Sears McGee

This case involved a Texas corporation suing a Missouri corporation for breach of warranty and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after purchasing a defective brick mold shipped to Texas. After the defendant failed to appear, the trial court entered a default judgment following service of process on the Secretary of State's office under the Texas long-arm statute. The court of appeals reversed, finding the service invalid because it was not made personally on the Secretary of State. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that service on the Secretary of State's office satisfied the statute's requirements for establishing jurisdiction, as the statute's objective is to provide fair notice and the Secretary's certificate is conclusive evidence of proper service absent fraud or mistake. On rehearing, the court also addressed damages, finding no evidence for certain repair costs and limiting treble damages under the DTPA, then remanded the case to the court of appeals for review of factual sufficiency points.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a dispute over a high school baseball regional playoff series between Westlake High School and Richfield High School that was disrupted by rain, resulting in only one game being played. The University Interscholastic League declared Westlake the winner under its rules, but after Richfield's appeals were denied, a district court issued an injunction requiring additional games and delaying the state tournament. Eanes Independent School District sought mandamus relief, which the court granted on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by interfering with the UIL's decision. The court reasoned that participation in extracurricular sports is not a fundamental right, triggering only rational basis review for equal protection and due process claims, and that the UIL rule permitting the director to determine whether and when a contest will proceed due to weather or other issues is rational.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a dispute in Galveston County over whether the county tax assessor-collector or the central appraisal district held the authority to appraise property for ad valorem tax purposes. Chuck Wilson, the tax assessor-collector, sued the Galveston County Central Appraisal District seeking to enjoin it from assuming full control over appraisals, arguing that the Texas Constitution's Article VIII, Section 14 granted him that power and that the Property Tax Code provisions were unconstitutional. The trial court denied the injunction and upheld the Code, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed. The court reasoned that the 1980 amendment to Article VIII, Section 18, which requires a single county-wide appraisal, authorized the Legislature to create appraisal districts with ultimate responsibility for appraisals, and this did not conflict with the duties of the tax assessor-collector under Section 14.

taxesproperty

This case concerns a contract for the sale of roofing materials governed by the Texas Business and Commerce Code, in which Safeway Stores sued Certainteed Corporation for breach of express and implied warranties after leaks developed in a warehouse roof installed in 1970. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for Certainteed on statute of limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the four-year limitations period under section 2.725 began to run upon delivery of the goods. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Certainteed's advertising claim that its "Dual 80" roof was "bondable up to 20 years" raised a fact issue as to whether any express warranty explicitly extended to future performance. Under section 2.725(b), if a warranty explicitly extends to future performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered rather than at the time of delivery.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a wrongful discharge lawsuit by farm worker Maria Guadalupe Vasquez against her employer Bannworths, Inc., alleging she was fired due to her membership in the United Farm Workers union and her complaints about workplace sanitation conditions. A jury found that Vasquez was terminated because of her union affiliation and that the employer would not rehire her for the same reason, leading the trial court to award lost wages and limited injunctive relief under the Texas Right-to-Work Law but to deny any order requiring reinstatement. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a mandatory injunction for rehire. The core reasoning was that the statute mandates injunctive relief to fully remedy violations by undoing their effects, including reinstatement when the jury found ongoing discrimination based on union membership, and that the pleadings and evidence supported such relief.

