Richard Critz

This case involved a suit by broker N. G. Buchoz against property owners William Klein and others to recover a $1,300 commission for procuring a buyer for real estate, based on a written contract allegedly signed by the owners' agent A. L. Carlton. Buchoz also sued Carlton in the alternative if Carlton lacked authority. After a jury trial resulted in a judgment for Buchoz against the owners, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the record contained no evidence that Carlton had authority to execute the contract on the owners' behalf and that the law does not presume agency, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a suit by the receiver of United Employers’ Casualty Company against Standard Accident Insurance Company, as surety on performance bonds for three housing construction contracts awarded to Vincent Falbo & Sons. The receiver sought to recover unpaid premiums for workers’ compensation and public liability insurance that the contractor had obtained. The district court and court of civil appeals ruled for the receiver, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bonds did not cover such premiums. The bonds expressly benefited only subcontractors, workmen, laborers, mechanics, and material furnishers, and required payment only for items necessary to complete the physical work; they did not extend to all contract expenses or to insurance premiums, unlike the broader bond language in a prior case. The court therefore rendered judgment for the surety.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case involved a dispute over coverage under an accident insurance policy issued by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. for the death of Aaron Schlakzug Slater, who died from a pyogenic infection after intentionally plucking a hair from his nostril, creating a small wound. The district court and court of civil appeals ruled in favor of the beneficiary, Moses Schlakzug, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed those judgments and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the policy's coverage for loss of life from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means was limited by an exception excluding bacterial infections unless the pyogenic infection occurred simultaneously with and through an accidental cut or wound. Because the insured intentionally produced the wound, it did not qualify as accidental, so the policy provided no coverage. The court also ruled that certain out-of-court statements by the insured about the incident were inadmissible hearsay and not res gestae.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This is a worker's compensation case involving employee Jack Tubbe, his employer San Augustine Manufacturing Company (a lumber business), and the employer's insurer Federal Underwriters Exchange. Tubbe was injured on the job in the woods, and the dispute centered on whether the value of transportation the employer provided to and from remote work sites could be factored into calculating his average weekly wage under the relevant statute for determining compensation benefits. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals had permitted the jury to consider the cost Tubbe would have incurred for his own transportation, but the Supreme Court reversed those rulings. The Court held that Subdivision 4 of Section 1 of Article 8309 expressly excludes such transportation costs as "special expenses" that cannot be included as wages, whether furnished directly by the employer or via reimbursement, and remanded the case for a new trial because the record lacked sufficient evidence to fix the wage rate as a matter of law under Subdivision 3.

labor & employment

The case involved a promissory note executed by M.J. Cook that was later held by Service Finance Corporation, which contained a clause allowing the holder to accelerate all remaining installments upon default in any payment. After Cook missed several installments starting in April 1943, an endorser paid the amounts that had become due, leaving no past-due installments owing to the holder at the time Service Finance Corporation filed suit and attempted to accelerate the balance. The Texas Supreme Court held that the holder lacked the right to accelerate and sue on the unmatured installments under these facts. It reasoned that the negotiable instruments statutes (including what became Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes articles 5935 and 5939) did not authorize acceleration when the holder itself had no unpaid matured installments, reversing the judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals.

business & regulatory

This case, Cook v. Service Finance Corporation, is a companion case to Cause No. A-205, sharing identical legal facts and questions. The court reversed the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the district court. It remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, based on the reasons provided in the opinion for the companion case. The decision was delivered on November 1, 1944, with rehearing overruled on December 6, 1944.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a companion to Cause No. A-205, decided the same day by the court, and involves identical legal facts and questions of law. In the companion case the court reversed the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the district court and remanded the matter to the district court. Applying the same reasoning, the court reverses the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and district court in this case and remands the cause to the district court.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between Trinity Universal Insurance Company, the surety on a federal construction contract payment bond, and First State Bank over the proceeds of a $4,180 government check issued to the contractor Foley & Maugh. The contractor had assigned its payments to the surety as security and defaulted on labor and material obligations, prompting the surety to pay out over $11,000 before recouping some retained funds. The bank had advanced money for weekly labor costs, received the checks via power of attorney, and applied most of the proceeds to its loans while depositing the rest to the contractor. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and awarded the surety $1,294.64, reasoning that the federal anti-assignment statute protected only the government and that, once the check reached the bank, the surety held an enforceable equitable lien on the unadvanced remainder. The bank could retain reimbursement for its pre-notice advances but could not divert the balance to the contractor.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a dispute over ownership of 76.52 acres of land in Texas originally co-owned by Mrs. Ruby and her daughter Mrs. Downey. Mrs. Downey and others executed a gift deed to Mrs. Keller, but Mrs. Downey later sued to recover her one-half interest, claiming she never personally appeared before the notary for the required separate acknowledgment under Texas statutes. Humble Oil had obtained an oil and gas lease from Mrs. Keller while the deed was on record and defended on grounds including estoppel. The court held that the deed was void as to Mrs. Downey because no valid acknowledgment occurred, and the statutes protected her interest even against an innocent purchaser like Humble that relied on the recorded deed. The decision rested on longstanding statutory construction requiring personal appearance by a married woman before the certifying officer and treating noncompliant deeds as nullities.

