James G. Denton

This case involves a dispute over possession of a child, Christopher, between his natural mother Debbie Armstrong and Sherri Pollan Armstrong, who obtained an ex parte guardianship order from a county court after the father's death and later sought to terminate Debbie's parental rights. The court addressed whether a writ of mandamus should issue to compel the trial judge to grant Debbie's petition for habeas corpus relief under the Texas Family Code. The court held that the county court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders affecting the parent-child relationship, which is reserved exclusively to district courts under the Texas Constitution and Family Code, rendering the guardianship order ineffective to terminate Debbie's rights. Because no valid order governed possession and Debbie established her status as the natural mother without any relinquishment or termination of rights, she held the superior right to possession under Family Code sections 14.10(e) and 12.04, requiring the trial court to grant the habeas corpus writ as a mandatory, ministerial act.

family lawprocedure

This condemnation case involved the City of Lubbock acquiring part of the Austins' residential lot to widen a street intersection, which reduced the side yard below the minimum required by the city's zoning ordinance. The Austins claimed the city abused its discretion by violating its own zoning rules, and a jury agreed, but the trial court disregarded that finding and upheld the taking. The Texas Supreme Court held that a city exercising eminent domain is not bound by its zoning ordinances unless the objecting party proves the action was arbitrary or unreasonable as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the reasonableness of such governmental actions is a legal question for the judge rather than the jury, drawing on prior precedent involving governmental immunity from local land-use rules. It concluded the Austins failed to show the city's street-improvement project was unreasonable, so it reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the city.

property

This case involves a libel lawsuit filed by Sheriff Richard Upchurch against columnist Ed Foster and the El Paso Times in Culberson County, Texas, after an article incorrectly attributed a prisoner's death to the Culberson County sheriff instead of Hudspeth County. The defendants filed pleas of privilege to transfer the case to El Paso County, their domicile. The trial court and court of civil appeals overruled the pleas, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Upchurch, as a public official, failed to present evidence of actual malice at the venue hearing, which is required to establish a cause of action for libel under New York Times v. Sullivan, and thus did not meet the venue requirements under Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, § 29.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

In Trahan v. Trahan, a former wife sued her ex-husband to partition his Air Force retirement benefits that had not been divided in either of their two prior divorces under Texas community property law. The trial court and court of civil appeals awarded her a share of the benefits, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that she was entitled to none. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty established that federal military retirement pay is not divisible under state community property rules, and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution preempts any contrary state law. Because no prior final judgment had divided the benefits, res judicata did not apply to preserve an earlier award.

family lawfederal power

In Mooney v. Harlin, Dulan Harlin sued the independent executor of Henry English's estate for fraud, alleging that English had promised to make her the beneficiary of a $500,000 bequest in a codicil to his will in exchange for her long-term companionship and services. The trial court granted summary judgment for the executor, finding the claim barred by the two-year statute of limitations, but the court of civil appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the limitations period began when English's 1974 will (which revoked all prior wills and omitted any bequest to Harlin) was admitted to probate in 1975, because probate records are public and provide constructive notice of the fraud, which Harlin should have discovered through reasonable diligence more than four years before filing suit in 1978.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case involved an appeal from the Texas Savings and Loan Commissioner's order granting a charter to Citizens Security Savings and Loan Association after denying an initial application and later approving a second one. The court of civil appeals had reversed the order, finding that a post-denial meeting between the applicants and the Commissioner constituted an unlawful ex parte communication under the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that no contested case was pending at the time of the meeting since the first application had been finally denied and the second had not yet been filed, and thus the communication was not prohibited. The court further reasoned that the Commissioner's order was presumed valid under substantial evidence review, that any similarities between the applications did not make them the same proceeding, and that the challengers failed to show prejudice, remanding remaining issues for consideration.

business & regulatoryprocedure