Zollie Steakley

The case involved a dispute between homeowner Roland Smith and builder Alan Baldwin over a contract to construct a house financed in part by a Veteran's Administration loan. Baldwin sued on the contract and note after Smith ordered him off the property due to delays and defects, while Smith counterclaimed under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act alleging misrepresentations that the house would meet VA inspection standards for permanent financing. The trial court awarded Smith damages under the DTPA, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that the unchallenged finding of substantial performance barred the statutory claim. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed that decision, holding that the doctrine of substantial performance does not preclude liability under DTPA section 17.46(b)(7) for misrepresentations about the quality or standard of goods or services, as the statute contains no such defense and must be liberally construed to protect consumers. The court distinguished the DTPA misrepresentation claim from ordinary contract-breach allegations and rendered judgment reinstating the trial court's DTPA award.

business & regulatory

In Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., the plaintiff sued the seller of concentrated sulfuric acid for personal injuries sustained when a glass container broke, alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Texas UCC § 2.314. The suit was filed more than two years but within four years after the accident, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions applied and that the plaintiff lacked privity. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that a personal-injury claim based on breach of an implied warranty under the UCC is governed by the Code’s four-year limitations period rather than the general tort statute, regardless of the absence of direct privity between the injured party and the seller.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Lodge, companion cases presented the question of whether the mootness doctrine bars appeals from orders for temporary involuntary commitment to a mental hospital for up to 90 days under the Texas Mental Health Code. The Supreme Court of Texas held that such appeals are not precluded by mootness, disagreeing with the Austin Court of Civil Appeals and aligning with the San Antonio court's view. The court reasoned that the short duration of temporary commitments, combined with statutory provisions allowing discharge at any time and requiring prior temporary hospitalization for indefinite commitments, would routinely prevent effective appellate review if mootness applied, contrary to the legislative purpose of providing a viable appeal process. It referenced exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including collateral consequences and matters capable of repetition yet evading review, while noting that advisory opinions on abstract questions remain impermissible.

procedurecivil rights

This case is a divorce proceeding between Marilyn O’Neill Mann and Horace Manning Mann, focused on the division of their marital estate under Texas Family Code § 3.63 and the appointment of a Master and Co-master in Chancery to handle complex property valuation and characterization issues. The trial court granted the divorce, divided the community property by ordering the husband to pay the wife $24,000 plus attorney fees, and assessed the masters’ fees against the husband. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the property division but reversed the fee assessment; the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full, holding that the division was not manifestly unfair so as to constitute an abuse of discretion and that the trial court had discretion to appoint masters in this exceptional case and allocate their reasonable costs. The Court’s jurisdiction arose from a disagreement on a question of law between the Court of Civil Appeals judges.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved the Texas Prosecutors Coordinating Council seeking to remove Criminal District Attorney Oscar McInnis from office under Article 332d for alleged pre-reelection misconduct including perjury and conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the suit under Article 5986, which bars removal for acts before an officer's election, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Texas Supreme Court held that the enactment of Article 332d preempted the prior removal procedures and the application of Article 5986, allowing the removal proceeding to go forward on the merits.

criminal lawprocedureelections

This case concerned whether an engineering firm could claim a statutory mechanics’ lien on land owned by private developers for services performed under a contract with a public utility district that encompassed but did not own the land. The trial court granted summary judgment to the developers, ruling no liens existed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed in part, finding fact issues on the statutory lien claim. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that holding and affirmed the trial court, concluding that Article 5452 requires a contract with the owner or its agent and that the district, as a governmental body created under the Water Code, was neither; moreover, public policy embodied in Article 5160 precludes liens on public improvements, leaving contractors to rely on payment bonds or suits against the district for the debt.

propertyprocedure