Robert W. Calvert

The case was a suit by Alice Hughes, as widow, administratrix, and guardian, to recover on a $45,000 promissory note made by Paul Hughes and to foreclose the securing deed of trust lien on land, with intervention by the Swilleys as judgment creditors of the deceased estate; defendants including subsequent grantees and a bank moved for summary judgment on lack of consideration. The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff and intervenors, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the intervenors and remanded, holding that the defendants' summary judgment proof failed to conclusively establish their defense and that any pleading defects regarding presentation of claims against the estate or special circumstances for suing on the note were not jurisdictional and had been waived under Rules 90 and 91 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

procedureproperty

The case involved a suit by Moore Burger, Inc. against Phillips Petroleum Company and others for breach of a contract to lease two tracts of land or for specific performance, with defendants raising the statute of frauds as a defense since the agreement was unsigned by them. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the main claims and awarded Phillips rental damages, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that summary judgment was improper because the pleadings and evidence could support promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds based on the defendants' promises to sign a compliant written lease agreement, on which Moore Burger relied by not bidding at a land sale. The court clarified that promissory estoppel applies defensively here to prevent denial of enforceability and did not decide the ultimate relief or other issues like covenants running with the land.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a contractual indemnity claim by general contractor Sira & Payne against subcontractor Wallace & Riddle after Sira & Payne settled a personal injury suit brought by Wallace & Riddle's employee, McDonald, who was hurt when a ditch collapsed during excavation work on a state highway project. Sira & Payne had tendered defense of the suit to Wallace & Riddle under the subcontract's indemnity clause, which required the subcontractor to hold the contractor harmless for damages caused by the subcontractor's negligence or fault, but Wallace & Riddle declined. The trial court and court of civil appeals granted summary judgment for Wallace & Riddle, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The court held that the indemnity language was not clear and unequivocal enough to require the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor for the contractor's own negligence, following precedents like Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Construction Co., though it left open the possibility of recovery if the facts showed only passive negligence by Sira & Payne and active negligence or breach by Wallace & Riddle.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a buyer suing a seller for specific performance of a contract to sell two tracts of land in Jones County, Texas. The trial court ruled for the buyer, and the court of civil appeals affirmed as to the first tract but reversed as to the second, finding its description insufficient under the Statute of Frauds. The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the metes and bounds description of the second tract, even with references to the Jefferson McGrew Survey, did not provide the means to identify the land with reasonable certainty as required by precedent. However, the court reversed the judgments below and remanded the case to the trial court so the buyer could amend pleadings and pursue the case on a different theory, exercising discretion to remand in the interest of justice.

propertyprocedure

In City of Corpus Christi v. Sudduth, local taxing units sued for a personal judgment on delinquent ad valorem taxes on personal property described as furniture and fixtures, office equipment, and law books at a specific address. The trial court sustained the defendant's special exception seeking a more particularized description and dismissed the suit upon the plaintiffs' refusal to amend, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments below and reinstated the case for trial. It held that the general description satisfied Article 7328.1 of the Texas Civil Statutes, which provides that such terms as fixtures, tools, machinery, or equipment are sufficient in these suits and that no more particular description may be required by special exception or otherwise.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim denied by the Industrial Accident Board on October 17, 1968; claimant Clawson did not file timely notice of appeal within twenty days but instead sought Board review on November 8, 1968, citing lack of notice of the hearing and award. The Board declined the review application on November 20, 1968, and Clawson sued to set aside both the original award and the denial, but the trial court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, a ruling affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the review application under Art. 8306, sec. 12d even without allegations of change of condition, mistake, or fraud, and its denial was a final reviewable order, so dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was error; however, because the only grounds asserted did not meet the statutory criteria for altering the award, remand would be futile and the judgments below were affirmed.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Pedro Del Bosque, an employee of a building tenant, who was injured when he fell from a misleveled elevator after pulling the tiller ropes and then holding onto the gate during its unexpected descent. The jury found the building owner negligent for unmarked ropes but also found Del Bosque negligent for grabbing the gate, while further finding that he faced an emergency and acted prudently afterward. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment for the plaintiff, but the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, citing an irreconcilable conflict in the jury answers. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that reversal, holding that the findings on the plaintiff's negligence and his prudent conduct in the emergency could not be reconciled without one negating the other. The court clarified that the sudden emergency doctrine does not automatically excuse conduct but allows the factfinder to assess reasonableness under the circumstances.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether the Texas Legislative Redistricting Board had authority to apportion the state into representative districts after the 62nd Legislature enacted an apportionment statute that was later invalidated by the courts, while also failing to enact a senatorial apportionment. The court held that the Board possessed jurisdiction to redistrict both senatorial and representative districts under Article III, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution, and issued a writ of mandamus compelling it to act. The core reasoning was that the constitutional provision's overriding purpose is to ensure timely legislative redistricting after each decennial census, such that judicial invalidation of a legislative effort constitutes a failure triggering the Board's duty; the court rejected arguments that the census had not been properly published or that the Board lacked power once the Legislature had passed any bill. The court declined requests for broader declaratory and injunctive relief beyond compelling the Board's performance.

electionsprocedure

The case arose from the City of San Antonio's condemnation of an easement over part of the Alexanders' lot for a drainage project, after the city had earlier trespassed on the land in 1961 during related construction, causing erosion and damage. The special commissioners awarded $210 in damages, but a jury trial determined the land taken was worth $2,400 and the remainder was diminished by $2,000, leading to a judgment for Mrs. Alexander that included interest. The court of civil appeals reversed, finding error in the admission of evidence about the prior trespass. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that damages from the prior trespass could be recovered in the condemnation action to prevent the city from profiting from its own wrong and to avoid requiring separate trials, and remanded for consideration of remaining issues.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from a car accident at an intersection where both drivers sued for personal injury and property damages, alleging negligence. The jury initially returned conflicting findings that both parties failed to yield the right of way, but after the judge directed further deliberations, it issued a second verdict finding only the defendant negligent. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant based on the first verdict, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first verdict had been set aside by the jury and the second was the only valid one, but remanded for a new trial because the second verdict resulted from judicial compulsion and justice required further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over coverage under an accidental death insurance policy after the insured died from injuries sustained in a single-car collision. The beneficiary sued the insurer for the policy proceeds, claiming the death resulted directly and independently from the accident, while the insurer argued that pre-existing conditions like a bleeding ulcer and emphysema contributed to the death and triggered the policy's exclusion for losses caused by illness or bodily infirmity. The trial court entered judgment for the beneficiary based on jury findings that the death met the policy's coverage requirements and that the conditions did not contribute, but the court of civil appeals reversed, holding there was no evidence to support those findings. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and remanded for further review, reasoning that the policy's coverage and exclusion clauses required disease to be a proximate cause of death rather than a remote or indirect factor, and that the jury's findings were supported by the evidence on that standard.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by Surety Savings and Loan Association against Carolina E. Hidalgo to recover on a promissory note for home repairs and to foreclose a lien on her real property securing the note. The trial court granted summary judgment for Surety, finding it was a holder in due course under the Uniform Commercial Code, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed both judgments and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Surety's verified pleadings alone did not conclusively establish its status as a holder in due course and that Hidalgo's affidavit and deposition raised a genuine fact issue on her defense of failure of consideration. The court explained that summary judgment requires the movant to negate all material fact issues, which was not met here despite the note's transfer and a completion certificate.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case arose from a 1957-1958 transaction in which Stanfield loaned O'Boyle $50,000 secured by corporate stock; O'Boyle later promised to substitute real estate of equal value in exchange for release of the stock but allegedly never intended to perform. After O'Boyle's 1964 bankruptcy discharge, Stanfield amended his suit to allege fraud and sought to except the debt from discharge under federal bankruptcy law; the trial court found actionable fraud at common law, awarded $50,000 in damages, and held the claim undischarged and timely. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the governing statute on real-estate fraud did not apply because no conveyance occurred and that the evidence was insufficient to support the fraud findings. The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the statute was inapplicable but held that common-law fraud remains available in principle; it concluded there was no probative evidence of fraudulent intent at the time of the promise, reversed the appeals court's judgment, and remanded for that court to determine factual sufficiency of the evidence and reconsider its remand order.

torts & liabilityprocedureproperty

In Fariss v. Tipps, relator Ronald Fariss, who had been placed on probation after a 1967 robbery conviction in Texas, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district judge to hold a hearing on a 1969 motion to revoke his probation based on subsequent violations, including a conviction in Virginia where he was imprisoned. The judge and prosecutor declined to schedule the hearing until Fariss completed his Virginia sentence, believing no right to a speedy trial applied to revocation proceedings. The court conditionally granted the writ, holding that the speedy trial guarantee under the Texas Constitution applies to probation revocation as a criminal prosecution and that the Sixth Amendment right, incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment, likewise requires a timely hearing. The core reasoning was that these constitutional protections extend to such proceedings regardless of the judge's discretionary role in probation matters.

