The case was a damages action arising from a motor vehicle collision in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendants and judgment was entered; the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial nearly six months later. The trial court granted the motion, stating that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, the jury had disregarded the instructions and evidence under passion or prejudice, and invoking the court's own authority under SDC 33.1609. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the motion was procedurally deficient because it lacked required affidavits and particulars under SDC 33.1606, the order failed to specify the grounds as mandated by SDC 33.1611, and the trial court had no power to grant a new trial on its own motion months after the verdict since the statute allows such action only at the time the verdict is returned.
The case involved a plaintiff who held first and third mortgages on a truck and trailer as collateral for a loan, after the original bank mortgage was assigned to him. Defendants attempted to foreclose on their second mortgage through an invalid process under South Dakota law, sold the vehicles, and the plaintiff sued for conversion, seeking the remaining balance due. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff, awarding $400 in damages (with one defendant's liability capped at $100), and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the foreclosure was void, plaintiff was the valid holder of the first mortgage, payments had been properly applied to the overall debt without debtor direction otherwise, and evidence showed the plaintiff's other collateral (a car and building) was insufficient to cover the balance.
This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Florence Cooper, widow of Theodore Cooper, who died from coronary occlusion four weeks after working on a sewer renovation project for employer Vinatieri. Cooper, who had preexisting arteriosclerotic heart disease, had performed the usual tasks of dislodging and removing sewer tile in a trench for about a week before quitting due to feeling ill from fumes and shortness of breath; medical evidence showed his work aggravated his condition but involved no unusual strain. The Industrial Commissioner denied benefits, finding death resulted from the normal course of his heart disease rather than an accidental injury arising out of employment. The circuit court reversed and awarded compensation, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the facts supported the commissioner's findings and that usual exertion on accustomed work does not qualify as an accidental injury under the compensation statute. The court directed reinstatement of the denial of the claim.
This case involved an insurance company that had paid workers' compensation benefits to the widow and minor child of a deceased employee seeking to recover damages from the defendant truck driver whose negligence allegedly caused the employee's death. The trial court allowed the insurer to proceed as plaintiff, permitted certain voir dire questions about insurance coverage, and instructed the jury on damages including mental suffering and loss of support under the wrongful death statute, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the insurer was the real party in interest under the compensation laws and could maintain the action, that the voir dire examination was conducted in good faith without prejudicial error, and that the damages instruction was proper. The court further noted that any excess recovery beyond compensation paid would be turned over to the personal representative of the deceased. The decision turned on interpretation of state statutes governing subrogation rights and procedural fairness in jury selection.
This case involved a dispute over whether restrictive covenants in the Park Ridge Addition of Sioux Falls permitted the defendant to build and operate a motor court (motel) on Block 5, which was designated for multiple residence uses under city zoning ordinances. The trial court had issued a permanent injunction against the project, finding that the use violated the zoning rules and would constitute a nuisance or annoyance to neighboring residents. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proposed structures qualified as lodging houses explicitly allowed under the applicable M-R-l zoning classification and covenants, which must be strictly construed to favor free use of property. The court further determined that testimony predicting future disturbances or reduced property values was insufficient to establish a nuisance warranting injunctive relief, as incidental effects of an authorized use do not destroy the property right.
The case involved a collision at a railroad crossing in Sioux Falls between a 45-foot tractor-trailer carrying 4900 gallons of gasoline, driven by plaintiff Keith Miller, and a locomotive operated by the defendant railway company. Plaintiffs sued for damages and obtained a $2600 verdict at trial, but the defendant appealed, arguing that Miller's failure to stop before crossing the tracks constituted contributory negligence. The court reversed the judgment and ordered dismissal of the complaint, holding that South Dakota statutes (SDC 44.0304 and SDC 28.0903) imposed a specific duty on drivers of loaded gasoline transports to stop and ascertain that the crossing could be made safely, which Miller did not do; his decision to proceed without stopping, even under the circumstances of following traffic and an apparently stationary engine, amounted to negligence that contributed to the accident.