Morris L. Overstreet

The case involved Joseph Louis Tovar, former president of a school board, who was convicted under the Texas Open Meetings Act for knowingly calling, organizing, and participating in two special closed meetings that were not permitted by the Act. The trial court denied Tovar's requested jury instruction requiring proof that he knew the closed meetings were illegal, instead instructing only that the meetings were not permitted under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute defines a nature-of-the-conduct offense and does not require the state to prove the defendant's knowledge of illegality or provide a good-faith exception. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the statute requires awareness that the meeting violates the Act, ultimately concluding based on the statute's plain language, the Act's purpose of ensuring open governmental proceedings, and the absence of any mistake-of-law defense that the offense is conduct-oriented and the jury instruction was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Simon Salinas, who was charged with felony driving while intoxicated and changed his plea to guilty before a jury without signing a written waiver of jury trial as required by Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the lack of a written waiver did not affect a substantial right and was thus subject to harmless error analysis. Salinas sought discretionary review on whether the failure to comply with the statute's waiver requirement is error immune from harmless error review. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and remanded the case to the court of appeals for reanalysis, citing the tension between its prior decision in Meek v. State (finding such error not subject to harmless error analysis) and its more recent holding in Cain v. State (that only certain federal constitutional structural errors are categorically exempt from harmless error review).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Bobbie Gainer Grant's conviction for the misdemeanor offense of evading arrest, where the charging information alleged that he fled from "Officer Lawson," a peace officer attempting to arrest him, but trial evidence identified the officer as Lieutenant Craig Lawson. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that there was a fatal variance between the allegation and the proof of the officer's name. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that ruling, holding that the information's use of "Officer" instead of the officer's actual first name constituted a defect in the charging instrument that was waived when the defendant failed to object before trial under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.14(b) and Studer v. State. Because the missing first name was not an allegation requiring proof, the State was not obligated to establish that "Officer" was the first name, and the case was remanded for consideration of the defendant's remaining points of error.

criminal lawprocedure

In this criminal case, the defendant was convicted of murder after a drive-by shooting involving rival street gangs; he had sought to subpoena two newspaper reporters to testify about the gang atmosphere in order to support his defenses that he lacked intent to kill or acted under sudden passion. The trial court quashed the subpoenas on the reporters' motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. On the State's motion for rehearing, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Court of Appeals erred, ruling that the defendant bore the burden to show that the reporters' testimony would be material and favorable to his defense and that his general assertions about their knowledge of gang activity did not meet this standard.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights

In Ex Parte Kerr, a death-sentenced applicant sought a stay of his February 1998 execution and either the right to file a habeas corpus application under the Texas Constitution or appointment of new counsel under Article 11.071 to challenge his conviction and sentence. His initial habeas attorney had filed only a perfunctory application raising a single claim about the unitary direct-appeal and habeas timeline, without addressing any trial issues. A majority of the court dismissed the motions upon due consideration. The dissent argued that the initial attorney's error—based on a mistaken belief that trial challenges could not be raised until after direct appeal—denied the applicant his constitutional right to effective habeas counsel and to the writ of habeas corpus, which the Texas Constitution declares shall never be suspended.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Juan Blanco was convicted of burglary of a habitation and placed on probation after the trial court suspended his ten-year sentence. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient when measured against the jury charge that omitted the law of parties, following the Benson/Boozer line of cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address that line of precedent but noted it had already been overruled in Malik v. State, which requires measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the elements in a hypothetically correct jury charge. The court held that Malik is binding precedent despite arguments to the contrary and vacated the appeals court's judgment, remanding the case for reconsideration under the Malik standard.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, appellant David Wayne Loesch entered a no-contest plea to marijuana possession after a roving border patrol stop along Highway 59 and appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated that judgment and remanded, holding that while the Court of Appeals correctly applied de novo review to the legal question of reasonable suspicion, it erred by assessing each factor (such as area characteristics, driver behavior, and vehicle appearance) in isolation rather than under the totality of the circumstances and by relying on the disavowed 'as consistent with innocent activity' test. The court emphasized that facts insufficient alone may combine to support reasonable suspicion in immigration enforcement stops.

