Robert W. Calvert

The case was a suit by Alice Hughes, as widow, administratrix, and guardian, to recover on a $45,000 promissory note made by Paul Hughes and to foreclose the securing deed of trust lien on land, with intervention by the Swilleys as judgment creditors of the deceased estate; defendants including subsequent grantees and a bank moved for summary judgment on lack of consideration. The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff and intervenors, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the intervenors and remanded, holding that the defendants' summary judgment proof failed to conclusively establish their defense and that any pleading defects regarding presentation of claims against the estate or special circumstances for suing on the note were not jurisdictional and had been waived under Rules 90 and 91 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

procedureproperty

The case involved a suit by Moore Burger, Inc. against Phillips Petroleum Company and others for breach of a contract to lease two tracts of land or for specific performance, with defendants raising the statute of frauds as a defense since the agreement was unsigned by them. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the main claims and awarded Phillips rental damages, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that summary judgment was improper because the pleadings and evidence could support promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds based on the defendants' promises to sign a compliant written lease agreement, on which Moore Burger relied by not bidding at a land sale. The court clarified that promissory estoppel applies defensively here to prevent denial of enforceability and did not decide the ultimate relief or other issues like covenants running with the land.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a contractual indemnity claim by general contractor Sira & Payne against subcontractor Wallace & Riddle after Sira & Payne settled a personal injury suit brought by Wallace & Riddle's employee, McDonald, who was hurt when a ditch collapsed during excavation work on a state highway project. Sira & Payne had tendered defense of the suit to Wallace & Riddle under the subcontract's indemnity clause, which required the subcontractor to hold the contractor harmless for damages caused by the subcontractor's negligence or fault, but Wallace & Riddle declined. The trial court and court of civil appeals granted summary judgment for Wallace & Riddle, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The court held that the indemnity language was not clear and unequivocal enough to require the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor for the contractor's own negligence, following precedents like Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Construction Co., though it left open the possibility of recovery if the facts showed only passive negligence by Sira & Payne and active negligence or breach by Wallace & Riddle.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a buyer suing a seller for specific performance of a contract to sell two tracts of land in Jones County, Texas. The trial court ruled for the buyer, and the court of civil appeals affirmed as to the first tract but reversed as to the second, finding its description insufficient under the Statute of Frauds. The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the metes and bounds description of the second tract, even with references to the Jefferson McGrew Survey, did not provide the means to identify the land with reasonable certainty as required by precedent. However, the court reversed the judgments below and remanded the case to the trial court so the buyer could amend pleadings and pursue the case on a different theory, exercising discretion to remand in the interest of justice.

propertyprocedure

In City of Corpus Christi v. Sudduth, local taxing units sued for a personal judgment on delinquent ad valorem taxes on personal property described as furniture and fixtures, office equipment, and law books at a specific address. The trial court sustained the defendant's special exception seeking a more particularized description and dismissed the suit upon the plaintiffs' refusal to amend, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments below and reinstated the case for trial. It held that the general description satisfied Article 7328.1 of the Texas Civil Statutes, which provides that such terms as fixtures, tools, machinery, or equipment are sufficient in these suits and that no more particular description may be required by special exception or otherwise.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim denied by the Industrial Accident Board on October 17, 1968; claimant Clawson did not file timely notice of appeal within twenty days but instead sought Board review on November 8, 1968, citing lack of notice of the hearing and award. The Board declined the review application on November 20, 1968, and Clawson sued to set aside both the original award and the denial, but the trial court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, a ruling affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the review application under Art. 8306, sec. 12d even without allegations of change of condition, mistake, or fraud, and its denial was a final reviewable order, so dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was error; however, because the only grounds asserted did not meet the statutory criteria for altering the award, remand would be futile and the judgments below were affirmed.

labor & employmentprocedure