labor & employment

This case involved Ralph Spoljaric's lawsuit against his former employer, Percival Tours, Inc., and its president, Jessie Upchurch, alleging breach of an oral contract and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding a promised bonus plan tied to improvements in the company's financial performance. The trial court entered judgment for Spoljaric based on the jury's findings that Upchurch made a false promise without intent to perform it, that Spoljaric justifiably relied on it, and that damages including punitive damages were warranted. The court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that circumstantial evidence—including Upchurch's repeated delays in finalizing the plan, statements that New York lawyers were reviewing it, failure to explain inconsistencies in his approval of an amended plan, and his later statement that he had no intention of signing it—constituted some evidence supporting the jury's finding of fraudulent intent. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to address remaining factual sufficiency and damages issues.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over whether partners Charles Thomas and B.J. McCombs remained liable on a $360,000 note that American National Bank extended to the Southwestern Cinema joint venture after the partners claimed to have withdrawn. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank against the joint venture and all partners, and the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that no effective dissolution had occurred. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded, concluding that the partners' deposition testimony raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they had dissolved the venture before the loan under the terms of the joint venture agreement and the Uniform Partnership Act. The court explained that the agreement permitted dissolution by owners of a two-thirds interest and that notice to the managing venturer sufficed to bind the partnership.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This wrongful death case arose from a 1981 collision in which a freight train struck a van at a railroad crossing, killing the three occupants. The plaintiffs sued the railroad company and its engineer; the jury found the company negligent and grossly negligent but not the engineer, and failed to find that one of the van occupants was the driver whose negligence contributed to the accident. The trial court rendered judgment against the railroad for full damages including punitive damages, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the driver issue had been established as a matter of law and that the railroad was entitled to a comparative-fault allocation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment on the jury verdict, reasoning that the railroad failed to preserve error by not objecting to the unanswered comparative-negligence question, that sufficient evidence supported the findings of negligence and gross negligence based on the missing stop sign and obstructed visibility, and that no prejudgment interest was available on punitive or future damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case is an original habeas corpus proceeding brought by William M. Reese, president of Mercari Corporation, who was held in contempt and jailed for failing to comply with an agreed district court judgment requiring the completion of water and road systems in two Texas subdivisions. The court decided to grant the writ and discharge Reese, holding that the underlying judgment was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable through contempt. The core reasoning was that the judgment used ambiguous terms like restoring the water system "to proper condition," providing "approved water," referring to unspecified plats, and requiring streets to be "properly" constructed and maintained, without providing clear standards or details that would allow Reese to know exactly what actions were required to purge the contempt.

procedurepropertycriminal law

This medical malpractice case involved Milton Barclay suing Dr. W. Lawrence Campbell for negligently failing to disclose risks of neuroleptic drugs that caused Barclay to develop tardive dyskinesia. The trial court directed a verdict for the doctor on informed consent, the jury found no negligence in treatment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the informed consent issue should have gone to the jury because the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act requires disclosure of risks that could influence a reasonable person under an objective standard, supported by expert testimony that the condition was an inherent and material risk. The court rejected a subjective standard based on the patient's schizophrenia, noting that mental illness does not eliminate the right to medical decision-making.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court considered a mandamus action arising from a negligence lawsuit in which a plaintiff was assaulted in her apartment; after a jury found some defendants negligent but returned an incomplete damages verdict, the trial court granted a mistrial, later rendered a take-nothing judgment, and then granted a new trial in the interest of justice. The court of appeals had twice issued mandamus to overturn the trial court's actions, but the Supreme Court held that a trial court possesses broad discretion to grant a new trial for reasons of fairness and justice without abusing that discretion. The core reasoning was that mandamus relief is available only to correct a clear abuse of discretion, that trial courts historically have wide latitude in new-trial decisions, and that appellate courts may not substitute their own judgment for the trial court's discretionary rulings when the order is not void or based on conflicting jury answers.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was an original mandamus proceeding in which a trial judge sought to compel the court of appeals to rescind its order protecting certain hospital documents from discovery in a wrongful death suit. The underlying litigation arose from the death of a child under the care of Dr. Kathleen Holland and Nurse Genene Jones, with claims that prior employers at Bexar County Hospital and UTHSCSA had negligently failed to disclose Jones's alleged incompetence. After the trial court reviewed the documents in camera and ordered production, the court of appeals ruled most of them privileged under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4447d, § 3. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the statutory privilege for hospital committee "records and proceedings" does not extend to factual materials considered by the committees or to recommendations that became hospital policy, and that any prior production to a grand jury did not waive the privilege for civil discovery purposes.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

