Bill Marvin White

Knox v. State involved the conviction of appellant for capital murder during aggravated robbery or robbery, resulting in a death sentence after the jury's findings on special issues. The primary issue addressed was whether a roughly ten-month delay between a federal appellate mandate for a new penalty phase and the state retrial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The court applied the Barker v. Wingo factors, assuming the delay was presumptively unreasonable but finding the state acted in good faith without bad-faith postponement, noting the defendant's strategic delay in asserting the claim, and determining insufficient prejudice to warrant relief. It rejected the speedy trial claim along with other points on evidentiary rulings regarding motive and accomplice testimony, ultimately affirming the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a jury convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated, but the trial court granted his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (JNOV), effectively setting aside the verdict. The court of appeals treated the JNOV as the equivalent of an order granting a new trial, which the state could appeal, and reversed the ruling after finding sufficient evidence supported the conviction. On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that trial courts lack authority under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to grant a JNOV in criminal cases, as Article 42.01 requires judgments to reflect the jury's verdict and no statute provides a civil-style power to override it. The court further ruled that such a JNOV functions as a grant of a new trial for insufficient evidence, making it appealable by the state under Article 44.01(a)(3), and that double jeopardy does not bar review of this post-verdict order. The decision reversed the trial court's action while clarifying the state's appellate rights.

criminal lawprocedure

In Fant v. State, the appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, after which the State initiated civil forfeiture proceedings under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure against seized cash, pistols, and a cellular phone; the parties reached an agreed judgment forfeiting some of the property. The appellant then filed a pretrial habeas application claiming that the forfeiture barred the criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing it amounted to prior punishment. The trial court denied relief, the court of appeals granted the writ, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that in rem civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The court relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing that such forfeitures are remedial rather than punitive and do not implicate the Fifth Amendment's protections against multiple punishments.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a defendant arrested for drug possession charges who entered an agreed judgment forfeiting over $11,000 in currency under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 59, then sought to bar the criminal prosecution on Fifth Amendment double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the habeas application, the court of appeals affirmed using a proportionality analysis, and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review. The court held that Chapter 59 forfeitures are civil in rem proceedings intended to be remedial rather than punitive, following its decision in Fant v. State and the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Ursery. It therefore concluded that double jeopardy protections do not apply to the forfeiture, sustained the State's cross-petition, and affirmed the judgment below because the correct result had been reached.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a jury convicted appellees Adams and Chambers of engaging in organized criminal activity, after which they filed motions for new trial; some were untimely, leading to appellate proceedings. The Texarkana Court of Appeals abated the appeals and remanded to the trial court with directions to hear the out-of-time motions, which the trial court did and granted, prompting the State to appeal on grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Houston Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of the State's jurisdictional challenge regarding the abatement order's validity under appellate rules. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Houston Court of Appeals erred in refusing to address those merits and that the Texarkana court's order improperly expanded jurisdiction contrary to Tex.R.App.P. 2(a). The core reasoning focused on the limits of appellate courts' authority to suspend procedural rules without affecting jurisdiction or Code of Criminal Procedure requirements.

criminal lawprocedure

In Stone v. State, the defendant entered a no-contest plea to attempted murder and stipulated in writing under Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that the State's witnesses would testify to facts supporting the charge, while modifying the plea papers to avoid any judicial confession of guilt. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the defendant to sixteen years in prison, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the stipulation insufficient because it did not affirm the truth of the witnesses' testimony. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and reversed the appellate decision, holding that a stipulation agreeing to what the witnesses would say if called is adequate to support a conviction on a nolo contendere plea. The court reasoned that prior precedents, including Brewster and Robinson, establish that Article 1.15 permits such stipulations without requiring the defendant to concede the veracity of the evidence, distinguishing this from cases involving not-guilty pleas or obscenity charges. This approach preserves the distinction between guilty and no-contest pleas while ensuring the evidence covers all elements of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure