Charles R. Hayes

The case was a damages action arising from a motor vehicle collision in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendants and judgment was entered; the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial nearly six months later. The trial court granted the motion, stating that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, the jury had disregarded the instructions and evidence under passion or prejudice, and invoking the court's own authority under SDC 33.1609. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the motion was procedurally deficient because it lacked required affidavits and particulars under SDC 33.1606, the order failed to specify the grounds as mandated by SDC 33.1611, and the trial court had no power to grant a new trial on its own motion months after the verdict since the statute allows such action only at the time the verdict is returned.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff who held first and third mortgages on a truck and trailer as collateral for a loan, after the original bank mortgage was assigned to him. Defendants attempted to foreclose on their second mortgage through an invalid process under South Dakota law, sold the vehicles, and the plaintiff sued for conversion, seeking the remaining balance due. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff, awarding $400 in damages (with one defendant's liability capped at $100), and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the foreclosure was void, plaintiff was the valid holder of the first mortgage, payments had been properly applied to the overall debt without debtor direction otherwise, and evidence showed the plaintiff's other collateral (a car and building) was insufficient to cover the balance.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Florence Cooper, widow of Theodore Cooper, who died from coronary occlusion four weeks after working on a sewer renovation project for employer Vinatieri. Cooper, who had preexisting arteriosclerotic heart disease, had performed the usual tasks of dislodging and removing sewer tile in a trench for about a week before quitting due to feeling ill from fumes and shortness of breath; medical evidence showed his work aggravated his condition but involved no unusual strain. The Industrial Commissioner denied benefits, finding death resulted from the normal course of his heart disease rather than an accidental injury arising out of employment. The circuit court reversed and awarded compensation, but the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the facts supported the commissioner's findings and that usual exertion on accustomed work does not qualify as an accidental injury under the compensation statute. The court directed reinstatement of the denial of the claim.

labor & employment

This case involved an insurance company that had paid workers' compensation benefits to the widow and minor child of a deceased employee seeking to recover damages from the defendant truck driver whose negligence allegedly caused the employee's death. The trial court allowed the insurer to proceed as plaintiff, permitted certain voir dire questions about insurance coverage, and instructed the jury on damages including mental suffering and loss of support under the wrongful death statute, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the insurer was the real party in interest under the compensation laws and could maintain the action, that the voir dire examination was conducted in good faith without prejudicial error, and that the damages instruction was proper. The court further noted that any excess recovery beyond compensation paid would be turned over to the personal representative of the deceased. The decision turned on interpretation of state statutes governing subrogation rights and procedural fairness in jury selection.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether restrictive covenants in the Park Ridge Addition of Sioux Falls permitted the defendant to build and operate a motor court (motel) on Block 5, which was designated for multiple residence uses under city zoning ordinances. The trial court had issued a permanent injunction against the project, finding that the use violated the zoning rules and would constitute a nuisance or annoyance to neighboring residents. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proposed structures qualified as lodging houses explicitly allowed under the applicable M-R-l zoning classification and covenants, which must be strictly construed to favor free use of property. The court further determined that testimony predicting future disturbances or reduced property values was insufficient to establish a nuisance warranting injunctive relief, as incidental effects of an authorized use do not destroy the property right.

property

The case involved a collision at a railroad crossing in Sioux Falls between a 45-foot tractor-trailer carrying 4900 gallons of gasoline, driven by plaintiff Keith Miller, and a locomotive operated by the defendant railway company. Plaintiffs sued for damages and obtained a $2600 verdict at trial, but the defendant appealed, arguing that Miller's failure to stop before crossing the tracks constituted contributory negligence. The court reversed the judgment and ordered dismissal of the complaint, holding that South Dakota statutes (SDC 44.0304 and SDC 28.0903) imposed a specific duty on drivers of loaded gasoline transports to stop and ascertain that the crossing could be made safely, which Miller did not do; his decision to proceed without stopping, even under the circumstances of following traffic and an apparently stationary engine, amounted to negligence that contributed to the accident.

