Robert W. Hamilton

This case involved third-party beneficiaries suing two insurance companies to recover amounts paid in settling claims from an automobile accident, where William Edwards III drove a car owned by the insured student Norman McVean. The insurers denied coverage based on a Student Restrictive Endorsement limiting coverage to McVean only, which was added after the policy was issued. The court held that the endorsement was unenforceable due to lack of consideration, as there was no evidence the insurer had forborne its cancellation rights or provided other value in exchange for the restriction. It affirmed liability for the settlement amounts under the original policy terms but reformed the judgment to limit interest to the amount owed by Travelers rather than the full judgment, since no suit against the insured had resulted in a judgment triggering the supplementary payments clause.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose when a divorced father sought clarification from the original divorce court in Sherman County of his reasonable visitation rights under an earlier decree that awarded custody to the mother but left visitation details unspecified. The mother, residing in Jefferson County, filed a plea of privilege asserting venue belonged in her county of residence. The Court of Civil Appeals held that, for venue purposes, there is no distinction between suits seeking changes in custody and those seeking changes in visitation, both governed by the general venue statute requiring suit in the defendant's county. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that a suit for readjudication of visitation rights must be brought in the defendant's county of residence and recognizing that the divorce court lacks continuing exclusive jurisdiction over such matters despite its authority in other post-decree contexts.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a libel suit by Truman O'Neil against Dun & Bradstreet after the credit agency sent a 'Special Notice' to 14 subscribers erroneously stating that O'Neil had filed for voluntary bankruptcy (when it was actually his brother). The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant based on conditional privilege, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof that the recipients had a current interest in O'Neil's finances. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the verdict for Dun & Bradstreet, holding that the agency's ongoing service to subscribers who had inquired within the prior 12 months established the conditional privilege as a matter of law and that the evidence failed to raise a fact issue of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard).

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case was a trespass to try title action in which plaintiffs Rio Bravo Oil Company and Southern Pacific Company sought to establish ownership of fee simple title, including minerals, to approximately 25 acres of land in Texas based on a 1901 deed from the Dickersons to a railroad company or, alternatively, by adverse possession. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals granted summary judgment to defendants Hunt Petroleum Corporation and others, construing the deed as conveying only a right-of-way easement rather than fee title. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed that the instrument conveyed a single right-of-way easement across three described tracts for railroad and station purposes, based on its language and contemporaneous railroad statutes, but held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues remained regarding plaintiffs' claim of title by limitations. The court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the limitations question.

propertyprocedure

The case involved resident landowners challenging the City of Lindale's annexation of their property as void due to lack of inhabitant consent under Article 974. The Texas Supreme Court held that general law cities must obtain consent from a majority of qualified voters in the annexed area and cannot annex unilaterally under Article 970a. The court reasoned that Article 970a applies to both home rule and general law cities but does not grant new powers of annexation or repeal the consent requirement, which general law cities derive solely from Article 974 as it existed prior to 1963.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from a worker's compensation lawsuit in which the defendant insurance company sought to depose a non-party treating physician scheduled to testify as an expert and to obtain his medical, appointment, and financial records via subpoena duces tecum solely to show possible bias or prejudice. The trial court overruled parts of the physician's motion to quash and ordered production of the records with limitations. The appellate court held that such records of a non-party witness are not discoverable before trial when they do not relate to the subject matter of the suit, the witness's credibility has not been placed in issue, and the sole purpose is impeachment. The court reasoned that pre-trial discovery for impeachment only exceeds permissible bounds because the records have no impeachment value until testimony is given, distinguishing this from the rules governing cross-examination at trial.

procedurelabor & employment