Clyde E. Smith

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which the State acquired a 50-by-680.55-foot strip of land (0.781 acre) from the Fullers for use as a frontage road alongside an expanded U.S. Highway 69. The sole issue at trial was the amount of just compensation, with the jury awarding $34,028 based on one expert's valuation assuming the land had highway frontage on the August 19, 1965, date of taking. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding error in the exclusion of the State's expert testimony that valued the land much lower by assuming no highway frontage due to the timing of highway construction and prior rulings on access rights. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that holding, reasoning that the excluded testimony was admissible because the case did not fall within recognized exceptions allowing landowners to benefit from project-related enhancements or uncertainty about whether the taking would occur, and the parties were not estopped by the earlier title dispute judgment.

propertyprocedure

This case was an original mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court brought by a licensed child-placement agency against a district judge. The agency challenged a trial court order that required it, under Rule 106 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, to forward citation and an adoption petition to the prospective adoptive parents with whom it had placed a child. The underlying adoption suit had been filed by the child's great-uncle and great-aunt after the natural mother's death, seeking to restrain any adoption and to obtain information about the child's location. The court held that the district judge lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners had no standing to bring the adoption action, rendering the service order void, and therefore directed the judge not to enforce it. The reasoning centered on the impropriety of using an unauthorized adoption proceeding to circumvent statutory confidentiality protections for child-placement records.

family lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1967 car collision between Nabers Price and O. Dean Couch. Price's insurer, Motors Insurance Company, paid for repairs, received a partial subrogation assignment of the property damage claim, and later filed suit against Couch in Price's name. Couch had previously sued Price and obtained a judgment, leading the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals to grant summary judgment against Motors on grounds that Texas law prohibits splitting personal injury and property damage claims from the same accident and that Rule 97(a) required Motors to intervene in the first suit as a compulsory counterclaim. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Rule 97(a) imposes no duty on a non-party subrogee-insurer to intervene in a suit brought by the opposing driver against the insured and that prior precedent did not bar the insurer's claim under these facts.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a bank suing borrowers on multiple promissory notes totaling about $600,000 and seeking foreclosure on a deed of trust securing a $30,000 note on 396 acres of land; the deed contained a broad 'dragnet' clause covering all other debts owed by the borrowers to the bank. The borrowers argued that the parties had orally agreed the lien would secure only the $30,000 note and sought to introduce parol evidence or reform the deed based on mutual mistake, but the trial court excluded the evidence, directed a verdict for the bank, and entered judgment for the full amount with foreclosure. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the written dragnet clause was unambiguous, parol evidence could not vary its terms, and reformation was unavailable because there was no clear evidence the clause resulted from mutual mistake—particularly since one borrower admitted he had not read the deed before signing. The court further upheld the trial court's discretion in denying a recess motion.

business & regulatoryproperty

This was a workmen's compensation case in which plaintiff Robert Landry sought benefits for an alleged back injury from an accident, with his claim resting primarily on his own testimony and that of his doctor. The trial court excluded evidence of Landry's five-year-old felony conviction involving moral turpitude as too remote for impeachment purposes, entered judgment for the plaintiff on the jury verdict, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that exclusion was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court, holding that admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment turns on case-specific circumstances rather than a fixed time limit and that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the conviction too remote here.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Zellars against his personal insurer Allstate to determine the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify him in a pending lawsuit by the Bama Company arising from a collision between a Bama vehicle and a truck owned by Zellars's employer, Humble Pipe Line Company, which Zellars was driving. Allstate brought Humble into the suit, arguing that Humble as a self-insurer under the Texas Safety Responsibility Act had the primary duty to defend and indemnify Zellars. The court followed precedent holding that an employer's self-insurer status does not qualify as other valid and collectible insurance that would render Allstate's coverage excess only. The court also held that Zellars's policy limited property damage liability to $5,000 and did not double that limit due to coverage for non-owned vehicles, reforming the judgment on that point while otherwise affirming.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, Mary Lou Busby sued her ex-husband Earl E. Busby to partition U.S. Air Force disability retirement benefits that had not been addressed in their 1963 divorce decree. The trial court ruled in favor of the husband that the ex-wife take nothing, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and awarded her half of the benefits, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed. The court held that the benefits constituted community property because the husband's eligibility for retirement pay accrued as an earned property right during the marriage based on his years of military service. It relied on prior precedent treating such retirement interests as earnings under Texas community property law rather than separate property or a gratuity.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over whether inheritance taxes were due on funds in a joint bank account with right of survivorship after one owner's death. Maurice Wallrath sued for a refund of taxes paid on accounts he had funded entirely, which became his sole property upon his sister Virginia's death. The Texas Supreme Court held that the surviving joint owner did not acquire a taxable interest under the inheritance tax statute, as the interest vested at the time the account was created rather than as a transfer at death. The decision relied on the legal attributes of joint tenancy, where the survivor takes full title by contract, and noted that any tax loophole would require legislative action rather than judicial expansion of the tax.

taxesproperty

This case was a declaratory judgment action filed by the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania to cancel a liability insurance policy issued to Larry Dean Koestler and to declare no duty to defend or indemnify his estate in a negligence suit arising from an auto collision. The company alleged material false statements in the application about Koestler's prior accidents and moving violations within the preceding 36 months, which breached express warranties in the policy that conditioned coverage on the truth of those representations. Defendants countered that the insurer's agent knew the correct information, so knowledge was imputed and the company was estopped from voiding the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring the policy void from inception, which the Court of Civil Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the policy explicitly stated it was issued in reliance on the declarations' truth, that agent knowledge would not waive or alter terms, and that the insured was bound by the false statements in the attached application.

business & regulatory

This case arose from a vehicle collision on a Texas highway in which plaintiff George King sued defendant J.S. Skelly for personal injuries. A jury found for King and the trial court entered judgment for $55,000 in damages, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that the damage issue for future loss of earning capacity lacked sufficient evidentiary support because King had not introduced proof of his own prior earnings. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that holding, ruling that evidence of the wages a pipeline welder could earn ($14,000–$17,000 per year) together with King's testimony about his pre-injury ability to perform that work supplied an adequate monetary measure of earning capacity under the rule reaffirmed in Bonney v. San Antonio Transit Co.; the court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a late trial amendment on an emergency defense and that Skelly's remaining jurisdictional points lacked merit. The cause was remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals to consider the unaddressed points on excessiveness of the verdict and sufficiency of the evidence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by Sheila Rutledge (later Voyles) and her husband against East Texas Theatres, Inc. for personal injuries sustained when an unidentified patron threw a bottle from the balcony during a midnight movie, striking her on the head. The jury found the theater negligent in failing to remove "rowdy persons" whose intermittent hollering and minor disturbances (such as throwing paper cups) occurred during the show, and it awarded $31,250 in damages; the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals upheld the verdict. The Texas Supreme Court reversed both lower courts and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing. The court held there was no probative evidence of proximate cause, as the disturbances had ceased before the incident, no specific individuals were identified as rowdy, and any causal link between the theater's inaction and the bottle throwing was purely speculative without proof of cause in fact or foreseeability.

torts & liability

This case involved building contractors who submitted an erroneously low bid for constructing additions to college library and science buildings, then notified the Board of Regents of the mistake before the contract was signed; after negotiations, the parties executed a written contract for the bid amount but the Board passed a conditional resolution to pay an extra $17,000 to cover part of the error. The contractors sued for a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to the additional sum due to the remediable mistake. The trial court ruled for the Board that the extra payment could not legally be made, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed in favor of the contractors, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed again, affirming the trial court judgment. The Court held that the final written contract specifically covered the disputed masonry work at the bid price, making any prior conditional agreement for extra payment inconsistent and barred by the parol evidence rule, so the extrinsic negotiations had no legal effect.

business & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit by customer Luisa Briones against Levine's Department Store after she tripped backward over a power lawn mower displayed in an aisle and fell while shopping. In the second trial, the jury found that the store had placed the mower in a location that created a danger to customers and that this placement was negligent and a proximate cause of the fall, but also found the mower was not concealed or hidden. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the defense verdict, holding that the danger was open and obvious so the store owed no duty to warn or protect the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment for the defendant on a ground raised but not addressed below.

torts & liability

This case involved a petition by the paternal grandmother and her husband to adopt four minor children without the consent of their natural mother, Joan Bauman, under a Texas statute allowing adoption without consent if a parent has failed to contribute to the children's support for two years commensurate with their ability. The trial court granted the adoption based on evidence that neither parent had provided direct financial support after the children moved into the petitioners' home in 1964. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the mother's arrangement for the children to live with the petitioners meant she had not failed to contribute to their support within the meaning of the statute, and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed that reversal. The core reasoning was that the statute's support exception to the consent requirement was not met where the mother had facilitated the children's placement with supportive relatives, even without her own direct contributions.

family law

This case involved a bill of review action by Gordon Knox Oil and Exploration Company seeking to set aside a default garnishment judgment obtained in the name of Texas Machinery and Equipment Company, a corporation whose charter had been forfeited after assigning its assets, based on a prior judgment against Frank Montgomery. The trial court and court of civil appeals held the garnishment judgment void due to the nonexistence of the corporation and granted relief. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, ruling that the judgment was not void because the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, and assignees may continue suits or issue processes like garnishment in the assignor's name without creating a jurisdictional defect. The court further held that the respondent failed to demonstrate sufficient cause under bill of review standards to set aside the default, as the garnishment proceeding was between parties in actual litigation and no adequate excuse for the failure to answer was shown.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved relators, members of a labor union, who were held in contempt of court and jailed for three days for allegedly violating a temporary restraining order that prohibited them from striking or picketing Texaco, Inc. before the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement. The relators sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Texas Supreme Court, arguing they were denied due process. The court granted the writ and discharged the relators, ruling that they had not received proper notice of the specific charges against them as required for constructive contempt proceedings. Due process demands that the accused be informed of when, how, and by what means they violated the order, which was not provided here through service of the affidavits or other means.

labor & employmentprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a condemnation action by the State of Texas and the City of Marshall to acquire a 0.207-acre strip of land owned by G.A. Walker and related parties for widening Highway 59, along with portions of buildings located partly on the remainder of the tract. A jury found the market value of the taken land considered as severed land to be $47,652 and the market value of the remainder to have decreased from $49,350 to $30,500 after the taking, resulting in a damages judgment for the landowners. The court reversed the judgments below and remanded for a new trial, holding that the value of the land taken must be determined solely on evidence of its market value considered as severed land, separate from any increase or decrease in the value of the remaining property, and that evidence of business profits from the remainder should be excluded.

property

In this case, National Homes Corporation sued Lloyd and Lowell Blume individually, along with Linton Building Co. (a corporation) and another party, to recover an unpaid balance of nearly $5,000 plus attorney's fees under a 1961 Dealer Sales Agreement and a related personal guaranty signed by the Blumes. The underlying agreement was originally with the Blumes' partnership doing business as Linton Building Company; after the partnership incorporated, the Blumes did not notify National of the change, and sales continued. A jury found the Blumes had failed to give notice, and the trial court entered judgment against the Blumes and the corporation for the debt and $2,000 in fees; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to the principal debt, holding that the guaranty bound the Blumes to cover the obligations because the agreement made the named dealer responsible for any related organization and the lack of notice kept the original parties liable, but reversed the award of attorney's fees, finding no contractual or statutory basis for them.

business & regulatory

The case involved Dorothy Hollins and her husband suing Pioneer Bus Company for damages from a bus collision, then adding claims against Houston City Lines and Rapid Transit Lines after Pioneer allegedly fraudulently transferred its assets to them. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim, reasoning that holders of unliquidated tort claims must first obtain a liquidated judgment before challenging such transfers, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 24.02 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, a creditor or interested person may seek to void a transfer intended to delay, hinder, or defraud them even before reducing an unliquidated claim to judgment, as the statute's language covers those who may become entitled to relief. The court noted that the plaintiffs raised fact issues regarding the transferees' notice of any fraudulent intent and that the consideration for the transfer was not conclusively shown. The cause was remanded for further proceedings.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a car collision on a Texas highway where Jess Satterfield was injured while riding as a passenger in his own vehicle, driven by his son Charles, after both Charles and the other driver were found negligent by a jury. The trial court ruled that Jess and Charles were in a joint enterprise, imputing Charles's negligence to Jess and barring recovery from the other driver, but allowed Jess to recover damages from Charles for ordinary negligence. The key issue was whether Jess qualified as a "guest" under the Texas guest statute (Article 6701b), which limits liability for ordinary negligence in cases of gratuitous transportation. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the statute did not apply because Jess was riding in his own car, not being transported as a guest by its owner or operator, and affirmed the judgment in his favor against Charles while denying contribution claims. The decision turned on the statutory language requiring transportation "by the owner or operator" and distinguished prior cases involving owner-operators.

torts & liability