
State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc.
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-12-19 · cited 23×
The case concerned whether Texas could require Corpus Christi People’s Baptist Church to obtain state licenses from the Department of Human Resources to operate its three residential child-care homes, or whether the licensing scheme violated the church’s rights under the First Amendment Religion Clauses, the Ninth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various Texas constitutional provisions. The trial court and court of appeals ruled for the church, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the licensing requirement is constitutional as applied to church-operated facilities. The court reasoned that the statute serves the secular purpose of protecting children’s health, safety, and welfare; expressly preserves religious freedom by prohibiting state regulation of religious instruction or curriculum; and uses the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest without creating excessive entanglement or burdening free exercise. The court remanded with instructions to enjoin operation of the homes until a license is obtained.
religious libertycivil rightsfamily lawbusiness & regulatory
Lemos v. Montez
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-11-14 · cited 157×
This case involved a negligence lawsuit arising from a 1979 traffic collision in which a Seven-Up truck driven by Alfred Montez backed into a Volkswagen occupied by plaintiff Mel Lemos. The trial court submitted a broad-form negligence issue that included a "neither" option and instructed the jury that the mere happening of a collision is not evidence of negligence; the jury answered "neither," resulting in a take-nothing judgment that the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the "neither" option improperly submitted an inferential-rebuttal issue on unavoidable accident without supporting evidence and that the collision instruction was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. The Court emphasized that broad-form issues under Rule 277 should not be accompanied by such additional instructions or options that tilt the jury or reintroduce prohibited inferential rebuttals. The decision rested on prior precedent limiting unavoidable-accident submissions and prohibiting instructions that nudge the jury.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Richardson v. Green
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-06-27 · cited 463×
This case involved a mother's suit to terminate the father's parental rights to their young son, alleging sexual abuse during visitation periods after the parents' divorce. The trial court entered judgment terminating those rights based on a jury verdict supported entirely by the child's out-of-court statements to his mother, grandmother, stepfather, a caseworker, and an assistant county attorney, with no corroboration and medical evidence showing no signs of abuse. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements were inadmissible hearsay and that the remaining evidence amounted to no more than a scintilla insufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard under Family Code section 15.02. The court therefore rendered judgment reinstating the father's parental rights.
family law
Manges v. Guerra
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-06-13 · cited 219×
This case involved a dispute among mineral co-tenants in Texas land where Clinton Manges held the executive rights to lease the minerals on behalf of himself and the Guerra family members, who owned a 46.6% interest. The Guerras sued Manges for breaching his fiduciary duty by leasing minerals to himself on unfair terms, failing to diligently lease to third parties, and encumbering the interests through various transactions, leading to a jury trial that awarded actual and exemplary damages, cancelled the self-lease, and removed Manges as executive. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation of the self-lease and the damage awards, including punitive damages based on findings of willful and malicious conduct, but reversed the removal of Manges from the executive role. The reasoning centered on the jury's supported findings that Manges breached fiduciary obligations supporting liability and damages, while the evidence did not justify complete removal of his executive authority under the deeds and agreements.
propertytorts & liability
Painter v. Shaner
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-04-04 · cited 45×
In Painter v. Shaner, a candidate for Midland County Sheriff attempted to file his application and fee with the Republican county chairman by the statutory 6:00 p.m. deadline on February 6, 1984, but found the designated party office locked and the chairman unavailable out of town; after being directed to the chairman's remote location, he completed the filing after hours and was later informed it was untimely. The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief ordering the chairman and executive committee to place the candidate's name on the primary ballot. The court reasoned that a candidate who appears at the correct place with proper documents before the deadline but is prevented from filing by the official's absence or locked office is deemed to have filed timely, as the Election Code does not permit party officers to effectively shorten the filing period by failing to be available.
electionsprocedure
Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck
Texas Supreme Court · 1984-04-04 · cited 136×
In Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, plaintiff Diane Steck sued her former employer Sakowitz for tortious interference with her employment contract after Sakowitz sent a letter to her new employer Oshman's citing a non-competition agreement and threatening legal action, resulting in her termination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sakowitz, the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court to affirm the trial court's judgment that Steck take nothing. The court held that Sakowitz established through summary judgment proof that its attorney sent the letter in good faith to protect its rights under the non-compete agreement without malice, and Steck failed to present controverting evidence showing lack of legal justification or excuse as required for a tortious interference claim. The opinion recognized a qualified privilege to interfere with a contract when done in the bona fide exercise of one's own rights, extending to the assertion or threatened assertion of those rights.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory