James G. Denton

This case involves a dispute over possession of a child, Christopher, between his natural mother Debbie Armstrong and Sherri Pollan Armstrong, who obtained an ex parte guardianship order from a county court after the father's death and later sought to terminate Debbie's parental rights. The court addressed whether a writ of mandamus should issue to compel the trial judge to grant Debbie's petition for habeas corpus relief under the Texas Family Code. The court held that the county court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders affecting the parent-child relationship, which is reserved exclusively to district courts under the Texas Constitution and Family Code, rendering the guardianship order ineffective to terminate Debbie's rights. Because no valid order governed possession and Debbie established her status as the natural mother without any relinquishment or termination of rights, she held the superior right to possession under Family Code sections 14.10(e) and 12.04, requiring the trial court to grant the habeas corpus writ as a mandatory, ministerial act.

family lawprocedure

This condemnation case involved the City of Lubbock acquiring part of the Austins' residential lot to widen a street intersection, which reduced the side yard below the minimum required by the city's zoning ordinance. The Austins claimed the city abused its discretion by violating its own zoning rules, and a jury agreed, but the trial court disregarded that finding and upheld the taking. The Texas Supreme Court held that a city exercising eminent domain is not bound by its zoning ordinances unless the objecting party proves the action was arbitrary or unreasonable as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the reasonableness of such governmental actions is a legal question for the judge rather than the jury, drawing on prior precedent involving governmental immunity from local land-use rules. It concluded the Austins failed to show the city's street-improvement project was unreasonable, so it reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the city.

property

This case involves a libel lawsuit filed by Sheriff Richard Upchurch against columnist Ed Foster and the El Paso Times in Culberson County, Texas, after an article incorrectly attributed a prisoner's death to the Culberson County sheriff instead of Hudspeth County. The defendants filed pleas of privilege to transfer the case to El Paso County, their domicile. The trial court and court of civil appeals overruled the pleas, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Upchurch, as a public official, failed to present evidence of actual malice at the venue hearing, which is required to establish a cause of action for libel under New York Times v. Sullivan, and thus did not meet the venue requirements under Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, § 29.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

In Trahan v. Trahan, a former wife sued her ex-husband to partition his Air Force retirement benefits that had not been divided in either of their two prior divorces under Texas community property law. The trial court and court of civil appeals awarded her a share of the benefits, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that she was entitled to none. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty established that federal military retirement pay is not divisible under state community property rules, and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution preempts any contrary state law. Because no prior final judgment had divided the benefits, res judicata did not apply to preserve an earlier award.

family lawfederal power

In Mooney v. Harlin, Dulan Harlin sued the independent executor of Henry English's estate for fraud, alleging that English had promised to make her the beneficiary of a $500,000 bequest in a codicil to his will in exchange for her long-term companionship and services. The trial court granted summary judgment for the executor, finding the claim barred by the two-year statute of limitations, but the court of civil appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the limitations period began when English's 1974 will (which revoked all prior wills and omitted any bequest to Harlin) was admitted to probate in 1975, because probate records are public and provide constructive notice of the fraud, which Harlin should have discovered through reasonable diligence more than four years before filing suit in 1978.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case involved an appeal from the Texas Savings and Loan Commissioner's order granting a charter to Citizens Security Savings and Loan Association after denying an initial application and later approving a second one. The court of civil appeals had reversed the order, finding that a post-denial meeting between the applicants and the Commissioner constituted an unlawful ex parte communication under the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that no contested case was pending at the time of the meeting since the first application had been finally denied and the second had not yet been filed, and thus the communication was not prohibited. The court further reasoned that the Commissioner's order was presumed valid under substantial evidence review, that any similarities between the applications did not make them the same proceeding, and that the challengers failed to show prejudice, remanding remaining issues for consideration.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved two Lubbock police officers who left the department for other jobs and were later rehired; they challenged the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission’s decision to exclude their prior non-continuous service when calculating statutory seniority points for a promotional exam under Article 1269m, § 14(B). The trial court ruled for the officers and restored their original exam rankings that credited all prior service, but the court of civil appeals reversed, interpreting “seniority” to mean only the most recent continuous period. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute’s plain language awards one point per year of seniority up to ten without any requirement of continuity. The court relied on the ordinary dictionary meaning of seniority as length of service when the provision was enacted in 1947, the absence of limiting terms like “continuous,” and the civil service law’s purpose of recognizing experience that benefits departmental efficiency.

