Charles W. Barrow

This case is an original mandamus proceeding in which relator Cynthia Siler sought to enforce a Pennsylvania custody decree awarding her custody of her young son against the child's father, Jon Siler, who had removed the child and hidden him in Texas. After a Texas district court granted her petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 14.10 of the Texas Family Code, the court of appeals issued mandamus directing the district court to vacate that order. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to Cynthia, reasoning that Jon failed to carry his burden of showing the Pennsylvania order was void for lack of reasonable notice, as he had actual notice through his own evasion of service and the proceedings satisfied Pennsylvania's substitute service rules, and that his possession of the child could not override the valid out-of-state decree under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.

family lawprocedure

This case was a libel suit brought by Dr. N. Jay Rogers, a Texas public official, against author Harvey Katz and publisher Doubleday & Co. for a false statement in the book Shadow on the Alamo that Rogers had been indicted three times for practicing optometry without a license. The jury found the statement was published with actual malice but awarded zero actual damages while assessing $2.5 million in exemplary damages; the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment, which the court of appeals reversed to award the exemplary damages. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Texas law does not permit recovery of exemplary damages for libel absent an award of actual damages, even when malice is proven and the plaintiff is a public official. The court applied the actual-malice standard from New York Times v. Sullivan but concluded it did not override the state-law requirement of actual damages for punitive awards.

free speechtorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over the interpretation of a 1929 mineral deed executed by the Koncabas in favor of Mang, with the Alfords as successors to the grantors and the Krums as successors to the grantee. The deed conveyed rights to oil, gas, and other minerals on an 85.9-acre tract in Gonzales County, Texas, that was subject to an existing lease at the time. The trial court held that the deed conveyed only an undivided one-sixteenth mineral interest, but the court of appeals reversed, finding a one-half interest in the permanent mineral estate. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the granting clause controlled the quantum of the estate conveyed and specified only one-half of the one-eighth interest, or one-sixteenth, while requiring all parts of the deed to be harmonized without altering the expressed intent in the granting clause.

property

This case concerns a dispute between former spouses over enforcement of a property settlement agreement from their divorce. Patsy McGoodwin sued her ex-husband James to recover $22,500 he had agreed to pay for her interest in twenty-two acres of land, seeking foreclosure of an implied vendor's lien on the property, which James had conveyed partly to his son and claimed as his homestead. The trial court and court of appeals ordered the land sold to satisfy the debt, but the Texas Supreme Court modified those judgments to limit foreclosure and sale to only the undivided one-half interest Patsy had conveyed. The court reasoned that the settlement agreement is treated as a contract under Texas law, and established principles of contract law for the sale of land imply a vendor's lien when purchase money is unpaid, which is enforceable against a homestead claim.

family lawproperty

The case involved a 1969 inverse condemnation suit by the Rotellos against the State of Texas for flooding damages to their land, which was twice dismissed for want of prosecution. The trial court dismissed the case in 1982 under a local rule providing for dismissal dockets after two years without prosecution, and the court of appeals reversed that dismissal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Rotellos' attorney had actual notice of the local rule through prior compliance and discussions, satisfying due process, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion given the nearly thirteen years of delay and inactivity. The court reasoned that the local rule itself provided notice and that the full evidentiary hearing on the motion to reinstate afforded the same opportunity to show good cause.

procedureproperty

This case involved a dispute over a construction contract for a restaurant where the contractor, Vance, substantially performed but did not fully complete the work due to alleged delays and termination by the owner, Steak House, which withheld $20,000 and claimed defects. Vance sued for the unpaid balance under the contract, while Steak House counterclaimed for costs to remedy defects and complete the project; a subcontractor’s claim was stipulated and is not at issue. The trial court granted instructed verdicts against both parties’ cross-actions, and the court of appeals affirmed as to Vance for failing to prove repair costs. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a contractor who substantially performs may recover the contract price less the cost of remediable defects but bears the burden of proving those costs, while the owner bears the burden on its counterclaim for damages, which are credited against any unpaid balance; the court declined to shift the contractor’s burden to the owner.

business & regulatory