criminal lawprocedureimmigration

The case involved Milton Ray Atkins, who was convicted of possessing a trace amount of cocaine found in a crack pipe and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Atkins challenged his conviction on the ground that during jury selection the prosecutor used a hypothetical question based on the exact facts of his case to ask potential jurors whether they could convict someone for possessing only drug residue, which the defense argued improperly committed the jurors to a guilty verdict. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that such fact-specific hypotheticals exceed the proper scope of voir dire and constitute reversible error when they seek to bind jurors to the case's specific circumstances. The court reasoned that while questions may probe jurors' views on the law, they may not use hypotheticals mirroring the trial facts to extract commitments to a particular outcome, and because the State had exhausted its peremptory challenges the error required reversal. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings on harm and preservation issues.

criminal lawprocedure

In Brown v. State, the appellant was convicted of murder after a jury trial in which he claimed that a handgun he was holding accidentally discharged when he was bumped from behind, killing an acquaintance. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by refusing the defendant's requested jury instruction on the voluntariness of his conduct under Penal Code § 6.01. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and held that no separate affirmative instruction on voluntariness was required, because the statutory elements that the offense be committed intentionally or knowingly already encompass the requirement of voluntary conduct, and the requested instruction would constitute an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the defendant entered nolo contendere pleas to two cocaine delivery offenses without a plea agreement, leading the trial court to defer guilt findings and impose ten years of deferred adjudication probation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on prior precedent that limited appeals from unadjudicated deferred adjudication to pretrial motion rulings or cases with trial court permission. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and held that those limitations apply only to negotiated pleas under former statutory rules, which do not govern this non-negotiated plea scenario. As a result, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address the merits of the appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved appellant's conviction for capital murder under Texas Penal Code Section 19.03(a)(2) for killing his girlfriend during the course of an attempted kidnapping on or about August 22, 1993, in Gillespie County. After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty, the jury answered the special issues under Article 37.071 in a manner requiring a death sentence, and the trial court imposed that sentence. On automatic direct appeal, appellant challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the attempted kidnapping element of the offense. The court reviewed the evidence, including appellant's confession, letters expressing intent, and eyewitness accounts of the shooting and the victim's removal from the scene, and applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard for legal sufficiency along with factual sufficiency analysis to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal law

The case involved Kenneth Allen McDuff's appeal from his Travis County conviction (after a change of venue) for capital murder, based on allegations that he intentionally caused the death of a woman during the commission or attempted commission of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping on December 29, 1991. A jury found him guilty and, following the special issues under Article 37.071, sentenced him to death. On appeal, McDuff challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction, directed verdict, legal and factual sufficiency, and corroboration of accomplice testimony, arguing failures to prove the corpus delicti of murder, kidnapping, or sexual assault and his connection to the crimes. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence such as witness identifications, hair and blood evidence from the defendant's car, and the victim's disappearance, and that the overall evidence supported the jury's findings on the charged offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ex Parte Davis, a death row inmate filed a subsequent habeas corpus application challenging his conviction and sentence, while also moving to declare portions of newly enacted Article 11.071, § 5 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered claims that the statute's limits on successive applications violated separation of powers under the Texas Constitution, improperly suspended the right to habeas corpus, and operated as an ex post facto law. The court upheld the statute's constitutionality, ruling that the Legislature is authorized by Article I, § 12 to enact laws making the habeas remedy speedy and effectual, and that the provisions establish procedural requirements without preventing the court's exercise of its powers or suspending the writ itself. The decision focused on the statute's methodology for handling applications, including exceptions for newly available claims or actual innocence showings, and denied relief on the constitutional challenges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Rex Newman, who was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to 50 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Newman sought appointment of appellate counsel and a free trial transcript under Texas rules allowing indigent defendants such relief, but the trial court found after hearings that he was not indigent based on his assets including equity in his residence, business, and personal property, and denied the requests. The court of appeals affirmed the non-indigency finding. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Newman's two grounds for review, holding that the lower courts did not require sale of exempt homestead property and did not abuse discretion in determining non-indigency on a case-by-case basis after considering available assets.

criminal lawprocedure

In Matchett v. State, the appellant pled guilty to capital murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) and was sentenced to death after the jury answered special issues affirmatively. The primary issue on direct appeal was whether the trial court's complete failure to provide the admonishments required by Article 26.13(a)(2-4) constituted reversible error. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that such a failure was error and not substantial compliance under Article 26.13(c), but that the error remained subject to a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2) rather than being automatically reversible. Applying that analysis, the court found the error harmless because the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary apart from the omitted admonishments, and affirmed the conviction and death sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Willie Earl Pondexter, Jr. for capital murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2), based on the killing of an elderly woman during a burglary and robbery on October 29, 1993. A jury found him guilty, answered the special issues affirmatively, and the trial court imposed a death sentence, which Pondexter automatically appealed. On appeal, he raised challenges including that the jury array violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments due to underrepresentation of African-Americans compared to the county population, and that evidence of gang-related conversations was improperly admitted as character evidence during the guilt phase. The court applied the Duren v. Missouri test to the jury claim, finding the first prong met but the second and third not satisfied because the selection process was random from official lists with no proof of systematic exclusion or unfairness. It also determined that any error in admitting the gang evidence was harmless under Rule 81(b)(2), leading to the overruling of the points of error.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Mitchell v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of delivering less than 28 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 77 years in prison. During the punishment phase, the State introduced evidence of four extraneous offenses, which the trial court admitted after finding they were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the court denied the defendant's request for jury instructions on the burden of proof, the definition of reasonable doubt, and the limited use of such evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower courts, holding that under Article 37.07, Section 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge—not the jury—determines whether extraneous offenses have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a preliminary admissibility question at the punishment stage. The core reasoning was that the statute addresses admissibility rather than requiring jury findings on the weight or proof of the evidence, distinguishing this from guilt-innocence phase procedures.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned David Lopez's second trial for a 1979 murder in Travis County, Texas, following reversal of his initial conviction; the jury again found him guilty and made an affirmative deadly weapon finding, resulting in a life sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed issues including whether the State's pursuit of the deadly weapon finding on retrial violated doctrines of prosecutorial vindictiveness or ex post facto, and whether evidence of Lopez's prior drug use and a specific incident of misconduct while under the influence was properly admitted at trial. The court held that the deadly weapon finding was permissible because the punishment range and sentence were no more severe than in the first trial and available regardless of the finding, and that the evidence was admissible on grounds such as motive even if not for impeachment of a false impression. Core reasoning centered on the law in effect at the time of the offense, the absence of any increase in penalty severity, and evidentiary rules permitting admission when relevant for purposes other than character conformity.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a conviction for sexual assault of a child under Texas law, where the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the 14-year-old complainant's prior sexual activity with multiple partners before age 14 to support a promiscuity defense. The trial court excluded the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the promiscuity defense was unavailable because a child under 14 cannot legally consent to sexual conduct. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, ruling that the statute permits the defense when the complainant is at least 14 at the time of the offense, and prior promiscuous conduct—even before age 14—can be relevant if it involved voluntary participation. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute does not restrict the timing of the prior conduct and that promiscuous refers to actual consent rather than legal consent.

criminal law

The case involved Tony Egbuna Ford's convictions for capital murder and three counts of attempted capital murder, all committed during a robbery of a family in El Paso County on December 18, 1991, for which he received a death sentence after the jury answered the special issues under Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On automatic direct appeal, Ford challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue, without contesting guilt-phase evidence. The court detailed the facts of the home invasion robbery and shootings, then addressed whether that evidence demonstrated a probability that Ford would commit future acts of criminal violence constituting a continuing threat to society. The opinion also examined related evidentiary questions concerning admissibility and the scope of consideration for aggravating and mitigating evidence under the punishment-phase special issues.

criminal law