property

This case concerns an appeal from a district court's interlocutory order that restrained the prosecution of a forcible detainer suit in justice court pending resolution of a related district court action in Harris County, Texas. The underlying district court case has since been fully tried, with its judgment affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals and writ of error denied by the Supreme Court, thereby disposing of all parties and issues in both proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the injunction proceeding had become moot due to the final disposition of the main case. As a result, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts in the injunction matter and dismissed the proceeding.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by the State of Texas against a gas processor and the estate of a gas producer to collect occupation taxes, penalties, interest, and fees under Article 7047b for gas produced and processed in Texas. The State sought taxes calculated on the higher resale price of extracted distillates in Corpus Christi rather than the initial sale price from producers to the processor. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals ruled for the State, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed those judgments and remanded for a new trial. The Court held that the statute imposes the tax liability solely on the producer, with the purchaser acting only as a withholding agent, and that market value for tax purposes is determined by the good-faith sale price to the initial purchaser, not subsequent resales. This interpretation aligns with the statutory text defining taxable value and avoids constitutional concerns about uncertain liability.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from probate proceedings in Dallas County involving the will of Mamie A. Grubbs, which named Chas. M. Cocke as independent executor and left the estate to Josie Birr; the county court probated the will as a muniment of title only and found no need for administration, prompting Cocke to appeal to district court without filing an appeal bond. After the district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and the Court of Civil Appeals denied mandamus to compel the clerk to release the transcript, Cocke sought further relief, leading the Court of Civil Appeals to certify questions about filing deadlines under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 386, and 437. The Supreme Court held that Cocke was entitled to appeal without a bond but answered all certified questions in the negative, ruling that Rule 5 does not enlarge the strict time limits in Rule 386 for filing the transcript or seeking extensions, and that the Court of Civil Appeals lacked discretion to allow a late filing 225 days after judgment when no timely extension request had been made. The Court emphasized that prior mandamus proceedings had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and could not excuse the procedural defaults.

procedureproperty

The case concerned whether a landowner could compel the county clerk to file and record a plat subdividing land located outside San Antonio city limits but within five miles of the city. The landowner presented the plat to the clerk, who refused without authorization from the Bexar County Commissioners’ Court under the 1931 amendment to Article 6626. The district court denied mandamus relief, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding the statute unconstitutional for lacking standards to guide the commissioners’ court. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the district court’s judgment, construing the statute to require commissioners’ court approval for recording such plats (with limited exceptions not applicable here) and determining that the 1931 law repealed the extraterritorial provisions of the prior 1927 statute.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether the City of Wichita Falls validly annexed two airfields and the connecting state highway, and whether it could then enforce its ordinances imposing a 2% rental charge on gross bus income and regulating bus fares against operator Bowen, who held certificates of convenience and necessity from the Texas Railroad Commission. The Texas Supreme Court held the annexation ordinance valid and ruled that the city could apply its bus regulations to the annexed area, reversing the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. The court reasoned that home-rule cities possess statutory authority under Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution and Article 1175 to annex adjacent territory in the manner provided by their charters; that a federal military reservation remains part of the state and may be annexed even if federal jurisdiction limits some local powers; and that the city's regulatory authority over bus operations on city streets supersedes the Railroad Commission's once annexation occurs.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case is a trespass to try title dispute over a 166-acre tract in Texas, in which record owner Doherty sued to recover possession from Pearson and Jensen, who each claimed portions of the land by adverse possession under the state's ten-year limitation statute. The trial court, based on jury findings, awarded Pearson 115 acres and Jensen 50 acres, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed those awards and gave the full tract to Doherty. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the jury's answers on Pearson's claim were conflicting—one finding peaceable and continuous possession but another finding the possession was not hostile to the true owner—so that portion must be remanded for a new trial; on Jensen's claim, the jury found he had recognized the record owner's title during part of the relevant period, which defeated adverse possession and entitled Doherty to the 50 acres. The court affirmed the award of one acre to Doherty and entered corresponding orders on costs and claims.

