Jack Pope

The case concerned whether Texas could require Corpus Christi People’s Baptist Church to obtain state licenses from the Department of Human Resources to operate its three residential child-care homes, or whether the licensing scheme violated the church’s rights under the First Amendment Religion Clauses, the Ninth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various Texas constitutional provisions. The trial court and court of appeals ruled for the church, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the licensing requirement is constitutional as applied to church-operated facilities. The court reasoned that the statute serves the secular purpose of protecting children’s health, safety, and welfare; expressly preserves religious freedom by prohibiting state regulation of religious instruction or curriculum; and uses the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest without creating excessive entanglement or burdening free exercise. The court remanded with instructions to enjoin operation of the homes until a license is obtained.

religious libertycivil rightsfamily lawbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a negligence lawsuit arising from a 1979 traffic collision in which a Seven-Up truck driven by Alfred Montez backed into a Volkswagen occupied by plaintiff Mel Lemos. The trial court submitted a broad-form negligence issue that included a "neither" option and instructed the jury that the mere happening of a collision is not evidence of negligence; the jury answered "neither," resulting in a take-nothing judgment that the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the "neither" option improperly submitted an inferential-rebuttal issue on unavoidable accident without supporting evidence and that the collision instruction was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. The Court emphasized that broad-form issues under Rule 277 should not be accompanied by such additional instructions or options that tilt the jury or reintroduce prohibited inferential rebuttals. The decision rested on prior precedent limiting unavoidable-accident submissions and prohibiting instructions that nudge the jury.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a mother's suit to terminate the father's parental rights to their young son, alleging sexual abuse during visitation periods after the parents' divorce. The trial court entered judgment terminating those rights based on a jury verdict supported entirely by the child's out-of-court statements to his mother, grandmother, stepfather, a caseworker, and an assistant county attorney, with no corroboration and medical evidence showing no signs of abuse. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements were inadmissible hearsay and that the remaining evidence amounted to no more than a scintilla insufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard under Family Code section 15.02. The court therefore rendered judgment reinstating the father's parental rights.

family law

This case involved a dispute among mineral co-tenants in Texas land where Clinton Manges held the executive rights to lease the minerals on behalf of himself and the Guerra family members, who owned a 46.6% interest. The Guerras sued Manges for breaching his fiduciary duty by leasing minerals to himself on unfair terms, failing to diligently lease to third parties, and encumbering the interests through various transactions, leading to a jury trial that awarded actual and exemplary damages, cancelled the self-lease, and removed Manges as executive. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation of the self-lease and the damage awards, including punitive damages based on findings of willful and malicious conduct, but reversed the removal of Manges from the executive role. The reasoning centered on the jury's supported findings that Manges breached fiduciary obligations supporting liability and damages, while the evidence did not justify complete removal of his executive authority under the deeds and agreements.

propertytorts & liability

In Painter v. Shaner, a candidate for Midland County Sheriff attempted to file his application and fee with the Republican county chairman by the statutory 6:00 p.m. deadline on February 6, 1984, but found the designated party office locked and the chairman unavailable out of town; after being directed to the chairman's remote location, he completed the filing after hours and was later informed it was untimely. The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief ordering the chairman and executive committee to place the candidate's name on the primary ballot. The court reasoned that a candidate who appears at the correct place with proper documents before the deadline but is prevented from filing by the official's absence or locked office is deemed to have filed timely, as the Election Code does not permit party officers to effectively shorten the filing period by failing to be available.

electionsprocedure

In Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, plaintiff Diane Steck sued her former employer Sakowitz for tortious interference with her employment contract after Sakowitz sent a letter to her new employer Oshman's citing a non-competition agreement and threatening legal action, resulting in her termination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sakowitz, the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court to affirm the trial court's judgment that Steck take nothing. The court held that Sakowitz established through summary judgment proof that its attorney sent the letter in good faith to protect its rights under the non-compete agreement without malice, and Steck failed to present controverting evidence showing lack of legal justification or excuse as required for a tortious interference claim. The opinion recognized a qualified privilege to interfere with a contract when done in the bona fide exercise of one's own rights, extending to the assertion or threatened assertion of those rights.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether an aviation liability insurance policy covered a fatal airplane crash near New Orleans. The insurer, United States Fire Insurance Company, sought a declaratory judgment that it owed nothing because the pilot, Ronald Marr, lacked an instrument rating and the flight involved instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. The trial court, based on a jury finding that Marr knew at takeoff he would encounter IFR weather, ruled for the insurer; the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial judgment, holding that the policy's pilot clause excludes coverage when the pilot knows at the inception of the flight that IFR conditions will be encountered, regardless of actual conditions later encountered.

business & regulatory

The case involved a real estate broker, Betty Leavell Realty Co., suing seller Grier H. Raggio for a commission after a contract for the sale of lots was terminated when the purchaser failed to secure financing within the required period. The trial court submitted a special jury issue that placed the burden of proof on the defendant to show the purchaser had not obtained financing and entered judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding error in the placement of the burden of proof on a condition precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that under Rule 54 the plaintiff bore the burden to prove compliance with the condition and that the defendant had preserved the objection to the erroneous charge.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

In Teer v. Duddlesten, plaintiffs sued the City of Bellaire and two other defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that a city zoning ordinance was invalid. Two defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in a final judgment that also favored the City even though the City had filed no motion, produced no evidence, and sought no relief. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that a summary judgment may be granted only in favor of a movant and that a final judgment disposing of all parties is improper when the record supports only a partial judgment with no severance. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings against the City.

procedureproperty

Earnest Gammage sued Litton Industrial Products after a defective ratchet adapter he used at work failed, causing serious injuries, and obtained a jury verdict on claims of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The trial court awarded $705,852 in actual damages and trebled that amount under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court held that Litton had not waived its challenges to the treble damages or the timing of the violation. The court reasoned that Litton's motion for judgment on actual damages alone was consistent with its position that the DTPA did not apply, and that the record contained no evidence the relevant act or practice occurred after the Act's May 21, 1973 effective date. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the actual damages but reversed the trebling and rendered judgment for actual damages only.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Alamo Lumber Company committed usury under Texas law by purchasing and extending Mrs. Gold's delinquent $75,000 note from a bank on the condition that she also assume and pay her son's separate open account debt to Alamo, resulting in two notes signed by Gold alone. The trial court found no usury and awarded Alamo judgment on both notes, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the transaction was usurious and imposing statutory penalties including forfeiture of principal and double interest. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals, ruling that the requirement to assume the third-party debt as a condition of the extension made that amount interest as to Gold, rendering the notes usurious regardless of the jury's finding on intent. The core reasoning was that such a tied assumption is not an independent collateral transaction and is treated as interest under precedent when a lender requires a borrower to pay a third party's debt.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a claim for workers' compensation benefits by Pamela Walters on behalf of Ivan Robert Justice after his father, Ivan Michael Justice, was fatally shot while accompanying his employer to a business meeting at the Dallas Airport Marina Hotel. The trial court awarded benefits based on the jury's determination that the death occurred in the course of employment, but the court of appeals reversed, finding insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the evidence and reasonable inferences were legally sufficient to support the jury's finding without relying on presumptions, and remanded the case for consideration of factual sufficiency. The court noted that the insurer had not preserved objections to the jury instructions or raised the statutory exclusion for personal-motivated assaults.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a quo warranto challenge by the State on behalf of the Spring Hill Utility District to the validity of four sequential annexation ordinances adopted by the City of Longview. The trial court upheld the annexation as valid, but the court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district had to be annexed in its entirety by a single ordinance. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding that state statutes required annexation of the entire district but did not mandate a single ordinance, and that Longview's sequential approach satisfied the adjacency, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and 90-day completion requirements.

propertyprocedure

This case involved an employee who received a workers’ compensation award for a workplace injury but filed a counterclaim against his employer alleging civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from interference with settlement of his claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the compensation award was the employee’s exclusive remedy, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar independent intentional tort claims that produce a separate injury, but that the employee’s pleadings failed to allege an unlawful overt act necessary for conspiracy; the Court further held that summary judgment cannot be used to dismiss a case for failure to state a cause of action without first allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend after special exceptions.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured when her foot slipped from a ladder while inspecting a roof; she sued the architect who designed the building and ladder under alternative theories of products liability for defective design and negligent design. The trial court submitted jury issues on defective design (with an approved instruction from Turner v. General Motors) and on negligence, without adding the plaintiff's requested instruction that her own negligence should not be considered in answering the defective design question; the jury found no liability on either theory, resulting in a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding the omitted instruction to be reversible error, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court reasoned that the requested instruction had no precedent in Texas products liability cases, would improperly deflect the jury's focus, was unnecessary and confusing, and failed to meet the requirements of Rule 277 for enabling a proper verdict, while the submitted issues followed established forms and precedent.

proceduretorts & liability

This products liability case arose when two maintenance workers were seriously burned in a fire while applying Con/Chem's primer inside a brewery storage tank; they sued on theories of both design defect and marketing defect (failure to warn). The trial court submitted only the marketing defect issues to the jury, which found for the defendant, leading to a take-nothing judgment that the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that no evidence supported a design defect claim. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs presented more than a scintilla of evidence on design defect through expert testimony showing that a safer, nonflammable alternative using water as the carrier was feasible at reasonable cost without impairing the product's utility. Under the risk-utility test from Turner v. General Motors and Boatland, this evidence of a safer alternative required submission of the design defect issues to the jury. The cause was remanded for a new trial.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether loans made by RepublicBank Dallas to a corporation formed by John L. Shook were usurious under Texas law, where the corporation was created solely so the bank could charge interest above the ten percent limit applicable to individual borrowers. Shook sued for double the interest paid, alleging he was the true borrower, while the bank counterclaimed for the unpaid principal, interest, and attorney fees. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the bank, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Shook on usury grounds, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, affirming the trial court's ruling that Shook take nothing and the bank recover on its claims. The court reasoned that the corporate exception to usury statutes permits incorporation to obtain a higher rate, as the parties followed the law meticulously rather than evading it, and that the bank's attorney fees were reasonable because defending against Shook's usury and related claims was necessary to collect on the note.

business & regulatory

The case was a Deceptive Trade Practices Act suit brought by Emma Jean Hurst against Sears after her home suffered soot damage from a heating and cooling unit that Sears had promised to install with proper city permits and inspections, which were never obtained. The jury found faulty installation and deceptive or unconscionable conduct by Sears, leading the trial court to award actual damages for property loss and pain and suffering, which were then trebled under the DTPA then in effect. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Sears could not have obtained the permits itself and that the special issues did not establish a per se deceptive practice or unconscionable conduct. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the representation about permits and inspections could support liability under the DTPA even if performance was impossible for Sears and that impossibility does not preclude a finding of unconscionability as a matter of law, then remanded for the court of appeals to assess the sufficiency of evidence on pain and suffering damages.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from the Texas Water Rights Commission's adjudication of water rights for 208 tracts along the Upper Guadalupe River under the 1967 Water Adjudication Act. The district court finalized the determination after exceptions, recognizing full riparian rights for domestic and livestock uses, no riparian rights for post-1895 grants, and limited irrigation rights based on actual 1963-1967 use; the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, upholding the Act against constitutional challenges while addressing conflicts with another case on the dual riparian-appropriation system in Texas water law. The core reasoning centered on the historical chaos in water rights, the Act's role in clarifying claims through administrative and judicial processes, and the validity of its review procedures.

environmentproperty

This case involved Joe E. Schero's challenge to the Texas Water Commission's adjudication of riparian water rights along the Llano River, which limited his claims based on land grants before and after 1895 and capped usage under the Adjudication Act to beneficial use during 1963-1967. Schero argued that the process violated separation of powers under the Texas Constitution, constituted an uncompensated taking, and denied due process. The trial court rejected these exceptions, the court of appeals partially affirmed and reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in full, upholding the constitutionality of the water rights adjudication statutes and the post-1895 reservation of ordinary stream flow to the state while recognizing Schero's limited pre-1895 rights to 88 acre-feet for irrigation. The decision relied on precedent from a related Guadalupe River basin adjudication sustaining the same statutory framework.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory