Charles W. Barrow

This case is an original mandamus proceeding in which relator Cynthia Siler sought to enforce a Pennsylvania custody decree awarding her custody of her young son against the child's father, Jon Siler, who had removed the child and hidden him in Texas. After a Texas district court granted her petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 14.10 of the Texas Family Code, the court of appeals issued mandamus directing the district court to vacate that order. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to Cynthia, reasoning that Jon failed to carry his burden of showing the Pennsylvania order was void for lack of reasonable notice, as he had actual notice through his own evasion of service and the proceedings satisfied Pennsylvania's substitute service rules, and that his possession of the child could not override the valid out-of-state decree under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.

family lawprocedure

This case was a libel suit brought by Dr. N. Jay Rogers, a Texas public official, against author Harvey Katz and publisher Doubleday & Co. for a false statement in the book Shadow on the Alamo that Rogers had been indicted three times for practicing optometry without a license. The jury found the statement was published with actual malice but awarded zero actual damages while assessing $2.5 million in exemplary damages; the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment, which the court of appeals reversed to award the exemplary damages. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Texas law does not permit recovery of exemplary damages for libel absent an award of actual damages, even when malice is proven and the plaintiff is a public official. The court applied the actual-malice standard from New York Times v. Sullivan but concluded it did not override the state-law requirement of actual damages for punitive awards.

free speechtorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over the interpretation of a 1929 mineral deed executed by the Koncabas in favor of Mang, with the Alfords as successors to the grantors and the Krums as successors to the grantee. The deed conveyed rights to oil, gas, and other minerals on an 85.9-acre tract in Gonzales County, Texas, that was subject to an existing lease at the time. The trial court held that the deed conveyed only an undivided one-sixteenth mineral interest, but the court of appeals reversed, finding a one-half interest in the permanent mineral estate. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the granting clause controlled the quantum of the estate conveyed and specified only one-half of the one-eighth interest, or one-sixteenth, while requiring all parts of the deed to be harmonized without altering the expressed intent in the granting clause.

property

This case concerns a dispute between former spouses over enforcement of a property settlement agreement from their divorce. Patsy McGoodwin sued her ex-husband James to recover $22,500 he had agreed to pay for her interest in twenty-two acres of land, seeking foreclosure of an implied vendor's lien on the property, which James had conveyed partly to his son and claimed as his homestead. The trial court and court of appeals ordered the land sold to satisfy the debt, but the Texas Supreme Court modified those judgments to limit foreclosure and sale to only the undivided one-half interest Patsy had conveyed. The court reasoned that the settlement agreement is treated as a contract under Texas law, and established principles of contract law for the sale of land imply a vendor's lien when purchase money is unpaid, which is enforceable against a homestead claim.

family lawproperty

The case involved a 1969 inverse condemnation suit by the Rotellos against the State of Texas for flooding damages to their land, which was twice dismissed for want of prosecution. The trial court dismissed the case in 1982 under a local rule providing for dismissal dockets after two years without prosecution, and the court of appeals reversed that dismissal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Rotellos' attorney had actual notice of the local rule through prior compliance and discussions, satisfying due process, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion given the nearly thirteen years of delay and inactivity. The court reasoned that the local rule itself provided notice and that the full evidentiary hearing on the motion to reinstate afforded the same opportunity to show good cause.

procedureproperty

This case involved a dispute over a construction contract for a restaurant where the contractor, Vance, substantially performed but did not fully complete the work due to alleged delays and termination by the owner, Steak House, which withheld $20,000 and claimed defects. Vance sued for the unpaid balance under the contract, while Steak House counterclaimed for costs to remedy defects and complete the project; a subcontractor’s claim was stipulated and is not at issue. The trial court granted instructed verdicts against both parties’ cross-actions, and the court of appeals affirmed as to Vance for failing to prove repair costs. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a contractor who substantially performs may recover the contract price less the cost of remediable defects but bears the burden of proving those costs, while the owner bears the burden on its counterclaim for damages, which are credited against any unpaid balance; the court declined to shift the contractor’s burden to the owner.

business & regulatory

This case arose from a 1980 car-truck collision in which Odilon Gracia and the couple’s minor daughter were injured; Josefina Gracia, who was not involved, later sued individually for loss of consortium and related economic damages. A prior suit brought by Odilon individually and by both parents as next friends for the child ended in an agreed judgment and payment that the bottling company argued barred the new claims under res judicata and accord and satisfaction. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on those grounds and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court held that Josefina appeared in the first action only in a representative capacity, the agreed judgment did not dispose of her individual claims, and the payment satisfied only the claims encompassed by that judgment, so neither doctrine barred the present suit. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

procedurefamily lawtorts & liability

This case involved competing applications to the Texas Health Facilities Commission for certificates of need to build or modify psychiatric health care facilities in north Dallas County and Collin County. The Commission granted certificates to Healthcare International and Memorial Hospital of Garland but denied the application of Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc.; the trial court upheld those orders. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the orders lacked sufficient underlying facts and were arbitrary. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding that the Commission's findings complied with the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, were supported by substantial evidence, and did not amount to arbitrary action or an abuse of discretion.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a creditor, Henry I. Siegel Co., suing Edna Holliday, a former officer and director of the dissolved Texas corporation Holly Gram, Inc., to hold her personally liable for an unpaid corporate debt under the trust fund doctrine and related statutes. The trial court found Holliday jointly and severally liable with other directors, but the court of appeals reversed as to her, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court reasoned that the statutes and trust fund doctrine limit directors' liability to the extent of corporate assets that came into their hands, that Holliday had paid more to corporate creditors than the value of assets she received, and that there was no fraud or favoritism in the distributions.

business & regulatory

This case involved the interpretation of an indemnity clause in a Well and Lease Service Master Contract between Amoco Production Company and Ideal Lease Service, Inc. After Terry Thompson, an independent contractor hired by Ideal to perform welding work for Amoco, was injured in a flash fire on Amoco's property, Amoco sought contractual indemnity from Ideal for Thompson's damages. The trial court denied Amoco's cross-claim, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding that the indemnity provision applied only to injuries of Ideal's or its subcontractors' employees, not to independent contractors like Thompson. The court reasoned that Thompson, operating as a sole proprietorship, was legally an independent contractor rather than an employee, and the contract's unambiguous language limited coverage to employees.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved an appeal by Maston Cunningham, the resigned independent administrator of his mother's estate, from a personal judgment entered against him by a Texas probate court for alleged deficiencies arising from advancements he made to himself and his sister. The probate court, acting on a motion by the estate's attorney without any formal pleadings requesting such relief from the successor administrator Parkdale Bank, without notice to Maston, and without an evidentiary hearing, rendered judgment against him for over $37,000. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the probate court lacked authority to enter the personal judgment because no pleadings invoked jurisdiction over Maston in his individual capacity and because fundamental requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard were not satisfied. The court emphasized that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Probate Code provisions require proper pleadings, citation, and due process protections before a personal judgment can be rendered in probate matters. The proceeding was remanded to the probate court for further administration of the estate.

procedureproperty

The case involved Louis and Paula Quintero suing Jim Walter Homes under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Consumer Credit Code, resulting in a jury verdict award of about $78,000. Their attorney participated in an aggregate settlement of multiple claims, leading to a joint motion to dismiss the case, which the trial court granted despite the Quinteros revoking consent upon learning of the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court cannot render an agreed judgment of dismissal when it knows a party does not consent at the time of rendition, and remanded for further proceedings on the settlement's validity.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Ellis v. Waldrop, the Waldrops sought a declaratory judgment to cancel a recorded right of first refusal held by Ellis on five acres of land and to remove the resulting cloud on title, while buyers Aghamalian, Wilemon, and Mahoney cross-claimed for damages from slander of title after Ellis asserted the right following their purchase. The trial court canceled the right of first refusal, removed the cloud, and awarded damages and attorney fees; the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation and removal of the cloud but reversed the slander of title damages and attorney fees awarded to the Waldrops, holding that such damages require proof of loss from a specific pending sale, which was not shown here where the plaintiffs alleged only interference with financing. The Court reasoned that Ellis had not properly exercised or waived his right under the agreement's terms, and the defendants were not required to prove bona fide purchaser status to prevail on the title claims.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a widow's FELA claim against a railroad for her husband's on-the-job death, which occurred when he was thrown from a train car due to forceful slack action caused by a defective cushioning device. A jury found the railroad 75% negligent and the employee 25% negligent, awarding damages for pecuniary loss and pain and suffering; the trial court entered judgment for the full amount, but the court of appeals reduced the pecuniary award by the employee's share of fault and ordered a remittitur. The court affirmed, holding that the 1979 Federal Railroad Administration regulations on cushioning devices, promulgated under the Federal Railroad Safety Act rather than the Safety Appliance Act, do not impose liability without proof that the railroad knew or should have known of the defect, so the FELA's general comparative negligence rules applied and reduced recovery. It further held that appellate courts may order remittitur in FELA cases.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Dearing v. Wright, Paul Dearing sought a temporary injunction in Texas state court to halt his criminal prosecution for marijuana possession, arguing that the 1981 amendments to the Texas Controlled Substances Act were unconstitutional because the bill's caption failed to adequately notify legislators and the public of major changes. The trial court denied the injunction after finding the amendments constitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the state constitution limits the Court's appellate authority to non-criminal matters and assigns exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law cases to the courts of appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals. The decision emphasized avoiding potential conflicts with those courts on the validity of penal statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Suburban Utility Corporation, a small water utility, to a Public Utility Commission order that reduced its rates and required extensive plant improvements. The PUC had calculated the utility's cost of service, adjusted value of invested capital rate base, and allowed rate of return, leading to lower rates than Suburban was charging. Suburban appealed, arguing errors in the rate components and that the order was untimely under the Administrative Procedure Act's 60-day rule. The court held that the 60-day provision is directory rather than mandatory, so the delay did not void the order, but concluded that the PUC's rate order was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. It therefore reversed the district court's judgment upholding the order and remanded the matter to the PUC for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a property settlement agreement incorporated into a 1971 divorce decree, under which Frances Coker was awarded commissions from the sale of the Jinkens ranch property that her ex-husband Mac had earned. After she received partial payments totaling about $14,000, the purchaser defaulted and no further commissions were due, leading Frances to sue Mac for the balance up to $25,000 under what she claimed was a guarantee. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in her favor, construing the agreement as creating a guaranty of payment. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the agreement unambiguously assigned Mac's interest in the commissions to Frances without imposing an unconditional guarantee on Mac to pay any shortfall if payments ceased due to default by the purchaser.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over payment of medical expenses under a 1977 compromise settlement agreement resolving a workers' compensation claim for a 1975 shoulder injury sustained by carpenter James Craig France. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' take-nothing judgments and rendered judgment for France on the medical bills while remanding his claim for attorney's fees. The court held that the jury's finding that the 1978 surgical expenses resulted from the original 1975 injury established the insurer's obligation under the agreement's terms, that the insurer's refusal to pay breached the contract, and that affirmative defenses such as abandonment were neither properly pleaded nor proven as a matter of law. It further concluded that the medical bills had been adequately presented to the insurer, satisfying the requirements for seeking attorney's fees.

labor & employment

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Jessie Skinner against First Employees Insurance Co. for total and permanent incapacity resulting from an alleged back injury sustained on the job in July 1980. The trial court awarded benefits based on a jury verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the insurance company appealed on the ground that the trial judge violated Rule 281 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by refusing to send five admitted exhibits to the jury room during deliberations. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 281 is mandatory and self-operative, requiring all admitted exhibits to be sent to the jury, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying the insurer's request. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless under Rules 434 and 503 because the exhibits' contents had been fully developed through testimony and cross-examination, were known to the jury, and were referenced in arguments, so their absence during deliberations did not probably cause an improper judgment.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether the Public Utility Commission of Texas had authority to regulate or prohibit a city's plans to drill groundwater wells outside its municipal boundaries within the service area of a water supply corporation. The trial court ruled that the PUC lacked jurisdiction and enjoined further proceedings on the corporation's complaint. The court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that the Public Utility Regulatory Act exempts municipally owned utilities from PUC oversight and that groundwater production and correlative rights are governed instead by provisions of the Texas Water Code administered by other agencies. The court further determined that an exception to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine applied because the agency was acting beyond its statutory powers.

business & regulatoryenvironment