Morris L. Overstreet

The case involved Joseph Louis Tovar, former president of a school board, who was convicted under the Texas Open Meetings Act for knowingly calling, organizing, and participating in two special closed meetings that were not permitted by the Act. The trial court denied Tovar's requested jury instruction requiring proof that he knew the closed meetings were illegal, instead instructing only that the meetings were not permitted under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute defines a nature-of-the-conduct offense and does not require the state to prove the defendant's knowledge of illegality or provide a good-faith exception. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the statute requires awareness that the meeting violates the Act, ultimately concluding based on the statute's plain language, the Act's purpose of ensuring open governmental proceedings, and the absence of any mistake-of-law defense that the offense is conduct-oriented and the jury instruction was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Simon Salinas, who was charged with felony driving while intoxicated and changed his plea to guilty before a jury without signing a written waiver of jury trial as required by Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the lack of a written waiver did not affect a substantial right and was thus subject to harmless error analysis. Salinas sought discretionary review on whether the failure to comply with the statute's waiver requirement is error immune from harmless error review. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and remanded the case to the court of appeals for reanalysis, citing the tension between its prior decision in Meek v. State (finding such error not subject to harmless error analysis) and its more recent holding in Cain v. State (that only certain federal constitutional structural errors are categorically exempt from harmless error review).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Bobbie Gainer Grant's conviction for the misdemeanor offense of evading arrest, where the charging information alleged that he fled from "Officer Lawson," a peace officer attempting to arrest him, but trial evidence identified the officer as Lieutenant Craig Lawson. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that there was a fatal variance between the allegation and the proof of the officer's name. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that ruling, holding that the information's use of "Officer" instead of the officer's actual first name constituted a defect in the charging instrument that was waived when the defendant failed to object before trial under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.14(b) and Studer v. State. Because the missing first name was not an allegation requiring proof, the State was not obligated to establish that "Officer" was the first name, and the case was remanded for consideration of the defendant's remaining points of error.

criminal lawprocedure

In this criminal case, the defendant was convicted of murder after a drive-by shooting involving rival street gangs; he had sought to subpoena two newspaper reporters to testify about the gang atmosphere in order to support his defenses that he lacked intent to kill or acted under sudden passion. The trial court quashed the subpoenas on the reporters' motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. On the State's motion for rehearing, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Court of Appeals erred, ruling that the defendant bore the burden to show that the reporters' testimony would be material and favorable to his defense and that his general assertions about their knowledge of gang activity did not meet this standard.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights

In Ex Parte Kerr, a death-sentenced applicant sought a stay of his February 1998 execution and either the right to file a habeas corpus application under the Texas Constitution or appointment of new counsel under Article 11.071 to challenge his conviction and sentence. His initial habeas attorney had filed only a perfunctory application raising a single claim about the unitary direct-appeal and habeas timeline, without addressing any trial issues. A majority of the court dismissed the motions upon due consideration. The dissent argued that the initial attorney's error—based on a mistaken belief that trial challenges could not be raised until after direct appeal—denied the applicant his constitutional right to effective habeas counsel and to the writ of habeas corpus, which the Texas Constitution declares shall never be suspended.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Juan Blanco was convicted of burglary of a habitation and placed on probation after the trial court suspended his ten-year sentence. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient when measured against the jury charge that omitted the law of parties, following the Benson/Boozer line of cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address that line of precedent but noted it had already been overruled in Malik v. State, which requires measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the elements in a hypothetically correct jury charge. The court held that Malik is binding precedent despite arguments to the contrary and vacated the appeals court's judgment, remanding the case for reconsideration under the Malik standard.

criminal lawprocedure