Shelby County sued to recover use taxes, penalties, and interest paid under protest after contractors were assessed the taxes on tangible personal property used to build the county's Criminal Justice Complex, even though the county held title to the property and had indemnified the contractors. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that T.C.A. § 67-3004(b) imposes use tax liability on contractors regardless of who holds title to the property or whether that party would itself be taxable, and that the statutory exemption for sales to counties under T.C.A. § 67-3012 applies only to sales taxes, not use taxes; an apparent 1978 Code amendment extending the exemption to use taxes was an unauthorized change by the Code Commission and therefore ineffective.
This case concerned whether real and personal property owned by Methodist and Baptist publishing entities in Tennessee qualified for tax exemptions under state law as property used for religious purposes. The State Board of Equalization had ruled that portions of the properties used for printing operations, publishing non-religious materials, or administrative functions not directly tied to religious activities were taxable, while the property owners sought full exemptions. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that exemptions apply only to property directly related to the religious work or programs of the institutions, requiring allocation of uses between exempt and taxable portions based on good-faith determinations by the owners. The court clarified that publishing secular materials does not qualify for exemption and that institutional authorization or distribution integral to the organization's religious mission can support exempt status, with remand for further proceedings on specific allocations.
The case involved a borrower who executed a promissory note secured by land with a provision for a 10% attorney's fee upon default or placement for collection; after refinancing and being notified of collection efforts, the borrower paid the full amount including the fee and then sued to recover it on grounds that collection was unnecessary or the fee unreasonable. The trial court dismissed the complaint on motion. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that while such fee stipulations are valid, courts are not bound by the stated percentage and may reduce it if unreasonable, following precedent that allows judicial review for reasonableness even without suit being filed.
The case involved a dispute over a five-year commercial lease for real estate that the lessees intended to use exclusively as office space for a federal savings and loan association, which required prior federal approval of both the charter and the premises. After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board denied the charter and site approval, the lessees stopped paying rent, claiming the doctrine of frustration of commercial purpose excused their performance under the lease. The trial court dismissed the lessor's suit for unpaid rent and fees, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine did not apply because the risk of federal denial was reasonably foreseeable to the parties at the time the lease was executed. The court reasoned that although the lease's specified purpose was destroyed, the lessees had received tentative unofficial approval and knew of the approval requirement beforehand, so they bore the risk and remained liable for the balance due under the lease terms.
This case concerned whether an uninsured motorist insurance policy could offset benefits paid under workers' compensation against the policy limits, pursuant to Tennessee's Uninsured Motorist Statutes. The court held that such offset provisions are valid and that the insurer had no further liability since workers' compensation exceeded the $10,000 policy limit. The reasoning centered on the legislative intent behind T.C.A. § 56-1152, which permits policy terms and offsets to avoid duplication of benefits, allowing limited rather than broad coverage under the statutes.
The case involved a dispute between a prime contractor (Bible & Godwin) and its subcontractor (Faener) after a fire damaged a construction project. In an earlier tort suit brought by the property owner, a jury held the prime contractor liable for negligence but exonerated the subcontractor. The prime contractor then sued the subcontractor for reimbursement, seeking indemnity based on their contract. The court held that the prior judgment barred any indemnity claim grounded in tort principles such as active-passive negligence, but did not preclude a separate claim for contractual indemnity because that issue had not been litigated. It reached this result by harmonizing provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, particularly sections preserving existing indemnity rights and making prior judgments binding among co-defendants.