criminal lawprocedure

In Harbin v. Seale, the plaintiff sued the defendant driver for damages after her son was killed in a car accident while riding as a guest passenger, with the defendant invoking Texas's guest statute (Art. 6701b) that barred recovery absent intentional conduct or gross negligence. The jury found the defendant had driven at excessive speed constituting gross negligence and that this proximately caused the crash on a curving residential street at night, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding there was no evidence of gross negligence. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of the defendant driving at least 80 mph at night on a narrow curving street in a residential area without applying brakes constituted some probative evidence of conscious indifference supporting the jury's gross negligence finding, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case began as a state action for temporary and permanent injunctions against a theater and its manager for exhibiting seven allegedly obscene films under Article 527 of the Texas Penal Code. The trial court denied the injunctions, dismissed the suit with prejudice, declared multiple sections of the statute unconstitutional, and barred enforcement by state officials. On appeal, the court reviewed the irregular pleadings and constitutional claims, focusing on the scienter definition in Section 1(F) and related provisions on distribution and seizure procedures. It held those sections constitutional, reasoning that they satisfied First Amendment requirements by mandating awareness of the material's obscene character rather than mere negligence or strict liability, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents like Smith v. California.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case concerned the validity of an order by the Railroad Commission of Texas pooling royalty interests in an oil well's proration unit under the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6008c). Ashford, who held a royalty interest in part of the unit after a post-lease subdivision, applied for and obtained the order apportioning production royalties between himself and Coleman, the owner of the tract where the well was located. Coleman challenged the order in court, arguing that royalty owners lack authority to invoke the Act. The Texas Supreme Court held that the statute permits compulsory pooling only upon application by an owner who has drilled or proposes to drill a well, not by holders of mere royalty interests, rendering the Commission's order invalid and entitling Coleman to an injunction. The decision rested on the plain language of section 2(a) limiting applications to "any such owner" who meets the drilling criterion, distinguishing the Texas statute from those in other states.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved La Raza Unida Party, an independent political party without a state organization, seeking writs of mandamus to require county judges and clerks in three Texas counties to place the party's nominees for county and precinct offices on the November general election ballot. The Texas Supreme Court denied the petition. The court interpreted Article 13.54 of the Texas Election Code to require that voter applications for ballot placement be signed and filed only after the party's county convention has nominated candidates and certified their names to the county clerk. This sequencing ensures that signers know the identities of the nominees in advance, consistent with the statute's logical steps and parallel provisions for independent candidates. The party's applications had been filed prematurely, before the conventions and certifications occurred.

elections

This case involved a lawsuit by parents against Rigo Manufacturing Company, a foreign corporation and manufacturer of the insecticide Kill Ko, for the death of their infant son who drank the product, asserting claims under Texas survival and wrongful death statutes based on failure to warn of dangers. The suit was filed in state court more than two years after the child's death, following dismissal of an earlier federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and effective service on Rigo occurred over three years after accrual. The trial court dismissed the claims as barred by the two-year statute of limitations, but the court of civil appeals reversed, holding that a tolling statute applied. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the dismissal, holding that the claims were time-barred because the mere filing of suit does not commence an action or toll limitations; due diligence in obtaining and serving proper citation is required, and the plaintiffs' seventeen-month delay after inadequate service failed to meet that standard under the tolling provision. The court reasoned that the initial improper service did not qualify as commencement within the required sixty-day period after the federal dismissal.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, Tyler Bank and Trust Company sued J.S. Hudnall to recover on a promissory note, and Hudnall responded with a general denial, a plea of failure of consideration based on an alleged oral agreement that the bank would control the note proceeds for use in completing construction of the Mother Frances Hospital, and a cross-action for damages from breach of that agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank on the note and dismissed the cross-action, which the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the summary judgment proof raised genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of the collateral agreement and whether it had been rescinded, which could support a set-off against recovery on the note. The court emphasized that, under summary judgment standards, Hudnall's conflicting testimony must be accepted as true with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, precluding judgment as a matter of law.

business & regulatoryprocedure