Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing Co.
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-12-10 · cited 118×
This case involved a Texas corporation suing a Missouri corporation for breach of warranty and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after purchasing a defective brick mold shipped to Texas. After the defendant failed to appear, the trial court entered a default judgment following service of process on the Secretary of State's office under the Texas long-arm statute. The court of appeals reversed, finding the service invalid because it was not made personally on the Secretary of State. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that service on the Secretary of State's office satisfied the statute's requirements for establishing jurisdiction, as the statute's objective is to provide fair notice and the Secretary's certificate is conclusive evidence of proper service absent fraud or mistake. On rehearing, the court also addressed damages, finding no evidence for certain repair costs and limiting treble damages under the DTPA, then remanded the case to the court of appeals for review of factual sufficiency points.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Eanes Independent School District v. Logue
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-07-16 · cited 23×
This case arose from a dispute over a high school baseball regional playoff series between Westlake High School and Richfield High School that was disrupted by rain, resulting in only one game being played. The University Interscholastic League declared Westlake the winner under its rules, but after Richfield's appeals were denied, a district court issued an injunction requiring additional games and delaying the state tournament. Eanes Independent School District sought mandamus relief, which the court granted on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by interfering with the UIL's decision. The court reasoned that participation in extracurricular sports is not a fundamental right, triggering only rational basis review for equal protection and due process claims, and that the UIL rule permitting the director to determine whether and when a contest will proceed due to weather or other issues is rational.
civil rightsprocedure
Wilson v. Galveston County Central Appraisal District
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-07-02 · cited 35×
The case concerned a dispute in Galveston County over whether the county tax assessor-collector or the central appraisal district held the authority to appraise property for ad valorem tax purposes. Chuck Wilson, the tax assessor-collector, sued the Galveston County Central Appraisal District seeking to enjoin it from assuming full control over appraisals, arguing that the Texas Constitution's Article VIII, Section 14 granted him that power and that the Property Tax Code provisions were unconstitutional. The trial court denied the injunction and upheld the Code, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed. The court reasoned that the 1980 amendment to Article VIII, Section 18, which requires a single county-wide appraisal, authorized the Legislature to create appraisal districts with ultimate responsibility for appraisals, and this did not conflict with the duties of the tax assessor-collector under Section 14.
taxesproperty
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp.
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-05-07 · cited 89×
This case concerns a contract for the sale of roofing materials governed by the Texas Business and Commerce Code, in which Safeway Stores sued Certainteed Corporation for breach of express and implied warranties after leaks developed in a warehouse roof installed in 1970. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for Certainteed on statute of limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the four-year limitations period under section 2.725 began to run upon delivery of the goods. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Certainteed's advertising claim that its "Dual 80" roof was "bondable up to 20 years" raised a fact issue as to whether any express warranty explicitly extended to future performance. Under section 2.725(b), if a warranty explicitly extends to future performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered rather than at the time of delivery.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Vasquez v. Bannworths, Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-03-26 · cited 5×
This case involved a wrongful discharge lawsuit by farm worker Maria Guadalupe Vasquez against her employer Bannworths, Inc., alleging she was fired due to her membership in the United Farm Workers union and her complaints about workplace sanitation conditions. A jury found that Vasquez was terminated because of her union affiliation and that the employer would not rehire her for the same reason, leading the trial court to award lost wages and limited injunctive relief under the Texas Right-to-Work Law but to deny any order requiring reinstatement. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a mandatory injunction for rehire. The core reasoning was that the statute mandates injunctive relief to fully remedy violations by undoing their effects, including reinstatement when the jury found ongoing discrimination based on union membership, and that the pleadings and evidence supported such relief.
labor & employment
Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 1986-03-19 · cited 635×
This case involved Ralph Spoljaric's lawsuit against his former employer, Percival Tours, Inc., and its president, Jessie Upchurch, alleging breach of an oral contract and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding a promised bonus plan tied to improvements in the company's financial performance. The trial court entered judgment for Spoljaric based on the jury's findings that Upchurch made a false promise without intent to perform it, that Spoljaric justifiably relied on it, and that damages including punitive damages were warranted. The court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that circumstantial evidence—including Upchurch's repeated delays in finalizing the plan, statements that New York lawyers were reviewing it, failure to explain inconsistencies in his approval of an amended plan, and his later statement that he had no intention of signing it—constituted some evidence supporting the jury's finding of fraudulent intent. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to address remaining factual sufficiency and damages issues.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory