T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso
Texas Supreme Court · 1993-03-24 · cited 896×
The case involved the Bank of El Paso suing T.O. Stanley Boot Co. and individual guarantors on past due promissory notes after the company failed to repay loans, with the defendants counterclaiming for breach of contract, fraud, and impairment of collateral related to the bank's alleged failure to provide a $500,000 line of credit. The jury found for the defendants on their claims and defenses, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the bank on its affirmative claims. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part, concluding there was no enforceable contract for additional financing, insufficient evidence to support the fraud finding, that guarantors lacked standing to assert certain claims belonging to the corporation, and that error was properly preserved on key issues.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Keetch v. Kroger Co.
Texas Supreme Court · 1992-12-02 · cited 712×
In Keetch v. Kroger Co., the plaintiff sued the grocery store after slipping and falling near the floral department, alleging that a waxy substance from plant spraying created a hazardous condition on the floor. The trial court submitted the case to the jury only on a premises liability theory, which required finding that Kroger knew or should have known of the slippery spot, and the jury did not make that finding, leading to a take-nothing judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injury resulted from a condition rather than a contemporaneous negligent activity, so no negligent activity theory applied, and that creating the condition does not automatically impute knowledge to the defendant.
torts & liability
In the Interest of S.A.V.
Texas Supreme Court · 1992-10-21 · cited 107×
The case concerned whether a Texas trial court had jurisdiction to modify a Minnesota divorce decree addressing child support, visitation expenses, custody, and visitation after the mother and children relocated to Texas while the father remained in Minnesota. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas court could properly exercise jurisdiction over all four issues and thus affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals. The decision rested on the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the father's general appearance in Texas proceedings that established personal jurisdiction, and Minnesota's conditional relinquishment of jurisdiction over custody and visitation. The court also addressed the timing and effect of parallel modification actions in both states.
family lawprocedure
Bard v. Charles R. Myers Insurance Agency, Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 1992-10-14 · cited 86×
This case concerned whether a Texas trial court was obligated to recognize and enforce an injunction from a Vermont court overseeing the receivership and liquidation of Ambassador Insurance Company. The Vermont order prohibited counterclaims against the liquidator in actions brought to recover assets, except through the Vermont claims process. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the Texas court to give effect to the Vermont order, reversing the court of appeals' decision to allow the counterclaim to proceed and remanding with instructions to dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice to rights in Vermont. The reasoning centered on the constitutional mandate to respect sister state judgments and the nature of the Vermont proceedings as a comprehensive liquidation process.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum
Texas Supreme Court · 1992-10-07 · cited 149×
This case involved a tenant who sued a shopping center's leasing agent under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after the leased space failed to meet expectations, seeking actual and additional damages. The central issues were whether the trial court properly allowed the unnamed plaintiff to testify as a fact witness despite not being disclosed in response to an interrogatory requesting witness identities, and whether evidence supported the damages awarded. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding good cause to admit the testimony, as the plaintiff was a named party whose deposition had been taken and whose trial testimony was limited to matters disclosed therein, satisfying the standard under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(5). The Court also found some evidence to support the damages award under benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of-pocket measures. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Wentworth v. Meyer
Texas Supreme Court · 1992-09-16 · cited 70×
The case concerned whether Texas Constitution article III, section 19 barred Jeff Wentworth from serving as a state senator due to a 21-day overlap between his prospective legislative term and the unexpired portion of his prior six-year appointment to the Board of Regents of the Texas State University System. Wentworth had resigned from the Board in 1988, four years before winning the Republican nomination for the Senate seat. The Supreme Court of Texas held that his resignation ended the relevant "term" under the constitutional provision, placing him outside its prohibition against holding legislative office while serving in certain other positions. The court reached this conclusion by strictly construing eligibility restrictions against ineligibility, examining the text and purpose of separation of powers, and determining that denying candidacy to a former officeholder who resigned years earlier would not advance the provision's goals.
elections