James P. Wallace

Farm workers sued the Texas Employment Commission challenging the agricultural exemption in the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act as unconstitutional under the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, which denied them unemployment benefits. The trial court granted declaratory relief finding the exemption unconstitutional and awarded reasonable attorney's fees but held sovereign immunity barred the fees; after the Legislature amended the Act to provide phased-in coverage, the court of appeals deemed the claims moot and upheld the denial of fees. The court held the case was not moot due to the live controversy over attorney's fees and costs, that Chapter 106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes fees and costs against the State for violations involving denial of benefits or participation in state programs, and that the injunction was improper because no ripe controversy existed; it therefore awarded $36,810 in fees and assessed all costs against the State.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a dispute over the termination of a sublease for commercial office space following the failure of the original bank lessor. H.L. Brown subleased space from First National Bank of Midland under agreements that included a Termination Agreement granting him the right to end the lease with 30 days' notice, and a Sublease. After the FDIC transferred assets to RepublicBank, Brown attempted to terminate, but the bank sued for unpaid rent. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments in favor of the bank, holding that the Termination Agreement and Sublease should be read together, incorporating the termination right into the sublease based on the parties' intent. The court rendered judgment for Brown without addressing mitigation of damages.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by Anthony Cropper against Caterpillar Tractor Company after Cropper was injured operating a water wagon that struck metal tracks, leading to a jury verdict awarding damages on negligence and products liability claims while finding no contributory negligence by Cropper. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the jury's failure to find contributory negligence was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The Texas Supreme Court held that courts of appeals have constitutional authority under Article V, Section 6 to review such "failure to find" determinations in the same manner as affirmative jury findings and to remand for new trial when warranted. The Court further concluded that this review power does not violate the right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 15, drawing on the constitution's grant of appellate jurisdiction and historical precedent recognizing appellate review of fact questions. The decision addressed the scope of intermediate appellate courts' fact-review authority without resolving the underlying sufficiency of evidence in this specific case.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Fifth Court of Appeals retained authority to decide a timely second motion for rehearing filed by Doctors Hospital after the opposing party had already filed an application for writ of error in the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals continued to have jurisdiction over the motion and was required to rule on it before the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction over the points raised therein. The core reasoning was that Texas appellate rules and precedent require a motion for rehearing to be filed and overruled in the intermediate court before higher-court review is available, and that allowing one party to cut off the other's rehearing right by filing first would arbitrarily deny access to appellate review protected by the Texas Constitution. The Court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief to compel a ruling and overruled conflicting prior authority.

procedure

This case was a Deceptive Trade Practices Act dispute arising from Kelly Joe Walters' purchase of a pickup truck from W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. Walters traded in his vehicle after the dealer represented the truck as a 1982 model, but it was actually a 1981 model, leading to financing issues and mechanical problems; he sued after the dealer refused to unwind the deal and had already sold the trade-in. The trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the dealer, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment on the jury verdict finding misrepresentation and damages, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court to affirm the trial court's take-nothing judgment. The court held that Walters failed to meet his burden of proving actual damages, which under the DTPA must be measured by either the out-of-pocket rule (difference between value parted with and value received) or the benefit-of-the-bargain rule (difference between value as represented and value received), and he had not requested proper jury issues on those measures.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a mandamus action by the Public Utility Commission of Texas against a district judge who had ordered the Attorney General to choose between representing the PUC or the State Purchasing and General Services Commission in an appeal from a telephone rate decision, due to a perceived conflict of interest from dual representation. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Attorney General must represent both agencies as required by the Public Utility Regulatory Act and the State Purchasing and General Services Act. The core reasoning was that the statutes unambiguously mandate the Attorney General's representation of each agency in court proceedings, and there was no evidence of collusion or other impropriety that would justify the trial court's exercise of inherent power to bar dual representation. The court concluded that the judge abused his discretion by overriding the legislative directives.

procedurebusiness & regulatory