Zollie Steakley

The case involved a dispute between homeowner Roland Smith and builder Alan Baldwin over a contract to construct a house financed in part by a Veteran's Administration loan. Baldwin sued on the contract and note after Smith ordered him off the property due to delays and defects, while Smith counterclaimed under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act alleging misrepresentations that the house would meet VA inspection standards for permanent financing. The trial court awarded Smith damages under the DTPA, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed on the ground that the unchallenged finding of substantial performance barred the statutory claim. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed that decision, holding that the doctrine of substantial performance does not preclude liability under DTPA section 17.46(b)(7) for misrepresentations about the quality or standard of goods or services, as the statute contains no such defense and must be liberally construed to protect consumers. The court distinguished the DTPA misrepresentation claim from ordinary contract-breach allegations and rendered judgment reinstating the trial court's DTPA award.

business & regulatory

In Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., the plaintiff sued the seller of concentrated sulfuric acid for personal injuries sustained when a glass container broke, alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Texas UCC § 2.314. The suit was filed more than two years but within four years after the accident, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions applied and that the plaintiff lacked privity. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that a personal-injury claim based on breach of an implied warranty under the UCC is governed by the Code’s four-year limitations period rather than the general tort statute, regardless of the absence of direct privity between the injured party and the seller.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Lodge, companion cases presented the question of whether the mootness doctrine bars appeals from orders for temporary involuntary commitment to a mental hospital for up to 90 days under the Texas Mental Health Code. The Supreme Court of Texas held that such appeals are not precluded by mootness, disagreeing with the Austin Court of Civil Appeals and aligning with the San Antonio court's view. The court reasoned that the short duration of temporary commitments, combined with statutory provisions allowing discharge at any time and requiring prior temporary hospitalization for indefinite commitments, would routinely prevent effective appellate review if mootness applied, contrary to the legislative purpose of providing a viable appeal process. It referenced exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including collateral consequences and matters capable of repetition yet evading review, while noting that advisory opinions on abstract questions remain impermissible.

procedurecivil rights

This case is a divorce proceeding between Marilyn O’Neill Mann and Horace Manning Mann, focused on the division of their marital estate under Texas Family Code § 3.63 and the appointment of a Master and Co-master in Chancery to handle complex property valuation and characterization issues. The trial court granted the divorce, divided the community property by ordering the husband to pay the wife $24,000 plus attorney fees, and assessed the masters’ fees against the husband. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the property division but reversed the fee assessment; the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full, holding that the division was not manifestly unfair so as to constitute an abuse of discretion and that the trial court had discretion to appoint masters in this exceptional case and allocate their reasonable costs. The Court’s jurisdiction arose from a disagreement on a question of law between the Court of Civil Appeals judges.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved the Texas Prosecutors Coordinating Council seeking to remove Criminal District Attorney Oscar McInnis from office under Article 332d for alleged pre-reelection misconduct including perjury and conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the suit under Article 5986, which bars removal for acts before an officer's election, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. The Texas Supreme Court held that the enactment of Article 332d preempted the prior removal procedures and the application of Article 5986, allowing the removal proceeding to go forward on the merits.

criminal lawprocedureelections

This case concerned whether an engineering firm could claim a statutory mechanics’ lien on land owned by private developers for services performed under a contract with a public utility district that encompassed but did not own the land. The trial court granted summary judgment to the developers, ruling no liens existed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed in part, finding fact issues on the statutory lien claim. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that holding and affirmed the trial court, concluding that Article 5452 requires a contract with the owner or its agent and that the district, as a governmental body created under the Water Code, was neither; moreover, public policy embodied in Article 5160 precludes liens on public improvements, leaving contractors to rely on payment bonds or suits against the district for the debt.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by the Texas Alarm and Signal Association to a Public Utility Commission order authorizing Southwestern Bell to increase overall revenues by about $124.5 million and adjust its rate structure, including higher tariffs for private line services used by alarm companies to transmit signals. The association intervened in the Commission proceedings and later sued in district court to set aside the order, arguing primarily against the private line rate design that rejected distance-sensitive pricing. The district court upheld the Commission's order, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, concluding that the rate structure was reasonable, based on sound ratemaking principles including the value-of-service concept, equitable across customer classes, and not unreasonably discriminatory or preferential.

business & regulatory

The case involved the estate of Maggie Dove Littell, where the administrator bank sued her nephew A.E. Moore to recover funds and property he obtained from her accounts and jewelry during her final years of incapacity. The trial court found Moore had breached his fiduciary duties and ordered him to return unaccounted funds plus exemplary damages, a ruling partially modified on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the intermediate appeals court and upheld the trial judgment, based on jury findings that certain account transfers were not intended as gifts and evidence that Moore failed to account for all funds received under his power of attorney.

propertyfamily lawproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a surviving ex-wife's attempt to collect unpaid court-ordered child support from the estate of her deceased former husband, who had failed to make weekly payments for their three children as required by a 1960 divorce decree. The trial court awarded her the arrearages plus attorney fees under Section 14.09(c) of the Texas Family Code, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that child support obligations are personal and cannot survive the obligor's death. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that ruling, concluding that the Family Code provision allows unpaid support to be reduced to a judgment after the parent's death and enforced against the estate in the same manner as other judgments, consistent with its earlier decision in Smith v. Bramhall; on rehearing, the court remanded the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to address additional unresolved points.

family law

This case involved a dispute over which of two wills of the deceased John Richard Lucik should be probated, pitting his widow against another principal beneficiary, with competing applications consolidated in the Probate Court of Dallas County. The Probate Court issued a temporary injunction requiring the delivery of estate assets to a temporary administrator and restraining their dissipation or transfer by the opposing beneficiary. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction because the injunction was not a matter incident to an estate. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the protection of potential estate assets from dissipation or transfer directly bears on the collection and distribution of properties and thus qualifies as a matter incident to an estate under the applicable probate statutes, falling within the court's injunctive authority.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a group of janitorial workers employed by Tarrant County who were terminated when county officials replaced the civil service custodial system with an independent contractor arrangement projected to save approximately $220,000 over two years. The workers sought a declaration that the terminations were invalid and demanded reinstatement with back pay, arguing that the change was not made in good faith and violated public policy protecting merit-system employees from political control. The trial court and court of civil appeals ruled in favor of the workers, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county officials had not abused their discretion because the record showed a legitimate purpose of achieving substantial economies in government operations. The court distinguished its earlier decision in City of San Antonio v. Wallace, where no economy motive was asserted, and concluded that civil service positions may be abolished for cost-saving reasons even if the county remains financially able to continue the prior system.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether $15,000 in military readjustment benefits received by Roberto Perez upon his involuntary release from active Army duty were community property under Texas law, subject to division with his former wife Marian, from whom he was divorced in 1970. The trial court and court of civil appeals held that a portion of the benefits constituted community property acquired during the marriage and awarded Marian $2,916.66. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the benefits were not community property. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the governing federal statute, 10 U.S.C. § 687, showed Congress intended the payments as an unearned gratuity to aid readjustment to civilian life rather than as earned wages or severance pay, which aligned with classifying them as separate property under Texas family code provisions governing gifts and similar acquisitions.

family lawpropertyfederal power

The case involved Warren H. Smith and his wife seeking rescission of their purchase of a lakefront lot from National Resort Communities, Inc., alleging the lot was unsuitable for residential use due to being entirely below the 715-foot contour line and subject to flooding under an easement held by the Lower Colorado River Authority, a fact not disclosed by the seller. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' take-nothing judgments and rendered judgment for the Smiths, ordering rescission and restitution of the purchase price plus interest. The court reasoned that a seller of real estate has a duty to disclose material facts affecting the property's suitability for its intended use when those facts are not discoverable through ordinary care and diligence by the buyer, and here the non-disclosure justified rescission.

property

This case involved a strict products liability claim by Robert Turner against General Motors after his 1969 Chevrolet Impala rolled over, causing the roof to collapse and resulting in his paralysis; the suit alleged that the roof's design was defective and uncrashworthy, enhancing his injuries even though it did not cause the initial accident. The trial court entered judgment for Turner based on a jury finding that the roof was defectively designed under a definition of 'unreasonably dangerous' drawn from prior precedent, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that a more specific multi-factor balancing instruction was required in crashworthiness design-defect cases and that certain post-manufacture federal standards evidence should have been admitted. On review, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its earlier opinion and held that the proper jury submission in design-defect strict liability cases is whether the product was 'unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use,' expressly overruling the bifurcated definition from General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. The court further addressed the admissibility of industry and federal standards evidence and clarified that conscious design cases remain subject to strict liability rather than being treated solely as negligence claims. The decision focused on establishing a uniform, balanced approach to instructing juries on design defects without requiring case-specific factor lists.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a state-chartered bank's application to amend its articles of association by moving its domicile from Hearne in Robertson County to College Station in Brazos County and changing its name, which was opposed by four existing banks in the Bryan-College Station area. The State Banking Board approved the application by a 2-1 vote, the trial court set aside the approval on appeal, and the court of civil appeals reinstated the Board's order; the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court. The court held that a domicile change must be approved in the same manner as an original charter under the banking statutes and rules, requiring proof of public necessity for the proposed location while accounting for the necessity already found for the bank's original location, and that the Board's decision violated procedural requirements because not all voting members had read the administrative record.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over coverage under two major medical insurance policies issued by Trinity National Life and Accident Insurance Company to Thomas C. Bomar, which included his daughter as a dependent. The policies defined dependent children as unmarried and under a certain age (later endorsed to 24), with coverage terminating upon marriage, but after the daughter married in 1976 and incurred hospitalization expenses in 1977, the insurer denied the claim despite having accepted renewal premiums. The trial court ruled for the father and daughter, holding the marriage-termination provision ineffective under Texas Insurance Code Articles 3.70-4 and 3.70-7, while the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and affirmed the trial court's award of $13,457.34, reasoning that the statute's requirement for continued coverage applied because the policy established a termination date upon marriage (an "or otherwise" event beyond age limits) and premiums had been accepted afterward.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

Expo Chemical sued its former employee Joan Brooks, now working for a competitor, alleging she was improperly using the company's customer lists and product reference cards, which it claimed were trade secrets, and sought a temporary injunction along with other relief. The trial court denied the temporary injunction after a hearing. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded after addressing the merits of the trade secret claims. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's denial, ruling that appellate review of a temporary injunction order is strictly limited to whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in deciding whether to preserve the status quo pending a full trial on the merits, and that the lower appellate court had improperly reached the underlying claims prematurely. The record showed factual disputes over the availability of the information and insufficient evidence of irreparable injury.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Manuel Hurtado against Texas Employers' Insurance Association, in which Hurtado alleged total incapacity from a back injury sustained at work or, alternatively, from the aggravation of his pre-existing arthritis and other conditions. The jury found that Hurtado suffered a work-related injury but that it was not a producing cause of total incapacity, leading the trial court to deny benefits; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the entirety of Hurtado's voluminous medical records over his objections. The records contained hearsay, opinions, and other inadmissible material, and the insurer offered them wholesale primarily to show the absence of any recorded history of the claimed injury; the court reasoned that the proponent bore the burden of identifying admissible portions rather than shifting it to the opponent to seek redactions, and that the full admission improperly allowed the jury to infer that pre-existing conditions alone caused any incapacity.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a 35-acre tract of land and its improvements, acquired by the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority for treating industrial waste, was exempt from property taxes imposed by Harris County and the Pasadena Independent School District. The Authority sought a declaration of tax exemption, while the taxing authorities counterclaimed for unpaid taxes. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the property was not exempt, ruling that the Facilities Agreement and Special Warranty Deed did not transfer exclusive ownership to the Authority as required by the Texas Constitution and enabling statutes. The court reasoned that the arrangements provided significant benefits and control to private industrial participants, meaning the property was not devoted exclusively to public purposes.

taxesproperty

Santiago Gonzales sued Caterpillar Tractor Company after falling from a step on a Model 941 Traxcavator tractor, alleging the step was defectively designed and negligently designed because it lacked antiskid material, accumulated mud, was hard to see, and required the operator to lean away from the vehicle. A jury found for Gonzales on both defective design (producing cause) and negligent design (proximate cause), awarding damages, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Caterpillar on no-evidence grounds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and remanded, holding that more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury findings, including Caterpillar's internal design guidelines requiring antiskid surfaces and minimization of debris accumulation, the lack of safety testing, and testimony that mud from the tracks fell on the step and that operators had to kick a foothold. The court noted the appeals court had not reached factual-sufficiency points, which remain for that court's consideration.

torts & liability