Bill Marvin White

Knox v. State involved the conviction of appellant for capital murder during aggravated robbery or robbery, resulting in a death sentence after the jury's findings on special issues. The primary issue addressed was whether a roughly ten-month delay between a federal appellate mandate for a new penalty phase and the state retrial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The court applied the Barker v. Wingo factors, assuming the delay was presumptively unreasonable but finding the state acted in good faith without bad-faith postponement, noting the defendant's strategic delay in asserting the claim, and determining insufficient prejudice to warrant relief. It rejected the speedy trial claim along with other points on evidentiary rulings regarding motive and accomplice testimony, ultimately affirming the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a jury convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated, but the trial court granted his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (JNOV), effectively setting aside the verdict. The court of appeals treated the JNOV as the equivalent of an order granting a new trial, which the state could appeal, and reversed the ruling after finding sufficient evidence supported the conviction. On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that trial courts lack authority under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to grant a JNOV in criminal cases, as Article 42.01 requires judgments to reflect the jury's verdict and no statute provides a civil-style power to override it. The court further ruled that such a JNOV functions as a grant of a new trial for insufficient evidence, making it appealable by the state under Article 44.01(a)(3), and that double jeopardy does not bar review of this post-verdict order. The decision reversed the trial court's action while clarifying the state's appellate rights.

criminal lawprocedure

In Fant v. State, the appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, after which the State initiated civil forfeiture proceedings under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure against seized cash, pistols, and a cellular phone; the parties reached an agreed judgment forfeiting some of the property. The appellant then filed a pretrial habeas application claiming that the forfeiture barred the criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing it amounted to prior punishment. The trial court denied relief, the court of appeals granted the writ, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that in rem civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The court relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing that such forfeitures are remedial rather than punitive and do not implicate the Fifth Amendment's protections against multiple punishments.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a defendant arrested for drug possession charges who entered an agreed judgment forfeiting over $11,000 in currency under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 59, then sought to bar the criminal prosecution on Fifth Amendment double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the habeas application, the court of appeals affirmed using a proportionality analysis, and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review. The court held that Chapter 59 forfeitures are civil in rem proceedings intended to be remedial rather than punitive, following its decision in Fant v. State and the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Ursery. It therefore concluded that double jeopardy protections do not apply to the forfeiture, sustained the State's cross-petition, and affirmed the judgment below because the correct result had been reached.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a jury convicted appellees Adams and Chambers of engaging in organized criminal activity, after which they filed motions for new trial; some were untimely, leading to appellate proceedings. The Texarkana Court of Appeals abated the appeals and remanded to the trial court with directions to hear the out-of-time motions, which the trial court did and granted, prompting the State to appeal on grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Houston Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of the State's jurisdictional challenge regarding the abatement order's validity under appellate rules. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Houston Court of Appeals erred in refusing to address those merits and that the Texarkana court's order improperly expanded jurisdiction contrary to Tex.R.App.P. 2(a). The core reasoning focused on the limits of appellate courts' authority to suspend procedural rules without affecting jurisdiction or Code of Criminal Procedure requirements.

criminal lawprocedure

In Stone v. State, the defendant entered a no-contest plea to attempted murder and stipulated in writing under Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that the State's witnesses would testify to facts supporting the charge, while modifying the plea papers to avoid any judicial confession of guilt. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the defendant to sixteen years in prison, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the stipulation insufficient because it did not affirm the truth of the witnesses' testimony. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and reversed the appellate decision, holding that a stipulation agreeing to what the witnesses would say if called is adequate to support a conviction on a nolo contendere plea. The court reasoned that prior precedents, including Brewster and Robinson, establish that Article 1.15 permits such stipulations without requiring the defendant to concede the veracity of the evidence, distinguishing this from cases involving not-guilty pleas or obscenity charges. This approach preserves the distinction between guilty and no-contest pleas while ensuring the evidence covers all elements of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Rodney Charles Rachal's 1992 conviction for capital murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.03 for a 1990 double robbery-murder committed during a planned ambush at an apartment complex. The jury answered the special issues under Article 37.071(b) affirmatively, resulting in a mandatory death sentence, which Rachal appealed directly to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the future dangerousness finding under Article 37.071(b)(2). The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard, considering evidence from both guilt and punishment phases including the defendant's confession, details of the unprovoked shootings of multiple victims, and his prior criminal and juvenile record, and held that a rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves an application for writ of habeas corpus by Marshall Lynn Long, who was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated and bond jumping based on informations rather than indictments. The applicant argued that his convictions were invalid because he never waived his right to indictment on the record. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, holding that the presentment of an information vests the trial court with jurisdiction, and that any failure to follow statutory waiver procedures for indictment is a statutory violation, not a jurisdictional or constitutional defect, requiring a showing of harm for collateral relief. The court reasoned that since the applicant did not claim he was denied the right or intended not to waive it, and showed no harm, the convictions stand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ricardo Lloyd Johnson, who was convicted by the trial court of aggravated possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. On appeal, Johnson argued that he was seized under Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution either when officers approached him in an apartment breezeway or when they pursued him and shouted for him to stop, and that evidence should have been suppressed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the conviction, holding that no seizure occurred under the state constitution until the suspect submitted to a show of authority or was physically stopped. The court reasoned that Article I, Section 9 does not provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in this context and aligned with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in California v. Hodari D.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hight, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of recklessly causing injury to a child, after which the trial court assessed punishment at one year in jail and a $3,000 fine. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for new trial as to the punishment phase only, citing alleged bias by the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that trial courts lack authority to grant a new trial limited to punishment. The core reasoning was that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 44.29(b) authorizes only appellate courts to grant new trials solely on punishment, and Rule 32 provides that a new trial by a trial court must restore the case to its pre-trial position.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of possessing a deadly weapon in a penal institution, with two prior convictions alleged for enhancement. After the jury assessed an 80-year sentence, the trial court ordered it to run consecutively to the defendant's existing 99-year murder sentence rather than his five-year theft sentence, pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.08(b). The defendant challenged the cumulation order on appeal, arguing it lacked sufficient record evidence of the prior murder conviction, citing Turner v. State. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the order, holding that the defense counsel's explicit admissions during the sentencing hearing—that the defendant was serving the murder sentence and identifying its details—provided adequate identification of the prior conviction to support stacking. This distinguished the case from Turner, where no such admissions or evidence existed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Derwin LaThomas Jackson's conviction for burglary of a vehicle, where the indictment charged him only as a principal actor but the jury was also instructed on the law of parties. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient because it did not show Jackson acted alone as the principal and the application paragraph did not adequately authorize conviction under party liability. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the full jury charge, which included separate paragraphs defining and applying the law of parties, was sufficient to allow conviction as a party even without an objection from the defendant at trial. The court reasoned that the evidence supported Jackson's guilt as a party, since he was driving the getaway vehicle containing the stolen items, and measured sufficiency against the charge as given.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Joseph, who was convicted after a bench trial of possessing less than 28 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 25 years in prison after pleading true to enhancements. Officers found him holding a syringe in an abandoned house amid drug paraphernalia, and lab tests later confirmed 0.2 milligrams of cocaine residue inside the closed syringe, though none was visible to the naked eye. The court of appeals had reversed the conviction, holding the evidence insufficient because the cocaine was not visible. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that decision, ruling that visibility to the naked eye is not an element of possession of a controlled substance and that the evidence was sufficient to prove knowing possession when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

criminal law

In State v. Mayorga, the defendant was charged with resisting arrest after officers, acting on incorrect information about outstanding warrants, attempted to take her into custody following a traffic accident; she resisted by swinging her arms and pulling away, and was later charged only with resisting after the warrant error was discovered. The trial court granted her motion to suppress all evidence of her resistance under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23 because the arrest was unlawful, but the court of appeals reversed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that the evidence should not be suppressed, reasoning that the crime of resisting arrest arises only at the moment of the arrest attempt, so the evidence is not "obtained" through exploitation of the prior illegal conduct and the exclusionary rule does not apply; it also noted that Texas law makes resisting arrest unlawful regardless of whether the arrest itself was legal. The court remanded for the court of appeals to consider the case in light of Barnett v. State, Ford v. State, and Arizona v. Evans.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the direct appeal of Cameron Todd Willingham's capital murder conviction and death sentence for intentionally setting fire to his home, killing his three young children. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence after reviewing four points of error, including denial of a change of venue, exclusion of impeachment evidence, omission of a parole instruction in the jury charge, and sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's findings on the special issues of future dangerousness and lack of sufficient mitigating circumstances. The court held that the evidence of the defendant's history of violence, lack of remorse, and expert testimony on his sociopathic profile supported the jury's answers to the special issues under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071. It further concluded that pretrial publicity did not prevent a fair trial and that no error occurred in the evidentiary or instructional rulings. The opinion details the facts of the arson and the defendant's prior criminal record but does not address guilt-phase sufficiency, as that was not challenged.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Don Anthony Johnson, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison; on appeal he challenged the trial court's decision to permit jurors to take notes during the proceedings and consult those notes during deliberations. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that juror note-taking and the use of notes in the jury room fall within the sound discretion of the trial court. The court reasoned that no Texas statute prohibits the practice, that the majority of jurisdictions permit it under judicial control, and that the appellant had not demonstrated any harm, misconduct, or injection of outside evidence. Instructions given to the jury limited the notes to personal use for refreshing memory only. The decision rested on prior precedent and the absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Robert Hern, who pled guilty to theft of a firearm over $400 and received a 20-year sentence under a plea agreement, but the sentence exceeded the maximum for a third-degree felony, rendering the conviction void. After the trial court sua sponte granted a new trial over Hern's objection and the state reindicted with enhancement allegations, Hern sought habeas relief claiming double jeopardy barred reprosecution. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that although the trial court lacked authority to order a new trial on its own motion because Hern never challenged the conviction, the original judgment was void and therefore the state could reindict and retry him without violating double jeopardy principles. The court relied on its decision in Hoang v. State to conclude that a void conviction need not be respected even absent a formal order setting it aside, and affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a district attorney seeking a writ of mandamus to vacate a trial judge's order barring two assistant attorneys general from serving as unpaid assistant district attorneys in criminal prosecutions of a nursing home operator and its employees for offenses like injury to the elderly. These criminal charges arose from facts similar to those in a parallel civil enforcement action brought by the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division. The Court of Criminal Appeals conditionally granted the writ, holding that the district attorney possessed authority to appoint the assistants via deputation, retained supervisory control over them, and that no disqualifying conflict of interest existed given their separate organizational unit, lack of involvement in the civil case, and the district attorney's ongoing participation in the prosecutions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted by jury of involuntary manslaughter in 1992, with punishment assessed at ten years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. The trial court and court of appeals rejected the defendant's request for a jury instruction at punishment that would have allowed confinement in a community correctional facility under Penal Code §12.34(a)(2), relying on Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42.12 §19(b)(2) to conclude the defendant was ineligible because the offense caused death. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Art. 42.12 §19(b)(2) applied only to conditions of probation and did not restrict the full range of punishment for third-degree felonies, while Art. 42.13 defined community corrections facilities without limiting them to probationers; thus the trial court erred by failing to instruct on all sentencing options. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for a harm analysis under Almanza v. State.

criminal lawprocedure

In Moore v. State, a jury convicted the appellant of aggravated assault after a trial involving testimony from peace officers and the defendant about an incident at the Harris County Jail; the trial court later allowed the court reporter to read back portions of one officer's testimony in response to repeated jury notes requesting it. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding a violation of Article 36.28 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because the trial court had not determined that the jury disagreed about any specific part of the testimony. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review and affirmed, holding that the statute's plain language requires the jury to make known its disagreement on a particular point before any testimony may be read, and that a simple request for testimony—without more—does not demonstrate such disagreement, whether explicit or implicit. The court rejected contrary precedent and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding without that determination.

criminal lawprocedure