torts & liability

The case involved an application for a writ of habeas corpus by Victor Kaufman challenging a warrant of arrest issued by the Governor of South Dakota for extradition to California on charges of willful child desertion as a felony. The court determined that Kaufman was not a fugitive from justice because the alleged desertion occurred after he had left California, and the warrant improperly recited facts under federal extradition law rather than the state's provision for acts committed in South Dakota intentionally resulting in a crime in California. The core reasoning was that the warrant failed to substantially recite the facts necessary for its validity under the applicable state statute, SDC 34.1706, as it did not reflect the governor's exercise of discretion under that section or the correct basis for extradition. The court reversed the trial court's order dissolving the writ and remanded with directions to discharge the appellant from custody under the warrant.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the validity of a 1946 contract in which landowners Blair Brothers granted plaintiff Pete Lien an exclusive three-year license to extract and remove lime rock, sand, and gravel from a portion of their Meade County ranch, along with a covenant not to lease adjacent land to others for similar purposes; Lien sought damages after the landowners allegedly breached the restraint by allowing third-party extraction. The majority upheld the restraining clause as enforceable. The dissenting opinion argued that the provision was void under South Dakota's restraint-of-trade statute (SDC 10.0706) and common-law principles because it was not ancillary to the transfer of property or goodwill, had the purpose and effect of creating a monopoly, and was therefore unreasonable and contrary to public policy.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Jerke, the defendant was charged with reckless driving under South Dakota law after complaints about erratic driving on a highway; he was convicted following a jury trial in circuit court after waiving a preliminary hearing. The court addressed multiple pretrial challenges, including a motion to quash the information for alleged variance from the complaint's location details and for charging multiple offenses, a demurrer on duplicity grounds, an objection to late endorsement of a witness, and a post-verdict claim of jurisdictional defect in the preliminary complaint's oath. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the information sufficiently stated the offense without needing specific location details, that disjunctive statutory elements could be alleged conjunctively as a single offense, that the trial court had discretion to allow the witness endorsement, and that the defendant waived any preliminary procedural irregularities by proceeding to trial on the merits without timely objection. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation of the reckless driving provisions and principles of waiver in criminal procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1947 amendment to SDC 37.2201, which added the phrase 'or injury' and provisions for survivorship of actions. The dissenting opinion contends that the amendment was meant to allow recovery of damages for personal injury even after the death of the injured person, thereby changing the prior rule from Petersen v. Kemper that such claims abate upon death. The reasoning relies on rules of statutory construction, the specific title of Chapter 172 declaring it relates to recovery for injury to a person and providing for survivorship, and a contrast with Chapter 173 limited to wrongful death actions. The dissent concludes that the legislature intended to remove the bar against recovery when the injured person dies and would affirm the trial court's ruling to that effect.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involves a workers' compensation claim by Edith Millage for death benefits after her husband William was fatally injured on his third day working as a gravel checker for Canton Township. The commissioner calculated the award of $3,120 by averaging Millage's actual hours worked across three days (six hours per day at 65 cents per hour) under SDC 64.0404(3). The dissenting justice agrees with the statutory basis but contends the commissioner erred by using the employee's specific hours rather than first determining the number of hours commonly regarded as a day's work for gravel checkers under the definition of earnings in SDC 64.0102(5), and would remand for recalculation of annual earnings and total compensation. The dissent notes that actual hours are immaterial and that the statute requires a uniform standard for the employment type, not individualized averages.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether Brown County Holding Company had timely presented a creditor's claim against the estate of Herman O. Frank to the administrator within the six-month period set by the published notice to creditors under the applicable 1933 statute. The claimant left a verified proof of claim with an attorney who also represented the administrator, and the administrator's later accounts mentioned the claim as presented, but the proof of claim was never endorsed by the administrator, remained in the attorney's possession for nine years, and was not filed with the court until after the administrator's death. The county court rejected the claim for noncompliance with the presentation statutes, the circuit court affirmed after a trial de novo, and the supreme court upheld the disallowance, holding that the evidence failed to prove timely exhibition of the claim to the administrator and that any admissions in the accounts were overcome by contrary facts. Other issues raised on appeal were found without merit.

procedure

The case involved a plaintiff's suit for personal injuries from an explosion at a filling station operated by an agent of Kent Oil Co., a foreign corporation doing business in South Dakota without complying with state licensing and agent-appointment requirements under SDC 11.20. The plaintiff served the Secretary of State pursuant to SDC 11.2108 after the corporation had not designated an agent for service of process. The corporation specially appeared and moved to quash the service, arguing that process should have been served on its managing agent instead. The court denied the motion, holding that by voluntarily conducting business in the state without compliance, the corporation had impliedly consented to service on the Secretary of State and could not benefit from its own failure to follow the law. The order was affirmed on appeal.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned whether a multi-page handwritten document prepared by Ella McNair qualified as a valid holographic will under South Dakota statute SDC 56.0209, which requires such a will to be entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. Lower courts admitted the instrument to probate over objections that it was not properly signed, and the state supreme court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the only relevant evidence of execution is found on the face of the document itself; based on its uniform handwriting and ink, comprehensive provisions including a final trust clause, and the placement of the testator's name, the instrument appeared complete and bore a sufficient signature. Extraneous testimony about the testator's later intentions was deemed irrelevant to the signing question.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a vendor seeking to enforce a forfeiture clause in a real estate sales contract after the purchaser stopped making payments, claiming the title was unmarketable. The plaintiff filed for declaratory judgment to confirm the forfeiture, regain possession, and seek damages. The court affirmed the trial court's decision denying the forfeiture and dismissing the action, reasoning that the vendor could not enforce the forfeiture because her title, resting on a tax deed, was unmarketable, and she was thus unable to tender the required marketable title when payments became due.

property

The case concerned the validity of a City of Aberdeen ordinance that barred any person convicted of driving under the influence from operating a motor vehicle on city streets for one year after conviction and imposed penalties for violations. The defendant was convicted under the ordinance for driving after a prior DUI conviction. The dissenting opinion determined that the ordinance exceeded municipal authority under state statutes such as SDC 45.0201, as it imposed additional punishment rather than merely regulating vehicle use or traffic, and unlawfully impaired the common right to use personal property.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a dispute over whether a trial court could order specific performance of an agreement in which plaintiff Crawford would convey part of his farm property to defendant Carter for use as a repair shop and service station site. The court examined the parties' understanding and found that Crawford was to receive only an undefined convenience or accommodation in exchange, with no obligation on Carter to provide specific services, repairs, or supplies for any definite period. It concluded that the agreement lacked a meeting of the minds on consideration and that enforcement would violate statutory requirements for adequate consideration and a just and reasonable contract under SDC 37.4603. The court therefore held that specific performance could not be enforced against Carter.

property

The case concerns a workers' compensation claim arising from the death of James Gulbrandson, who was killed while assisting a town marshal in apprehending two felony suspects wanted for a crime committed in another location. The industrial commissioner and circuit court awarded compensation against the Town of Midland on the ground that the marshal had authority to deputize Gulbrandson as an employee of the town. The dissenting opinion contends that the town marshal was exercising only permissive statewide authority to pursue fugitives under state statute rather than performing a municipal function of keeping the peace within the town, that such activity was not part of the town's usual business, and that no employment relationship therefore existed between the town and Gulbrandson.

labor & employmentcriminal law

In Anderson v. Langenfeld, the plaintiff sued for personal injuries and automobile damage after colliding with the defendants' truck on a highway. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $700, but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the judgment on appeal. The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he chose to overtake and pass the truck at an intersection in violation of SDC 44.0313, failed to sound his horn as required by SDC 44.0312, and admitted he could have avoided the crash by braking earlier or staying behind the truck. This statutory violation proximately caused the accident and barred recovery.

torts & liability

This case involved an ongoing probate proceeding in South Dakota concerning an administrator's supplementary final account and petition for distribution after a prior circuit court judgment. The account sought approval for additional post-distribution expenses including bond premiums, costs, and attorneys' fees totaling $1,632.82. Appellants specially appeared in county court to challenge its jurisdiction to consider the account, leading to an order overruling the objection; they then appealed to circuit court, which affirmed the county court's ruling and dismissed the appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the county court's order was not appealable under SDC 35.2101 because it addressed only a matter of practice and procedure without affecting any substantial right of the parties. Accordingly, the court directed the circuit court to vacate its order and dismiss the unauthorized appeal.

procedureproperty