lots, and a breach must be substantial to justify rescission.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Prosser v. Parsons
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-04-02 · cited 25×
The case involved a plaintiff who sued a game warden for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion after being arrested at night with hunting equipment and having his car seized. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff on all claims, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and entered it for the defendant. The court held that the arrest was lawful because the warden, exercising constable powers, could arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his presence; the malicious prosecution claim failed due to probable cause, including the solicitor's advice after full disclosure; and the car seizure was authorized by statute requiring forfeiture of vehicles used in night deer hunting.
criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedureenvironment
First National Bank of SC v. Wade
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-03-08 · cited 3×
This case involved First National Bank of South Carolina bringing a claim and delivery action to recover possession of an automobile securing a defaulted note and chattel mortgage that had been assigned to the bank, plus actual and punitive damages for wrongful detention by the defendant purchaser. The defendant raised affirmative defenses of failure of consideration and breach of warranty based on the vehicle's excessive oil and gas consumption and mechanical wear. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on both possession and $500 in damages for detention. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of possession, holding that the bank as assignee was entitled to the vehicle upon default with no proven offset, but reversed and remanded the damages portion because unliquidated damages for detention must be assessed by a jury in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the defendant had not met his burden to establish any specific amount of offset from his defenses against the original seller.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Blandshaw v. State
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-03-01 · cited 6×
The case involved an appeal from the denial without a hearing of a habeas corpus petition filed by Bisand Blandshaw, who had been convicted of manslaughter in 1963 and was serving a twelve-year sentence. The sole issue was whether the petition adequately alleged grounds for relief, specifically that the petitioner had been denied a preliminary hearing despite filing a written demand as required by South Carolina Code Section 43-232. The court reversed the lower court's order, reasoning that the allegations, accepted as true, made a prima facie showing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case until a preliminary hearing occurred, and habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle to challenge such jurisdiction. The matter was remanded for a hearing on the petition, where other allegations could also be considered.
criminal lawprocedure
In Re McClam's Estate
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-02-10 · cited 3×
The case concerned the appointment of an administrator for the intestate estate of Creola C. McClam after her brother Moseley C. Coleman, who had served as her court-appointed committee while she was incompetent, petitioned for the role. The probate court granted the appointment, but the circuit court reversed it, disqualifying Coleman on the ground that his prior service created a conflict of interest because he would be required to account to the estate's personal representative for his handling of her assets. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification, citing precedent that such a conflict arising from the applicant's relation to the decedent's affairs renders the person unqualified, but reversed the circuit court's direct appointment of the Citizens and Southern National Bank as premature and remanded the matter to the probate court to select an administrator from the statutory priority list among the surviving siblings.
family lawpropertyprocedure
ACLR CO. v. SC Pub. Ser. Comm.
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1965-01-13
The case involved an appeal by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company challenging the South Carolina Public Service Commission's grant of a Class E Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Dangerous Materials Disposal Co., Inc., allowing it to transport radioactive materials intrastate by motor vehicle. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the Commission's order. The court reasoned that the Motor Carrier Certification Law was constitutional and not an invalid delegation of legislative power, as it provided sufficient standards within the state's police power to regulate highways for public welfare. It further held that the Commission's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence of anticipated future need for such specialized transport services, which no existing carriers were authorized to provide, and thus not arbitrary or capricious.
business & regulatoryenvironment
Philco Finance Corp. v. Mehlman
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1964-12-14 · cited 3×
The case concerned a priority dispute over proceeds from the sale of collateral in an insolvent business. After Mehlman sold his radio and appliance company to Brown on credit secured by a chattel mortgage, Brown obtained financing from Philco Finance by assigning customer contracts; when Brown became insolvent due to fraud, Philco sued to enforce a subordination and assignment agreement Mehlman had signed to improve Brown's credit standing. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the agreement subordinated Mehlman's claims and liens to Philco's, holding that the document did not create a suretyship because Mehlman had not undertaken to pay Brown's debts but had only agreed to subordinate his own rights.
business & regulatoryproperty
Tucker v. Craig
Supreme Court of South Carolina · 1964-11-11 · cited 2×
The South Carolina Mental Health Commission sued prime contractor Charles J. Craig and his surety for $100,000 in damages over defects in a quarry tile floor installed in a state building, alleging failure to meet contract specifications. Craig moved to join his tile subcontractor, W. H. Frazier, as an additional defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the denial, reasoning that while Frazier might ultimately be liable to Craig under their subcontract, Frazier was not a necessary party to resolve the dispute between the Commission and Craig. The court held that adding Frazier would introduce separate issues not involving the plaintiff and was a matter within the trial judge's discretion.
procedurebusiness & regulatory