Eugene A. Cook

The case involved the Bank of El Paso suing T.O. Stanley Boot Co. and individual guarantors on past due promissory notes after the company failed to repay loans, with the defendants counterclaiming for breach of contract, fraud, and impairment of collateral related to the bank's alleged failure to provide a $500,000 line of credit. The jury found for the defendants on their claims and defenses, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the bank on its affirmative claims. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part, concluding there was no enforceable contract for additional financing, insufficient evidence to support the fraud finding, that guarantors lacked standing to assert certain claims belonging to the corporation, and that error was properly preserved on key issues.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Keetch v. Kroger Co., the plaintiff sued the grocery store after slipping and falling near the floral department, alleging that a waxy substance from plant spraying created a hazardous condition on the floor. The trial court submitted the case to the jury only on a premises liability theory, which required finding that Kroger knew or should have known of the slippery spot, and the jury did not make that finding, leading to a take-nothing judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injury resulted from a condition rather than a contemporaneous negligent activity, so no negligent activity theory applied, and that creating the condition does not automatically impute knowledge to the defendant.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether a Texas trial court had jurisdiction to modify a Minnesota divorce decree addressing child support, visitation expenses, custody, and visitation after the mother and children relocated to Texas while the father remained in Minnesota. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas court could properly exercise jurisdiction over all four issues and thus affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals. The decision rested on the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the father's general appearance in Texas proceedings that established personal jurisdiction, and Minnesota's conditional relinquishment of jurisdiction over custody and visitation. The court also addressed the timing and effect of parallel modification actions in both states.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a Texas trial court was obligated to recognize and enforce an injunction from a Vermont court overseeing the receivership and liquidation of Ambassador Insurance Company. The Vermont order prohibited counterclaims against the liquidator in actions brought to recover assets, except through the Vermont claims process. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the Texas court to give effect to the Vermont order, reversing the court of appeals' decision to allow the counterclaim to proceed and remanding with instructions to dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice to rights in Vermont. The reasoning centered on the constitutional mandate to respect sister state judgments and the nature of the Vermont proceedings as a comprehensive liquidation process.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a tenant who sued a shopping center's leasing agent under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after the leased space failed to meet expectations, seeking actual and additional damages. The central issues were whether the trial court properly allowed the unnamed plaintiff to testify as a fact witness despite not being disclosed in response to an interrogatory requesting witness identities, and whether evidence supported the damages awarded. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding good cause to admit the testimony, as the plaintiff was a named party whose deposition had been taken and whose trial testimony was limited to matters disclosed therein, satisfying the standard under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(5). The Court also found some evidence to support the damages award under benefit-of-the-bargain or out-of-pocket measures. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Texas Constitution article III, section 19 barred Jeff Wentworth from serving as a state senator due to a 21-day overlap between his prospective legislative term and the unexpired portion of his prior six-year appointment to the Board of Regents of the Texas State University System. Wentworth had resigned from the Board in 1988, four years before winning the Republican nomination for the Senate seat. The Supreme Court of Texas held that his resignation ended the relevant "term" under the constitutional provision, placing him outside its prohibition against holding legislative office while serving in certain other positions. The court reached this conclusion by strictly construing eligibility restrictions against ineligibility, examining the text and purpose of separation of powers, and determining that denying candidacy to a former officeholder who resigned years earlier would not advance the provision's goals.

elections

This case involves a Texas real estate broker seeking to recover a commission from an investor for locating a Nashville building, based on a letter acknowledging a debt to unnamed "outside brokers." The Texas Supreme Court answered two certified questions from the Fourth Circuit by holding that neither parol evidence nor partial performance could satisfy the Real Estate Licensing Act's statute-of-frauds requirement that a written memorandum name the broker. The court reasoned that the writing must itself furnish the broker's identity with reasonable certainty, that essential terms cannot be supplied by extrinsic evidence, and that partial performance does not corroborate the broker's name or excuse compliance with the statutory writing rule.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a default judgment against Bank One after it failed to file a written answer to a writ of garnishment served by Robert Moody to collect on a prior judgment. The bank moved for a new trial, arguing its actions (freezing accounts and tendering funds) reflected a mistaken belief that it had complied with the writ, but the motion was overruled by operation of law and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Craddock test for setting aside default judgments consists of three elements rather than four and that a mistake of law can satisfy the first element by showing the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. The court remanded for a new trial, clarifying that the "mistake or accident" requirement is integrated into the first element and is not a separate hurdle.

procedure

This case arose from a dispute over repairs to the Heines' bulldozer under an alleged oral warranty, leading to claims against Holt Atherton Industries for violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of warranties, breach of contract, negligence, and related torts. After the company failed to answer the suit following proper service, the trial court entered a default judgment that included an award of lost profits, which the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment and for new trial, because the uncontroverted affidavit was conclusory and failed to show that the registered agent's failure to answer was due to mistake or accident rather than conscious indifference under the Craddock test. The court further held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support recovery of lost profits, so it affirmed the denial of a new trial but reversed the damages portion of the judgment.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case arose from a 1976 divorce decree that awarded Melissa Laster a right of occupancy in the former marital residence (subject to conditions like child support and maintenance) while dividing ownership interests 73.83% to her and 26.17% to Richard Laster; after Richard mortgaged his interest and defaulted, the interest passed through foreclosure and sales to First Huntsville Properties, which later sought partition once the occupancy right ended in 1988. The trial court denied partition, holding that Melissa's homestead rights protected the entire property from forced sale and were superior to First Huntsville's interest. The court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an ex-spouse's future interest in homestead property may be validly mortgaged and that, upon termination of the occupancy right, the resulting cotenants may seek partition because the homestead claim does not bar enforcement of the other cotenant's ownership rights acquired through the mortgage.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute between Caller-Times Publishing Company, which publishes newspapers and an advertising circular in the Corpus Christi area, and Triad Communications, which operated a competing advertising circular called Wheels & Keels. Triad sued under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, alleging that Caller-Times engaged in predatory pricing by offering targeted discounts to Triad's customers, causing lost sales and forcing Triad out of business; Triad also raised a tortious interference claim. The trial court entered judgment for Triad after a jury found predatory pricing and awarded trebled damages, and the court of appeals affirmed using a hybrid test requiring proof of prices below average total costs plus evidence of predatory intent. The Texas Supreme Court held that Caller-Times did not engage in predatory pricing on the record presented, reversed the antitrust portion of the judgment, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further consideration of Triad's alternative claims, with a possible new trial on the antitrust issues if requested.

business & regulatory

This case involved divorced parents who entered into a private settlement agreement to reduce the father's child support arrearages from nearly $10,000 to $2,850 while also modifying future payments, after which the mother sought to enforce the original obligations through contempt proceedings. The Texas Supreme Court held that section 14.41(a) of the Texas Family Code prohibits parents from settling claims for unpaid child support before the arrearages have been reduced to a final judgment by a court. The core reasoning was that the statute requires court confirmation of the amount owed after notice and hearing, treats each missed payment as a final judgment subject to judicial oversight, and limits the parties' ability to modify or release obligations until the court either renders judgment or loses jurisdiction over the matter. The court therefore affirmed the lower court's ruling that the settlement agreement was void and unenforceable.