labor & employment

This case involved a breach of contract claim arising from the sale of a real estate business, where the buyer (Johnson) agreed to pay the seller (Mead) a sum, assume an SBA loan, pay business debts, and remit commissions and overrides, while Mead agreed to transfer assets and work for the buyer without competing. The trial court awarded Mead damages including for injury to her credit reputation, unpaid loans and debts, commissions, and attorneys' fees, but the court of civil appeals eliminated the credit reputation damages as too speculative. The Texas Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that actual damages for loss of credit are recoverable in contract actions if they are the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of the breach under the rule from Hadley v. Baxendale, and it rendered judgment allowing those damages along with the others while affirming the rest of the lower court's rulings on commissions and related issues.

business & regulatory

In Allen v. Keeling, the Allens sued neighboring property developers for trespass after the defendants attempted to connect a new road to an existing prescriptive easement road on the Allens' land by crossing a grassy area and beyond the easement boundaries. The trial court and court of civil appeals ruled against the Allens, finding the right-of-way extended to the fence line, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prescriptive easement was limited to the area necessary for drainage and maintenance, and the defendants lacked a justiciable interest because their property was not adjacent to the easement. The court reasoned that while the easement included the beaten path and bar ditches, the specific connection point and additional land belonged to the Allens without any easement rights attached.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved downstream riparian landowners, Charles and Irma Hooks, who challenged an order by the Texas Department of Water Resources granting a waste discharge permit for a sewage treatment plant that would release effluent into Willow Creek, which flows through their property. The district court upheld the permit, but the court of civil appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that dismissal and remanded for consideration of the merits, holding that the Hooks had standing because they were aggrieved or affected persons under the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act and the Water Code, as they owned land directly downstream from the proposed discharge point and were designated as potentially affected parties in the administrative hearing.

environmentprocedure

This workers' compensation case involved plaintiff Bobby G. Schaefer, a plumber, who sued Texas Employers' Insurance Association after contracting atypical tuberculosis (Group III mycobacterium intracellularis), alleging it was an occupational disease from exposure to contaminated soil while crawling under houses. The jury found the disease caused total and permanent disability and was compensable, leading to a judgment for Schaefer, but the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no evidence of probative force to support the jury's finding that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment. The core reasoning was that the bacteria had not been isolated or serotyped from Schaefer's work environments, no studies linked the disease to plumbing, it occurs in many common settings with uncertain transmission, and expert testimony failed to establish causation within reasonable medical probability while excluding ordinary diseases of life.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns a priority dispute between lienholders on a tract of land in Dallas County after an agent executed a subordination agreement without the principal's knowledge. Floyd M. Stigler, Inc. sought to set aside HNC Realty Company's foreclosure and establish the superiority of its deed of trust, while third-party claims were brought against the title company. The trial court found that Stigler ratified its agent's unauthorized act by retaining the down-payment proceeds from the HNC loan after learning of the transaction, rendering judgment that Stigler take nothing against HNC. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that retention of benefits directly resulting from the agent's act, without tendering them back, constitutes ratification of the entire transaction, including the subordination of the lien.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a shopper, Winifred McClure, who was injured when a fleeing shoplifter collided with her in a crowded mall after being pursued by Joske's department store security guards. The trial court entered judgment for McClure based on a jury finding that the guards were negligent in their pursuit after a failed peaceful apprehension attempt and that the store failed to properly train them, with such negligence proximately causing her injuries. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no evidence of proximate cause. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, holding that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that the guards' close pursuit was a cause in fact of the collision because it was a substantial factor in the shoplifter's flight and that the jury's proximate cause finding was supported by some evidence of foreseeability and cause in fact. The case was remanded to the court of civil appeals for consideration of other points.

torts & liability

Roy Strange sued Treasure City for false imprisonment after an incident in its store, and the jury awarded him $1,500 in actual damages plus $7,000 in exemplary damages. Treasure City moved for a new trial, alleging jury misconduct during deliberations on damages such as discussions of insurance coverage, contingent attorney fees, taxes on the award, racial bias, and other matters outside the court's charge. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, but the court of civil appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that misconduct had occurred and denied a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding under Rule 327 that the trial court could properly find no material misconduct or probable injury on the record as a whole, and remanded unresolved sufficiency points to the court of civil appeals.

proceduretorts & liability

In this worker's compensation case, Celedonio Mendoza sued Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., seeking to modify a final 1976 Industrial Accident Board award by proving a substantial change in his physical condition after an upper back injury that increased his incapacity. The trial court entered judgment for Mendoza based on a jury finding of total permanent incapacity, but the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, treating Mendoza's cross-examination testimony that he had been totally unable to work before the award as a conclusive judicial admission. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, holding that the testimony was only a quasi-admission because it was a lay opinion on a medical matter that was not clear, unequivocal, and free from the possibility of mistake, and therefore did not preclude proof of a subsequent change in condition under Art. 8306 § 12d.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from a divorce in which Janet Day received a $12,500 money judgment secured by a lien on property awarded to Norman Day as his separate property. After the divorce judgment became final, Janet sought to enforce the lien through foreclosure and also to obtain a proportional share of the property's appreciation by imposing a resulting trust. The trial court granted foreclosure, post-judgment interest, and the appreciation share, but the court of civil appeals reversed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the divorce judgment was res judicata. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that while the prior divorce judgment barred any attempt to alter the property division or add an appreciation share, the suit also properly included an independent action to enforce the existing judgment lien, over which the district court had jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the court of civil appeals for consideration of the merits.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Glen Ball, the surface lessee of a ranch, and A.R. Dillard, Jr., the mineral lessee, over Dillard's access to the property for oil and gas drilling. Ball locked the south gate, preventing Dillard from entering to build a road and conduct operations as permitted by his lease, leading Dillard to sue for an injunction and damages while Ball filed a cross-action. After an agreed interlocutory order on injunctive relief, a jury found that Dillard suffered damages from the denial of access but the trial court granted Ball's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied recovery to both parties. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Dillard, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the mineral estate is dominant with rights of reasonable ingress and egress that the surface lessee may not interfere with absent express limitations.

property

This case involved a dispute over a fidelity bond issued by United States Fire Insurance Company to cover Republic National Life Insurance Company against losses from employee fraud. After an employee forged and altered checks, Republic submitted proofs of loss claiming around $26,641.55 total, accepted a $13,255.59 payment from U.S. Fire, and signed a release referencing the December 1973 proof of loss for $13,692.84 while noting it was in full and final settlement. Republic later demanded an additional $19,232 for the increased check amounts, which U.S. Fire denied, prompting suit. The trial court ruled for U.S. Fire based on the release, the court of appeals reversed on grounds of insufficient consideration, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, concluding that payment on a single claim of uncertain amount provided valid consideration for releasing the remainder when the parties intended full settlement.

business & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit by the Printing Industries Association of Texas seeking to enjoin Texas state agencies from purchasing printing equipment and performing their own printing work, on the grounds that such activities violated Article XVI, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution, which requires certain printing to be done under contract to the lowest responsible bidder. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a cause of action and lack of legislative consent to sue the state, but the court of civil appeals reversed, finding the suit maintainable as a challenge to unauthorized state action. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the dismissal, holding that suits against the state require consent unless the challenged actions are clearly unlawful, and that the constitutional provision, based on its text, historical background, and 1978 amendment, does not prohibit state agencies from conducting their own printing. The court reasoned that the framers intended to allow in-house state printing while mandating competitive bidding only for work contracted out, consistent with long-standing state practices.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the natural mother and the guardian ad litem of two minor children filing a bill of review to set aside the children's adoption by the Durhams and restore the mother's parental rights, after the mother's rights had been terminated in a prior proceeding and the children placed for adoption without notice to the mother or guardian. The trial court dismissed the action on a plea in bar, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not parties to the adoption. The court of civil appeals reversed, finding standing on alternative grounds, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the reversal and remand but rejected the lower appellate court's rationale regarding next-friend standing or the guardian's ongoing role. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs were not parties to the adoption proceeding and thus could not directly attack it, but they could potentially establish standing by first challenging the underlying termination decree through the bill of review, with the necessary elements of that review to be litigated on remand in the trial court.

family lawprocedure