In Dyson v. Olin Corp., a motorist sued the Olin Corporation for personal injuries sustained when his vehicle collided with Olin's parked crane that partially obstructed the roadway. The trial court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages after a jury found Olin 75 percent negligent and grossly negligent for failing to use flagmen, barricades, or lights. The court of appeals reversed the gross negligence finding on insufficiency grounds and remanded for a new trial, interpreting Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls to require proof that the defendant knew of an unreasonable peril. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded, holding that the intermediate court had improperly added an element by re-examining the objective reasonableness of the peril rather than focusing solely on whether Olin's conduct showed conscious indifference to safety.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether certain loans made by Lomas & Nettleton to the Lawler Family Trusts and Lawler Corporation were usurious under Texas law. The trial court found that the portion of loan 607 made to the non-corporate trusts was usurious due to interest charged above the 10% cap applicable to such entities, but that the later portion assigned to the corporation and loans 1126 and 1667 were not usurious. The court of appeals reversed as to loans 607 and 1126. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding that the promissory note executed by the corporation constituted a new transaction separate from the original trust loan, supported by differences in terms such as default interest rates and interest calculation methods, and that loan 1126 did not involve usurious charges when properly calculated.

business & regulatory

In King v. Bauer, Mrs. Estle King sued Dr. James Bauer for negligent administration of radiation therapy that allegedly caused her radiation myelopathy and paralysis. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding her damages, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, finding no evidence that Dr. Bauer breached the applicable standard of care. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that expert testimony from multiple physicians provided evidence that the radiation doses, field sizes, and treatment methods deviated from the usual practices of a reasonable physician under similar circumstances. The court noted that reviewing courts must consider evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's findings when evaluating a no-evidence challenge.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved a homeowner's suit against an exterminator company under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) alleging deceptive representations in a termite treatment contract and inspections. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages, which were trebled, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1968 representation predated the DTPA and that liability could only rest on 1977 representations, which required proof that all termite damage occurred after January 19, 1977. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's expert testimony, based only on photographs, provided no more than speculation or a scintilla of evidence that the damage occurred after the relevant date, making it legally insufficient to support the verdict.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case was a wrongful death action brought by the survivors of two fishermen who drowned in back currents below the Livingston Dam operated by the Trinity River Authority and the City of Houston. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiffs based on the defendants' negligence in failing to warn of the hazards or maintain a barrier cable, but reduced the awards due to the decedents' contributory negligence and capped the Authority's liability at $100,000 per decedent under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The court of appeals modified the judgment to remove the contributory negligence reduction. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the floodgates exception in the Tort Claims Act did not bar liability for the failure-to-warn claims, that federal maritime law could apply without a commercial activity requirement, and that state law damage limits remained applicable.

torts & liabilityfederal power

In Equitable General Insurance Co. of Texas v. Yates, the dispute arose from a workers' compensation claim in which the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer on grounds that the claimant had not timely filed his claim with the Industrial Accident Board. The trial court then issued an interlocutory order granting the claimant's motion for new trial on the condition that he pay $500 in attorney's fees to opposing counsel, and entered a final order denying the motion when payment was not made. The Texas Supreme Court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 permits a trial court to condition a new trial on payment of attorney's fees as an equitable matter within its discretion, but that the court abused its discretion by enforcing the condition after the claimant filed an uncontested affidavit of inability to pay. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

procedurelabor & employment

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a 1978 truck accident where the plaintiff sued the wrong corporate entity due to similar company names. The trial court dismissed the claim against the correct defendant on statute of limitations grounds, as the suit was filed more than two years after the accident. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the dismissal, reasoning that filing against the incorrect defendant does not toll the limitations period for the proper party, there is no duty for the correct defendant to intervene and correct the error, and an alleged mistake by the Secretary of State's office does not extend the tolling rule.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over coverage under a stockbroker's blanket fidelity bond after Kelly Associates transferred substantial assets and business operations to Fidelity Brokerage Services. Kelly sued Aetna for denying a claim for employee thefts discovered after the transfer, arguing the bond remained in effect, while Aetna contended the transaction triggered the policy's standard termination clause upon the insured being taken over by another entity. Both parties moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted Aetna's motion and denied Kelly's, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, construing the term 'taking over' to require a complete transfer of control and finding that Kelly had retained significant assets, liabilities, memberships, and winding-up authority, then remanded to the trial court.

business & regulatoryprocedure