family law

This case arose from a subcontractor's breach-of-contract suit against a general contractor on a commercial construction project; the subcontractor sought prejudgment interest on amounts not yet due under a pay-when-paid clause. The trial court held that the demand for interest in the original petition constituted a usurious "charge" under Texas law, triggering forfeiture of principal and statutory penalties. The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed, ruling that a pleading asserting a claim for prejudgment interest during a period when no interest is contractually due does not qualify as a "charge" of usurious interest. The Court based its decision on the text of the usury statute, its accompanying legislative declaration of intent focused on abusive lending practices outside litigation, and the distinction between pleadings and other communications such as invoices or repossession notices. The holding applies specifically to claims for prejudgment interest and leaves open questions involving other types of interest demands in pleadings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, the dispute concerned whether 11,000 pages of documents generated by the company's attorneys in prior asbestos personal injury cases were protected from discovery under the work product privilege in two new suits filed in Brazoria County. The trial court adopted a master's in camera review and ordered production of nearly all the documents, concluding the privilege applied only to materials prepared specifically for the current litigation and that Owens-Corning had waived it by raising a state-of-the-art defense. The court granted conditional mandamus relief, ruling that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(3) protects attorney work product regardless of whether it was created for the instant case. The core reasoning was that the privilege's purpose of safeguarding attorneys' mental processes, conclusions, and strategies would be defeated by a case-specific limitation, particularly for repeat litigants, and that the rules and precedent afford work product stronger, continuing protection than other discovery exemptions.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether Fort Bend County Drainage District owed a duty under the Texas Tort Claims Act to repair a privately owned bridge over a drainage channel or to warn of its unsafe condition after being notified of rotten pilings. The bridge had been built pursuant to an easement agreement with a prior landowner, and the District had repaired similar bridges in the past on a discretionary basis when resources allowed. Plaintiff Sbrusch was injured when the bridge collapsed under his truck. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the District, the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Act does not create new duties and that the District had not assumed a legal duty to this plaintiff through its prior voluntary actions or statements, as no express promise of future repairs was made. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment for the District.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved inconsistent judgments from two courts on the same promissory note, with a creditor suing the makers in district court and later pursuing the deceased maker's estate in probate court. The probate court ruled after trial that the note had been fully satisfied and awarded the creditor nothing, while the district court had earlier entered a partial summary judgment for the creditor on liability and later rendered a final judgment in the creditor's favor after trial on remaining issues. The Texas Supreme Court held that the district court's interlocutory partial summary judgment was not final and thus had no preclusive effect under res judicata or collateral estoppel, but the probate court's subsequent final judgment was entitled to collateral estoppel effect because the satisfaction issue was fully litigated there, was essential to the judgment, and involved the same parties. As a result, the probate court's determination barred the district court from awarding recovery to the creditor on the note.

procedure

The case concerned whether J.T.S., who pleaded guilty to misdemeanor marijuana possession in 1988 and received deferred adjudication probation under the consolidated article 42.12, could obtain expunction of her arrest and probation records under article 55.01. That statute barred expunction for anyone subject to court-ordered supervision under the since-repealed article 42.13, which had previously governed misdemeanor probation. The court of appeals had allowed expunction on the ground that no article 42.13 existed at the time of J.T.S.’s probation. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Code Construction Act preserves the scope of a statutory reference to a repealed provision absent clear contrary legislative intent, and that the 1985 consolidation of probation laws did not alter the substantive effect of misdemeanor deferred adjudication. Consequently, the court rendered judgment denying expunction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a bank's use of Texas's turnover statute to enforce a judgment exceeding $270,000 against the estate of a deceased guarantor on defaulted promissory notes. The trial court found that the widow, serving as independent executrix, possessed or controlled estate assets from a $100,000 certificate of deposit that had been transferred to her attorney's trust account and partially disbursed, and it ordered her to turn over nearly $98,000. The court of appeals reversed on no-evidence grounds, but the Supreme Court of Texas reversed that decision. It held that evidence, including the widow's testimony about authorizing transfers to thwart creditors and her failure to account for the funds, supported the trial court's conclusion that she controlled assets reachable under the statute.

procedure

This case consolidated challenges by two non-profit water supply corporations seeking ad valorem tax exemptions on their buildings and personal property, arguing they qualified as purely public charities under article VIII, section 2 of the Texas Constitution and section 11.18 of the Texas Tax Code due to their water distribution functions. The appraisal districts denied the exemptions, lower courts upheld the denials, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the corporations do not qualify as purely public charities under the constitution, as they charge membership fees, connection charges, and monthly rates for water, and that statutory criteria cannot override or replace the independent constitutional requirements for exemption.

taxesproperty

This case arose from a 1982 sale-leaseback transaction involving a bank building and related financing, which led to federal litigation by the FDIC after the bank's insolvency; the federal case settled on appeal without vacating the judgment. Two subsequent state-court suits by the buyers and partners alleged fraud, deceptive trade practices, negligence, and breach of contract against the bank's former officers and directors as well as participating banks and accountants. The trial court granted summary judgment on grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutes of limitations; the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the four-year limitations period applies to the fraud claims so they are not time-barred, that res judicata does not preclude any of the claims, and that collateral estoppel bars only some of the claims; it therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on remaining limitations issues.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability