Clyde E. Smith

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which the State acquired a 50-by-680.55-foot strip of land (0.781 acre) from the Fullers for use as a frontage road alongside an expanded U.S. Highway 69. The sole issue at trial was the amount of just compensation, with the jury awarding $34,028 based on one expert's valuation assuming the land had highway frontage on the August 19, 1965, date of taking. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding error in the exclusion of the State's expert testimony that valued the land much lower by assuming no highway frontage due to the timing of highway construction and prior rulings on access rights. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that holding, reasoning that the excluded testimony was admissible because the case did not fall within recognized exceptions allowing landowners to benefit from project-related enhancements or uncertainty about whether the taking would occur, and the parties were not estopped by the earlier title dispute judgment.

propertyprocedure

This case was an original mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court brought by a licensed child-placement agency against a district judge. The agency challenged a trial court order that required it, under Rule 106 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, to forward citation and an adoption petition to the prospective adoptive parents with whom it had placed a child. The underlying adoption suit had been filed by the child's great-uncle and great-aunt after the natural mother's death, seeking to restrain any adoption and to obtain information about the child's location. The court held that the district judge lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners had no standing to bring the adoption action, rendering the service order void, and therefore directed the judge not to enforce it. The reasoning centered on the impropriety of using an unauthorized adoption proceeding to circumvent statutory confidentiality protections for child-placement records.

family lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1967 car collision between Nabers Price and O. Dean Couch. Price's insurer, Motors Insurance Company, paid for repairs, received a partial subrogation assignment of the property damage claim, and later filed suit against Couch in Price's name. Couch had previously sued Price and obtained a judgment, leading the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals to grant summary judgment against Motors on grounds that Texas law prohibits splitting personal injury and property damage claims from the same accident and that Rule 97(a) required Motors to intervene in the first suit as a compulsory counterclaim. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Rule 97(a) imposes no duty on a non-party subrogee-insurer to intervene in a suit brought by the opposing driver against the insured and that prior precedent did not bar the insurer's claim under these facts.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a bank suing borrowers on multiple promissory notes totaling about $600,000 and seeking foreclosure on a deed of trust securing a $30,000 note on 396 acres of land; the deed contained a broad 'dragnet' clause covering all other debts owed by the borrowers to the bank. The borrowers argued that the parties had orally agreed the lien would secure only the $30,000 note and sought to introduce parol evidence or reform the deed based on mutual mistake, but the trial court excluded the evidence, directed a verdict for the bank, and entered judgment for the full amount with foreclosure. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the written dragnet clause was unambiguous, parol evidence could not vary its terms, and reformation was unavailable because there was no clear evidence the clause resulted from mutual mistake—particularly since one borrower admitted he had not read the deed before signing. The court further upheld the trial court's discretion in denying a recess motion.

business & regulatoryproperty

This was a workmen's compensation case in which plaintiff Robert Landry sought benefits for an alleged back injury from an accident, with his claim resting primarily on his own testimony and that of his doctor. The trial court excluded evidence of Landry's five-year-old felony conviction involving moral turpitude as too remote for impeachment purposes, entered judgment for the plaintiff on the jury verdict, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that exclusion was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, holding that admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment turns on case-specific circumstances rather than a fixed time limit and that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the conviction too remote here.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Zellars against his personal insurer Allstate to determine the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify him in a pending lawsuit by the Bama Company arising from a collision between a Bama vehicle and a truck owned by Zellars's employer, Humble Pipe Line Company, which Zellars was driving. Allstate brought Humble into the suit, arguing that Humble as a self-insurer under the Texas Safety Responsibility Act had the primary duty to defend and indemnify Zellars. The court followed precedent holding that an employer's self-insurer status does not qualify as other valid and collectible insurance that would render Allstate's coverage excess only. The court also held that Zellars's policy limited property damage liability to $5,000 and did not double that limit due to coverage for non-owned vehicles, reforming the judgment on that point while otherwise affirming.

business & regulatorytorts & liability