Ross W. Dyer

Shelby County sued to recover use taxes, penalties, and interest paid under protest after contractors were assessed the taxes on tangible personal property used to build the county's Criminal Justice Complex, even though the county held title to the property and had indemnified the contractors. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that T.C.A. § 67-3004(b) imposes use tax liability on contractors regardless of who holds title to the property or whether that party would itself be taxable, and that the statutory exemption for sales to counties under T.C.A. § 67-3012 applies only to sales taxes, not use taxes; an apparent 1978 Code amendment extending the exemption to use taxes was an unauthorized change by the Code Commission and therefore ineffective.

taxesprocedure

This case concerned whether real and personal property owned by Methodist and Baptist publishing entities in Tennessee qualified for tax exemptions under state law as property used for religious purposes. The State Board of Equalization had ruled that portions of the properties used for printing operations, publishing non-religious materials, or administrative functions not directly tied to religious activities were taxable, while the property owners sought full exemptions. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that exemptions apply only to property directly related to the religious work or programs of the institutions, requiring allocation of uses between exempt and taxable portions based on good-faith determinations by the owners. The court clarified that publishing secular materials does not qualify for exemption and that institutional authorization or distribution integral to the organization's religious mission can support exempt status, with remand for further proceedings on specific allocations.

taxesreligious libertyproperty

The case involved a borrower who executed a promissory note secured by land with a provision for a 10% attorney's fee upon default or placement for collection; after refinancing and being notified of collection efforts, the borrower paid the full amount including the fee and then sued to recover it on grounds that collection was unnecessary or the fee unreasonable. The trial court dismissed the complaint on motion. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that while such fee stipulations are valid, courts are not bound by the stated percentage and may reduce it if unreasonable, following precedent that allows judicial review for reasonableness even without suit being filed.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a five-year commercial lease for real estate that the lessees intended to use exclusively as office space for a federal savings and loan association, which required prior federal approval of both the charter and the premises. After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board denied the charter and site approval, the lessees stopped paying rent, claiming the doctrine of frustration of commercial purpose excused their performance under the lease. The trial court dismissed the lessor's suit for unpaid rent and fees, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine did not apply because the risk of federal denial was reasonably foreseeable to the parties at the time the lease was executed. The court reasoned that although the lease's specified purpose was destroyed, the lessees had received tentative unofficial approval and knew of the approval requirement beforehand, so they bore the risk and remained liable for the balance due under the lease terms.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether an uninsured motorist insurance policy could offset benefits paid under workers' compensation against the policy limits, pursuant to Tennessee's Uninsured Motorist Statutes. The court held that such offset provisions are valid and that the insurer had no further liability since workers' compensation exceeded the $10,000 policy limit. The reasoning centered on the legislative intent behind T.C.A. § 56-1152, which permits policy terms and offsets to avoid duplication of benefits, allowing limited rather than broad coverage under the statutes.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between a prime contractor (Bible & Godwin) and its subcontractor (Faener) after a fire damaged a construction project. In an earlier tort suit brought by the property owner, a jury held the prime contractor liable for negligence but exonerated the subcontractor. The prime contractor then sued the subcontractor for reimbursement, seeking indemnity based on their contract. The court held that the prior judgment barred any indemnity claim grounded in tort principles such as active-passive negligence, but did not preclude a separate claim for contractual indemnity because that issue had not been litigated. It reached this result by harmonizing provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, particularly sections preserving existing indemnity rights and making prior judgments binding among co-defendants.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a Tennessee corporation suing a Missouri resident farmer for breach of contract after he allegedly failed to deliver cotton production under an agreement made through the National Farmers Organization. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant's separate agreements with the NFO did not constitute transacting business in Tennessee or entering a contract for materials to be furnished in the state under the long-arm statute, T.C.A. § 20-235. The court further concluded that the defendant's limited activities through the non-resident NFO did not meet due process standards, as there was no purposeful availment of Tennessee's laws or benefits.

procedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Kellogg and Sanitors over an indemnity clause in their agreement for janitorial services at a Kellogg plant. An employee of Sanitors was injured due to Kellogg's negligence, Kellogg settled the claim by paying the employee, and then sought reimbursement from Sanitors under the contract. The trial court ruled in favor of Kellogg, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that while the first paragraph of the indemnity provision covered claims arising from Sanitors' own acts or omissions, the second paragraph's broad language making Sanitors responsible for its employees' safety and indemnifying Kellogg against any and all claims by those employees would be meaningless unless it also applied to claims resulting from Kellogg's negligence; citing prior precedent, the court found the intent to indemnify against one's own negligence was expressed clearly enough to be enforceable.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a libel claim filed by Sammy D. Applewhite against author Paul J. Vanderwood, Memphis State University Press, Inc., and Memphis State University over a false statement in the 1969 book “Night Riders of Reel-foot Lake” alleging the plaintiff was killed in a knife fight. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the one-year statute of limitations and by sovereign immunity as to some defendants. On appeal, the court determined that Tennessee follows the single publication rule for libel, meaning the cause of action accrued upon initial release and distribution of the book edition rather than upon each subsequent sale, rendering the claim untimely. It affirmed dismissal of the University on sovereign immunity grounds but reversed as to the Press, Inc., holding that its publishing activities constituted a proprietary function with a separate income-producing fund, making it subject to suit, and remanded the case.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether the Hamilton County Board of Education could discharge tenured teacher Jack Morrison for wearing a full beard in violation of its grooming regulations, which prohibited styles that were or could become disruptive to the classroom or educational process. Morrison appealed his termination, arguing that the board lacked authority under the teacher tenure act, that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, and that his discharge violated due process and a claimed right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the chancery court's upholding of the discharge. The court reasoned that the board possessed broad statutory authority to manage schools, that the regulation had a definite meaning and was reasonable in relation to maintaining discipline and an effective learning environment, and that no constitutional right existed to wear a beard while teaching in the public schools.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether defendant Bishop was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial on a 1969 third-degree burglary indictment. Bishop, who was serving a federal sentence, demanded a speedy trial in July 1969, but the state did not secure his return from federal custody until January 1971 due to funding and logistical issues; he was tried and convicted in February 1971. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the case, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed that ruling and reinstated the conviction. Applying the balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, the court weighed the two-year delay, the state's reasons for delay, Bishop's assertion of the right, and the minimal prejudice (as he was already imprisoned and the state's evidence of guilt was strong), concluding that the factors did not establish a violation of the speedy-trial right under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1957 private act authorizing Williamson County to impose a privilege tax on retail liquor dealers equal to one-half of one percent of monthly sales, with proceeds dedicated to the county hospital, which conflicted with a later general state law setting a lower minimum tax rate applicable to all counties. The chancellor ruled the private act invalid under Article 11, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that this constitutional provision applies even to legislation affecting a county's governmental functions when the act suspends the general law, requiring a reasonable basis for the resulting discrimination; no such basis existed for subjecting liquor businesses in Williamson County to a higher tax than similar businesses statewide.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over whether a father could reduce child support payments under a 1971 divorce decree after Tennessee lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18. The court decided that the reduction was proper once the older child turned 18, affirming dismissal of the mother's petition for contempt and full payments. The core reasoning was that the parties' property settlement agreement had merged into the court decree and lost its independent contractual character, so support obligations were governed by statutes authorizing payments only during minority, a period the legislature could and did redefine.

family law

In Hunter v. State, five defendants were convicted of rape in Shelby County Criminal Court and sentenced to death by electrocution. After the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded for review under Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined the voir dire record and found that numerous prospective jurors had been excluded for cause solely due to general reservations or conscientious objections to capital punishment, resulting in a jury that lacked impartiality on the punishment issue. The court held that this violation affected only the sentencing determination and did not invalidate the underlying convictions of guilt, as the same jury need not decide both phases under Tennessee and federal constitutions. The case was therefore remanded solely for redetermination of punishment, with instructions that the death penalty could not be imposed following Furman v. Georgia.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned the constitutionality of Chapter 420, Public Acts of 1971, a Tennessee statute amending T.C.A. 6-309 to allow municipalities to annex adjacent territory while levying ad valorem taxes only for actual services rendered. The act included a population threshold over 100,000 and exclusions for certain counties, limiting its practical effect to Chattanooga in Hamilton County. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's decision upholding the statute, ruling that it constituted an invalid local law rather than a general law, in violation of Article 11, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, which mandates that municipal boundaries be altered only by general laws. The court found the population classification arbitrary because it was crafted to exclude all other large municipalities and could not be saved by elision due to the statute's integrated structure.

taxesproperty

This case involved a minor injured in a motorcycle accident with both an uninsured motorist and another driver. After settling a claim against the other driver for $9,500 and obtaining a $170,000 judgment against the uninsured motorist that went unpaid, the plaintiff sought the full $10,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under his State Farm policy. The insurer claimed it could offset the settlement amount against its policy limits pursuant to a policy provision that had been filed with and approved by the state insurance commissioner. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the offset provision conflicted with the state's uninsured motorist statute because the total payments would not exceed the insured's actual damages and thus would not constitute a duplication of benefits.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves a dispute between two insurance carriers, Allstate and Hartford, over which is liable for losses from a vehicle accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hartford under the new Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56, and the losing party appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because an appeal from a summary judgment requires review of evidentiary matters in the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, placing the case within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under T.C.A. § 16-408 rather than the Supreme Court. The court distinguished the case from prior precedent involving stipulated facts and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals.

procedure

This case involved a worker's compensation claim by James Vernon Potts against his employer Heil-Quaker Corporation after he slipped and fell on an oil-slicked concrete surface in an open area on the company's premises while walking from his welding station to the exit gate after his shift. The trial court denied benefits, finding the injury did not occur in the course of employment. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, holding that the injury was compensable because the employee was required to use the guard gate for ingress and egress, making the route part of the employer's premises, and the conditions presented a special hazard under the applicable exception to the general rule that injuries off-premises or after leaving work are not covered.

labor & employment

The case involved a car accident in Alabama between two Tennessee residents on a trip that began and was to end in Tennessee; the plaintiff, a guest passenger, sued the defendant driver in Tennessee court alleging ordinary negligence, but Alabama's guest statute would bar recovery absent willful or wanton conduct. The trial court applied Tennessee's longstanding lex loci delicti rule, which looks to the law of the place of the injury, and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that the rule should not be abandoned in favor of a dominant-contacts approach and that Alabama's guest statute did not violate Tennessee public policy because it did not offend good morals or natural justice. The court relied on decades of precedent applying the law of the situs in tort cases absent such an exception. A dissent argued that the Alabama statute conflicted with Tennessee's policy favoring ordinary-negligence liability between hosts and guests.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation challenging a Tennessee sales tax assessment on electricity purchased to operate compressor stations for its interstate natural gas pipeline. The company paid the tax under protest and sought recovery, arguing the tax violated state exemption statutes and the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the company, holding that the electricity use was an integral part of interstate gas transmission and thus not subject to state taxation under the Commerce Clause.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory