Robert W. Hamilton

This case involved third-party beneficiaries suing two insurance companies to recover amounts paid in settling claims from an automobile accident, where William Edwards III drove a car owned by the insured student Norman McVean. The insurers denied coverage based on a Student Restrictive Endorsement limiting coverage to McVean only, which was added after the policy was issued. The court held that the endorsement was unenforceable due to lack of consideration, as there was no evidence the insurer had forborne its cancellation rights or provided other value in exchange for the restriction. It affirmed liability for the settlement amounts under the original policy terms but reformed the judgment to limit interest to the amount owed by Travelers rather than the full judgment, since no suit against the insured had resulted in a judgment triggering the supplementary payments clause.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose when a divorced father sought clarification from the original divorce court in Sherman County of his reasonable visitation rights under an earlier decree that awarded custody to the mother but left visitation details unspecified. The mother, residing in Jefferson County, filed a plea of privilege asserting venue belonged in her county of residence. The Court of Civil Appeals held that, for venue purposes, there is no distinction between suits seeking changes in custody and those seeking changes in visitation, both governed by the general venue statute requiring suit in the defendant's county. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that a suit for readjudication of visitation rights must be brought in the defendant's county of residence and recognizing that the divorce court lacks continuing exclusive jurisdiction over such matters despite its authority in other post-decree contexts.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a libel suit by Truman O'Neil against Dun & Bradstreet after the credit agency sent a 'Special Notice' to 14 subscribers erroneously stating that O'Neil had filed for voluntary bankruptcy (when it was actually his brother). The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant based on conditional privilege, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof that the recipients had a current interest in O'Neil's finances. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the verdict for Dun & Bradstreet, holding that the agency's ongoing service to subscribers who had inquired within the prior 12 months established the conditional privilege as a matter of law and that the evidence failed to raise a fact issue of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard).

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case was a trespass to try title action in which plaintiffs Rio Bravo Oil Company and Southern Pacific Company sought to establish ownership of fee simple title, including minerals, to approximately 25 acres of land in Texas based on a 1901 deed from the Dickersons to a railroad company or, alternatively, by adverse possession. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals granted summary judgment to defendants Hunt Petroleum Corporation and others, construing the deed as conveying only a right-of-way easement rather than fee title. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed that the instrument conveyed a single right-of-way easement across three described tracts for railroad and station purposes, based on its language and contemporaneous railroad statutes, but held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues remained regarding plaintiffs' claim of title by limitations. The court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the limitations question.

propertyprocedure

The case involved resident landowners challenging the City of Lindale's annexation of their property as void due to lack of inhabitant consent under Article 974. The Texas Supreme Court held that general law cities must obtain consent from a majority of qualified voters in the annexed area and cannot annex unilaterally under Article 970a. The court reasoned that Article 970a applies to both home rule and general law cities but does not grant new powers of annexation or repeal the consent requirement, which general law cities derive solely from Article 974 as it existed prior to 1963.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from a worker's compensation lawsuit in which the defendant insurance company sought to depose a non-party treating physician scheduled to testify as an expert and to obtain his medical, appointment, and financial records via subpoena duces tecum solely to show possible bias or prejudice. The trial court overruled parts of the physician's motion to quash and ordered production of the records with limitations. The appellate court held that such records of a non-party witness are not discoverable before trial when they do not relate to the subject matter of the suit, the witness's credibility has not been placed in issue, and the sole purpose is impeachment. The court reasoned that pre-trial discovery for impeachment only exceeds permissible bounds because the records have no impeachment value until testimony is given, distinguishing this from the rules governing cross-examination at trial.

procedurelabor & employment

In this eminent domain case, a navigation district sought to condemn the surface estate of 7.6345 acres owned by the respondents for port and navigation development, while expressly reserving the mineral estate and associated rights of ingress and egress to the respondents. The trial court, based on the jury verdict, awarded compensation only for the surface estate and found no damages to the severed mineral estate. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the no-damages finding was against the great weight of the evidence. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court judgment, ruling that as a matter of law the mineral estate suffered no damages because it is the dominant estate and the owners retain their common-law right to reasonable use of the surface for mineral exploration and production. The Court also upheld the validity of the city's consent resolution authorizing the condemnation.

property

The case involved an employee, Joe S. Wilson, who sought to recover about $16,256 under his former employer's profit-sharing plan after being discharged for accepting weekly payments from an auction barn where he bought cattle on the employer's behalf. The plan's managing committee determined that the conduct constituted dishonesty under the plan terms, resulting in forfeiture of benefits, and the employer and trustee argued this good-faith determination was conclusive and binding. The trial court granted judgment for the defendants notwithstanding a jury verdict finding no dishonesty and lack of good faith by the committee, while the Court of Civil Appeals reversed as to the management corporation and bank. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court, holding there was no evidence of bad faith by the committee—which consulted an attorney before deciding—and that the plan instrument made the committee's determination final.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over specific performance of a contract for the sale of two tracts of real property, including a service station lot, where the buyers refused to complete the purchase upon learning of an undisclosed highway easement encumbering part of the land. The sellers sued for specific performance after the buyers had already taken title to one tract, and the trial court and court of civil appeals ruled in the sellers' favor. The Texas Supreme Court reversed those judgments and rendered judgment for the buyers, holding that the sellers could not convey marketable title free and clear of encumbrances as required by the contract. The court reasoned that the 1,600-square-foot easement represented a substantial 13% shortage in the described lot area, was not physically visible or notorious at the time of contracting, and thus breached the covenant despite the easement area being used as a driveway. It further held that the buyers' intended use of the property was irrelevant given the substantial variance in area conveyed.

property

Plaintiff H. L. "Brownie" Choate, Inc. sued defendant Southland Drilling Co. on a sworn account for $2,648.27 in unpaid services after deductions for equipment damage from an accident. Defendant raised the defense of accord and satisfaction, asserting that its November 1965 check for a net amount was tendered conditionally as full payment of the disputed balance. The trial court found for defendant on this defense and entered a take-nothing judgment, which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding there was no evidence that plaintiff knew or was bound to know the check was offered on the condition that its acceptance would constitute full settlement, which is required for accord and satisfaction. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial to determine the validity and amount of defendant's claimed offset.

business & regulatory

The case involved the First State Bank seeking to collect on ten $1,000 bonds issued by the Yoakum County Water Control and Improvement District No. 2, with certain landowners joined as defendants for allegedly interfering with tax collection to pay the bonds. The landowners collaterally attacked the bonds' validity, claiming the issuance was not authorized by an election as required by the Texas Constitution and alleging defects in the district's organization. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed summary judgment for the bank, holding that a bond issuance cannot be collaterally attacked in a collection suit and may only be challenged through the specific statutory procedures for contesting district creation and bond approval, which the challengers had not followed.

electionsbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a libel lawsuit brought by Richard C. Trexler, a university professor and public figure who had led an anti-Vietnam War demonstration, against the El Paso Times newspaper for publishing a reader's letter that allegedly accused him of treason. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Trexler was a public figure, and the jury found no actual malice or damages, resulting in a judgment for the newspaper. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the jury instruction on actual malice was erroneous. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial judgment, holding that the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard applies equally to public figures and public officials, and that the evidence showed no knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the newspaper in publishing the letter.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

In Owens v. Rogers, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages from a rear-end automobile collision on a divided highway. The jury determined that both parties were negligent in several ways that proximately caused the accident, leading the trial court to enter a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding insufficient evidence to support the contributory negligence findings, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the plaintiff's challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence was not properly preserved in her motion for new trial and that some evidence existed to support the jury's findings on contributory negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Muller suing defendants DeBord and Anderson for conversion of a boat or alternatively to foreclose a chattel mortgage lien after Jones, the original owner, failed to pay a promissory note secured by the boat. The trial court granted summary judgment to Muller against DeBord, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals affirmance and remanded to the trial court. The court reasoned that the prior judgment against Jones, which was silent on foreclosure despite Muller seeking it, constituted a final adjudication barring the lien claim under res judicata principles from Vance v. Wilson. Although DeBord's motion for summary judgment raised and supported the res judicata defense with evidence, it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense in his answer as required by Rule 94, preventing the court from granting him summary judgment. Both motions were properly before the court when decided, rendering Muller's motion insupportable due to the evidence.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a dispute over control of the estate of Sarita Kenedy East between Alice National Bank, the independent executor under a 1960 will that had been probated, and Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, a temporary administrator appointed during a will contest seeking to probate an earlier 1948 will. After the probate court invalidated the 1960 will, admitted the 1948 will, and ordered the temporary administrator to take possession of estate assets pending appeal, Alice National Bank appealed and sought injunctive relief to retain control during the de novo district court proceedings. The Court of Civil Appeals granted a temporary injunction preventing interference with Alice National Bank's possession, which the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that under the Texas Probate Code and Rule 335, an independent executor remains in control until final adjudication of the will contest, making the probate court's transfer order invalid and the district court's denial of injunctive relief an abuse of discretion.

propertyprocedure

In Dunn v. Dunn, the wife sued for divorce and property division in January 1967; the husband filed a cross-action, and after a bench trial the court orally pronounced a divorce and division of assets on May 24, 1967. The husband died two days later, before any written judgment was signed. The wife moved to dismiss the action, the trial court denied the motion and entered a written judgment matching its prior oral ruling, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, ordering dismissal on the ground that the oral pronouncement was not a final judgment. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court, holding that the oral bench pronouncement constituted a rendered judgment under Texas rules, that the case was not rendered moot by the husband's death because property rights remained at stake, and that the action could therefore proceed to entry of the written judgment.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Gifford-Hill & Company and the State of Texas over whether the company owed sales taxes on amounts it collected from customers to reimburse common carriers for transporting aggregate materials after the products were ordered. The trial court ruled for Gifford-Hill that the transportation charges were not taxable, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed in favor of the State. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court's judgment for Gifford-Hill. The court reasoned that under the statutory definitions in the limited sales tax provisions, a 'sale' occurred upon segregation of the materials in contemplation of transfer to the buyer, making subsequent transportation charges explicitly excluded from taxable 'receipts' or 'sales price.'

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case was a trespass to try title action to determine ownership of a 50-by-140-foot tract that had been part of an abandoned railroad right-of-way in Beaumont, Texas. Petitioners owned adjacent lots when the right-of-way was abandoned, acquiring fee title to the tract, and later conveyed the lots to respondent by a deed describing only the numbered lots. The lower courts awarded the tract to respondent, applying presumptions from prior cases that a deed conveys abutting easements or narrow strips and finding three years of adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for petitioners, ruling that the abandonment had already converted the easement to fee title before the conveyance, so the presumptions did not apply, and respondent's deed did not provide the title required for the three-year limitations statute.

propertyprocedure

This was a workers' compensation case in which plaintiff Alton Parker sued his employer's insurer for total and permanent disability benefits, claiming his cancer resulted from on-the-job exposure to radioactive materials while handling nuclear weapons components. The trial court entered judgment for Parker based on a jury verdict, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the insurer on the ground that no evidence established a causal link between the radiation exposure and the cancer. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the reversal, holding that expert testimony showing only a possibility of causation (rather than reasonable medical probability) was insufficient to support submission of the case to the jury, given the inherently uncertain etiology of cancer. The court emphasized that, under the applicable statute, an employee must still prove that the disability arose out of the employment, applying the traditional "but for" causation standard.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved the State of Texas seeking a temporary injunction against Gibson’s Distributing Company for allegedly violating a penal statute prohibiting sales on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays. The trial court denied the injunction, ruling the statute unconstitutional as vague. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the State failed to file the appeal record within the required 20-day period for interlocutory orders under the applicable rules. The court reasoned that the time limits for such appeals are jurisdictional, and the order was interlocutory since no trial on the merits for a permanent injunction had occurred.

procedurecriminal law