Richard Critz

This case involved a suit by broker N. G. Buchoz against property owners William Klein and others to recover a $1,300 commission for procuring a buyer for real estate, based on a written contract allegedly signed by the owners' agent A. L. Carlton. Buchoz also sued Carlton in the alternative if Carlton lacked authority. After a jury trial resulted in a judgment for Buchoz against the owners, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the record contained no evidence that Carlton had authority to execute the contract on the owners' behalf and that the law does not presume agency, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a suit by the receiver of United Employers’ Casualty Company against Standard Accident Insurance Company, as surety on performance bonds for three housing construction contracts awarded to Vincent Falbo & Sons. The receiver sought to recover unpaid premiums for workers’ compensation and public liability insurance that the contractor had obtained. The district court and court of civil appeals ruled for the receiver, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bonds did not cover such premiums. The bonds expressly benefited only subcontractors, workmen, laborers, mechanics, and material furnishers, and required payment only for items necessary to complete the physical work; they did not extend to all contract expenses or to insurance premiums, unlike the broader bond language in a prior case. The court therefore rendered judgment for the surety.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case involved a dispute over coverage under an accident insurance policy issued by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. for the death of Aaron Schlakzug Slater, who died from a pyogenic infection after intentionally plucking a hair from his nostril, creating a small wound. The district court and court of civil appeals ruled in favor of the beneficiary, Moses Schlakzug, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed those judgments and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the policy's coverage for loss of life from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means was limited by an exception excluding bacterial infections unless the pyogenic infection occurred simultaneously with and through an accidental cut or wound. Because the insured intentionally produced the wound, it did not qualify as accidental, so the policy provided no coverage. The court also ruled that certain out-of-court statements by the insured about the incident were inadmissible hearsay and not res gestae.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This is a worker's compensation case involving employee Jack Tubbe, his employer San Augustine Manufacturing Company (a lumber business), and the employer's insurer Federal Underwriters Exchange. Tubbe was injured on the job in the woods, and the dispute centered on whether the value of transportation the employer provided to and from remote work sites could be factored into calculating his average weekly wage under the relevant statute for determining compensation benefits. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals had permitted the jury to consider the cost Tubbe would have incurred for his own transportation, but the Supreme Court reversed those rulings. The Court held that Subdivision 4 of Section 1 of Article 8309 expressly excludes such transportation costs as "special expenses" that cannot be included as wages, whether furnished directly by the employer or via reimbursement, and remanded the case for a new trial because the record lacked sufficient evidence to fix the wage rate as a matter of law under Subdivision 3.

labor & employment

The case involved a promissory note executed by M.J. Cook that was later held by Service Finance Corporation, which contained a clause allowing the holder to accelerate all remaining installments upon default in any payment. After Cook missed several installments starting in April 1943, an endorser paid the amounts that had become due, leaving no past-due installments owing to the holder at the time Service Finance Corporation filed suit and attempted to accelerate the balance. The Texas Supreme Court held that the holder lacked the right to accelerate and sue on the unmatured installments under these facts. It reasoned that the negotiable instruments statutes (including what became Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes articles 5935 and 5939) did not authorize acceleration when the holder itself had no unpaid matured installments, reversing the judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals.

business & regulatory

This case, Cook v. Service Finance Corporation, is a companion case to Cause No. A-205, sharing identical legal facts and questions. The court reversed the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the district court. It remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, based on the reasons provided in the opinion for the companion case. The decision was delivered on November 1, 1944, with rehearing overruled on December 6, 1944.

business & regulatoryprocedure