propertyprocedure

This was a workers’ compensation case in which the widow of employee Alfred G. Nelson sought benefits after he died in a car accident while driving to purchase paint and supplies for his employer, Peterson Brothers, a steel construction firm. The Industrial Accident Board denied the claim, finding Nelson was not acting in the course of employment, but a jury in district court awarded the widow $6,659.59, a decision affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Nelson was engaged in his employer’s business at the time of the accident because he was procuring necessary supplies on a trip that his employers had long approved and that furthered their work, even though he was paid only by the hour on the job site and used his own car. The court applied the statutory definition of compensable injury as one having to do with and originating in the employer’s business and received while furthering the employer’s affairs, whether on or off the premises.

labor & employment

This case involved a lawsuit for personal injuries and property damage from a vehicle collision on a Texas highway, where respondent Gish's car struck petitioner Blaugrund's truck as the truck turned left onto a side street while Gish attempted to pass. The jury found the truck driver negligent for failing to signal properly, maintain a lookout, and ensure safe space to turn, and determined these acts proximately caused the collision; it also rejected claims of contributory negligence by Gish regarding signaling, lookout, and speed. The trial court awarded damages to Gish, which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court upheld the judgment after reviewing claims of jury misconduct in discussing evidence of a possible future operation and conflicting answers on negligence issues, as well as a request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The court reasoned that the jury properly considered admitted evidence without violating instructions, that alleged misconduct statements were not sufficiently proven, and that other points regarding jury issues on control and highway positioning lacked merit.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a creditor, W. A. Wagner, seeking to recover on a promissory note executed by Emil Riske and foreclose a lien on 43.8 acres of a larger tract of land in Victoria County, Texas, after Emil's death. The trial court ruled for the defendants, finding the land to be the separate property of Emil's widow, Liessette Riske, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed; the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed. The court relied on findings of fact showing that the originally community property had been conveyed by Mr. and Mrs. Riske to Mrs. Riske's father, who then deeded it back to her as her separate estate, with no community funds later used to pay debts against the land. It further held that the trial court's failure to make certain additional findings requested by the plaintiff caused no reversible injury because the record affirmatively demonstrated the land's separate character. The decision turned on Texas marital property rules distinguishing separate from community estates and the effect of specific deeds and payments.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs who sued defendants on four promissory notes from the 1920s that were undisputedly barred by Texas's four-year statute of limitations. After defendants raised the limitations defense in an initial 1942 suit, plaintiffs took a nonsuit; they then refiled the identical claims in 1943 and indicated they would continue filing suits each court term. Defendants responded with a cross-action seeking damages and an injunction against further suits, but the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims without prejudice and denied all relief on the cross-action, a result affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Texas Supreme Court reversed on the cross-action, holding that the statute permitting nonsuits does not allow repeated filings on concededly time-barred claims for the purpose of harassment, and that proof of such conduct plus resulting expense to defendants justified injunctive relief to end the litigation.

procedure

In Moore v. Dilworth, plaintiff John W. Moore sued defendant C. E. Dilworth in 1938 to recover on a $22,500 promissory note executed in 1931; Dilworth defended based on his 1934 bankruptcy discharge, while Moore alleged that Dilworth had promised before and after the discharge not to file the note as a claim in bankruptcy and to pay it afterward. The district court entered judgment for Moore, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Dilworth, which the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that any pre-discharge promise was barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that Moore's testimony about post-discharge oral promises failed to establish an enforceable obligation because it did not sufficiently fix the time or approximate time when those promises were made, preventing determination of when payment was due. The court also rejected Moore's rehearing arguments regarding remand and procedural defaults in assignments of error.

procedurebusiness & regulatory